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ABSTRACT 
 
“A DAINGEROUS LIBERTY”: MOHAWK-DUTCH RELATIONS AND THE COLONIAL 
GUNPOWDER TRADE, 1534-1665 
By 
Shaun Sayres  
University of New Hampshire, May, 2018  
  
This thesis examines seventeenth-century Mohawk-Dutch relations through the lens of 
the colonial gunpowder trade. Looking through the eyes of cultural brokers such as Arent van 
Curler or Saggodryochta, it argues the Dutch colonies of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck 
and the Mohawk Nation of the Haudenosaunee formed a symbiotic relationship that significantly 
altered the geopolitical landscape of eastern North America in the seventeenth century. As time 
wore on, and neighboring European colonies and Indian nations grew stronger, the Mohawks and 
Dutch grew increasingly dependent on one another for survival. These Mohawk-Dutch 
encounters and negotiations, dictated by the need for gunpowder and pelts, reveal a distinct arc 
of intertwined fates, outlining their shared rise, peak, and decline within a world embroiled in 
conflict. As a result of perpetual mourning wars, and a colony plagued with indigenous conflicts, 
New Netherland never possessed adequate stores of guns, powder, and shot to defend itself from 
invasion or fuel endless Mohawk conquests. The Mohawks survived, but the Dutch did not, 
relinquishing New Netherland to the English without a shot in 1664.  
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“We are joined together with chains.” 
 
On an early summer day in 1689, an embassy of Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida 
sachems treated the Albany magistrates of colonial New York to a rich oration of 
Haudenosaunee history. They had come to “Renew the old Covenant” with the English, first 
“made with Jacques many years ago who came with a Ship into their Waters” and recorded them 
as “Bretheren.”1 The Five Nations wanted this “Governor Called Jacques” to establish himself 
among them, and together with Jacques they drew a “General Covenant,” metaphorically 
concluded by planting the “Tree of good Understanding.”2 They had “allways been dutifull to 
this Government,” recounted the orator to his English audience, with whom the Haudenosaunee 
sought to “Confirm the old Covenant made here” where the “Sun may allways shine on them.”3 
Having cast “Beams to the Sun of Peace,” the speaker concluded the oral history by returning to 
its starting place.4 From the memory of Jacques, the orator recalled how the Mohawks, Oneidas, 
                                                 
1
 This speech is one of three such recorded accounts dated 1678, 1689, and 1691. For all three accounts, extracted 
from an anonymous notebook in the possession of the American Antiquarian Society, see Daniel K. Richter, 
“Rediscovered Links in the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished Transcripts of New York Indian Treaty 
Minutes, 1677-1691,” American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings, XCII (1982), 45-88; 48-49 and Appendix B. A 
separate, loosely transcribed version of this speech can be found in Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five 
Nations: Depending on the Province of New-York in America, and Are the Barrier between the English and the 
French in That Part of the World (London, 1747), 99. The notebook, donated by Thomas Jefferson to the AAS in 
1815, is catalogued under Indians of North America, Miscellaneous Papers, 1620-1895, Manuscript Collections, 
American Antiquarian Society.  
2
 Jacques is referred to as a “governor” in the preceding 1678 oration, all other quotations come from the 1689 
oration. Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49.  
3
 Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49. 
4
 Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49. 
  2 
and Onondagas “did carry the Ankor of the Ship that Jaques came in to onnondages [Onondaga 
Country],” grounding the English to this old covenant, originally made with Dutch colonists, the 
Five Nations now “renew [and] Confirm.”5 The oral tradition evokes elements of clarity, kinship 
and alliance, all deeply anchored by a chain to a distinct moment in the past, to the time when 
Dutch traders first encountered Haudenosaunee peoples in the Hudson Valley. Beginning with 
the “Governor called Jacques,” this covenant made between the Haudenosaunee and Europeans 
remained in a state of constant flux, of rust and renewal, one that the Haudenosaunee had come 
to make “Bright” again.6 
Following the lead of the Haudenosaunee orator, this thesis focuses on the initial links in 
the relationship between the Five Nations and Europeans, first established between the Mohawk 
Nation of the Iroquois and the Dutch traders that came to North America in the early seventeenth 
century. By examining the colonial gunpowder trade, it argues that Mohawk imperialists and 
Dutch colonizers formed a symbiotic relationship, which drastically altered the geopolitical 
landscape of eastern North America. With the help of Dutch munitions, the Mohawks 
transformed themselves into an expansive colonial power, leading to their sweeping conquests 
that would stretch from Nova Scotia to Wisconsin.7 In return, the Dutch received a powerful, and 
feared, indigenous ally it desperately needed in order to survive the turbulent currents of a 
                                                 
5
 Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48-49. 
6
 (“linking of arms”) Mary Druke Becker, “Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal Diplomacy,” in 
Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. 
Richter and James H. Merrell (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), 29-39; 29. 
(“bright”) Richter, “Rediscovered Links,” 48.  
7
 For histories of seventeenth-century Mohawk responses to change and strategies of survival, see Jon Parmenter, 
The Edge of the Woods; José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall Burn No More,”; Richter, Ordeal of the 
Longhouse; “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” WMQ vol. 40 (1983), 528-559; Francis Jennings, The 
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire; and Ian K. Steele, Warpaths.  
  3 
predominantly native space and a powerful ally who helped curb English and French territorial 
expansion.8 In the pages that follow, I retrace the footsteps of the “Governor called Jacques” and 
“Old Corlaer,” known also as Jacob Eelckens and Arent van Curler, as participants in the 
intercultural gunpowder trade, both crucial links in the chain of events that saw the Mohawk-
Dutch partnership rise and fall while each attempted to navigate the complex entanglements of 
seventeenth-century America.9 Out of separate needs for munitions and beaver pelts, Dutch 
traders and Mohawk imperialists found common ground, forming a mutually-beneficial 
partnership, which would contribute both to New Netherland’s economic prosperity and the 
Mohawk quest for empire.  
The significance of gunpowder cannot be understated. Europeans could not produce 
gunpowder domestically in the colonial period. Saltpeter, gunpowder’s chief ingredient, came 
almost exclusively from the East Indies, forcing Atlantic imperialists to rely on amicable 
diplomatic and trade relations with Asian polities. Moreover, although the Dutch would lead the 
global market in munitions by the seventeenth century, wars in Europe and in more important 
Atlantic colonies left New Netherland at the bottom of the keg. Through the colony’s duration, 
gunpowder remained scarce to the point Director-General Petrus Stuyvesant began maintaining 
records of it, as if to preemptively prepare for a defense for why the colony fell.10 Despite a clear 
                                                 
8
 On the histories of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck and their ties to the Mohawks, see Allen W. Trelease, 
Indian Affairs in Colonial New York, Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse; Jacobs, New Netherland; Merwick, 
Possessing Albany; Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods; Venema, Beverwijck; Burke, Mohawk Frontier;  
9
 “Old Corlaer” appears in the oration of 1678 and refers to the Dutch trader Arent van Curler, Richter, 
“Rediscovered Links,” 49, 55. For brief summations of both Jacob Eelckens and Arent van Curler, see Richter, 
“Rediscovered Links,” 50-56.  
10
  See an account from the Gunner’s Delivery Book detailing incoming shipments of powder and its dispersal from 
May 1661 to September 1664; DRCHNY 2: 460-471. 
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scarcity of gunpowder in the colony, however, colonial records suggest that New Netherland’s 
continued existence depended heavily on a consistent flow of gunpowder to their Native 
American allies. Dutch officials quickly identified a need to meet indigenous demands for 
gunpowder, lest powerful nations such as the Mohawks begin seeking “munitions from our 
neighbors the English.”11  
Analyzing this Mohawk-Dutch partnership through the colonial gunpowder trade draws 
from several subfields colonial historians have developed in recent years. First and foremost, this 
interpretation builds on the recent explosion in Native American scholarship.12Several scholars 
of Iroquoia have reconstructed the Haudenosaunee’s complex relationship with the Dutch, while 
some New Netherland scholars have integrated dealings with the Haudenosaunee into the Dutch 
colonial narrative.13 As a study deeply immersed in both worlds, this analysis benefits from the 
                                                 
11
 February, 24, 1654, Council Minutes II, 116 (“munitions”). 
12
 Native American history as a discipline has changed tremendously since the days of “shattered” peoples written 
about in James H. Merrell, The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact 
through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989) and Richard White, The Middle 
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). Following the steps of Daniel K. Richter’s Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of 
Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), historians have now begun creating continentally-
oriented histories that both shed the trappings of Eurocentric analyses while also reinserting Native Americans 
within the contexts that shaped their decisions and developments. Best examples include: Kathleen DuVal, The 
Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Michael J. Witgen, 
An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Michael A. McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making on 
America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015). 
13
 On histories of the Haudenosaunee and their relationship with the Dutch, see Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in 
Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1960); Francis Jennings, The 
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its 
Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal 
of the Longhouse; Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in 
Seventeenth-Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); José António Brandão, “Your Fyre Shall 
Burn No More:” Iroquois Policy toward New France and its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1997); and Jon Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2010). On histories of New Netherland and Dutch-Iroquoian relations, see Donna Merwick, 
Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990); Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch Village on the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2003); Susanah Shaw Romney: New Netherland Connections: Intimate Networks and Atlantic 
  5 
great strides made in recent years on intercultural encounters and partnerships.14 In relation to 
gunpowder, a few New Netherland scholars have touched upon the contraband trade and 
smuggling as pieces of larger studies on Dutch colonial trade and administrative policy.15 In this 
vein, historians have gradually begun to consider the impact of European weapons technology on 
Native American society. As David J. Silverman has argued in Thundersticks (2016), Native 
American adoption of gunpowder technology dramatically altered the course of events in Early 
North America.16 “A Daingerous Liberty” draws on these approaches to help explain how Dutch 
                                                 
Ties in Seventeenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2013). Many anthropological 
works have contributed to these discussions as well including: William Engelbrecht, Iroquoia: The Development of 
a Native World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003); William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the 
Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Jordan 
E. Kerber, ed. Archaeology of the Iroquois: Selected Readings & Research Sources (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2007) and James W. Bradley, Before Albany: An Archaeology of Native-Dutch Relations in the Capital 
Region, 1600-1664 (Albany: New York State Museum, 2007). 
14
 On intercultural encounters, alliances, and partnerships pertaining to New Netherland, see: See Cynthia J. Van 
Zandt, Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Evan Haefeli, “Kieft’s War and the Cultures of Violence in Early America” in 
Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American History, ed. Michael A. Bellesiles (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999), 17-42; and “On First Contact and Apotheosis: Manitou and Men in North America,” in 
Ethnohistory vol. 54, no. 3 (Summer 2007), 407-443; Daniel K. Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle For 
Eastern North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Jeffrey Glover, Paper Sovereigns: 
Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604-1664 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); 
Mark L. Thompson, The Contest for the Delaware Valley: Allegiance, Identity, and Empire in the Seventeenth 
Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2013); Andrew Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier: Indians 
and the Contest for the American Coast (New haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Donna Merwick, The Shame and 
the Sorrow: Dutch-Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006); Paul Otto, The Dutch-Munsee Encounter: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Hudson Valley (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2006); Tom Arne Midtrød, The Memory of All Ancient Customs: Native American Diplomacy in 
the Colonial Hudson Valley (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); and of the Dutch more broadly, Mark 
Meuwese, Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674 
(Boston: Brill, 2012). 
15
 On Dutch trade, see Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America (Boston: 
Brill, 2005); Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986); Dennis J. Maika, “Commerce and Community: Manhattan Merchants in the 
Seventeenth Century," Ph.D. diss., (New York: New York University, 1995); Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch 
Village on the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Susanah Shaw 
Romney, New Netherland Connections; Wim Klooster, The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the 
Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
16
 David J. Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press, 2016), 21-55. For an older account, see Carl P. Russell, Guns on the Early Frontier: A History of 
Firearms from Colonial Times Through the Years of the Western Fur Trade (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1957). For a source on the broader Dutch arms trade, consult Jan Piet Puype and Marco van der Hoeven, eds., The 
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colonists and Mohawk natives operated within a contested space shared by powerful European 
and indigenous rivals. Moreover, connecting colonial events to gunpowder highlights the 
importance of tying events in North America to broader developments in the Atlantic World and 
beyond. 
By analyzing gunpowder as both a commodity and tool of diplomacy, New Netherland’s 
role within the Dutch Atlantic and broader Dutch empire becomes especially crucial to its 
developments within New Netherland and by extension Iroquoia.17 In an examination of the 
mutually-beneficial, Dutch-Mohawk partnership, this thesis examines how the Dutch and 
Mohawks slowly crumbled under the pressures of a contentious power struggle between 
powerful Native American groups and other European forces, when faced with the realities of a  
limited gunpowder supply. Examining the colonial gunpowder trade places the short tenure of 
New Netherland in new light, underscoring the significance of Mohawk-Dutch relations and the 
importance of Native American warfare and the unpredictable fur trade that ultimately 
contributed to the their mutual rise and decline.  
* * * 
                                                 
Arsenal of the World: The Dutch Arms Trade in the Seventeenth Century (Amsterdam: Batavian Lion International, 
1996) and Michiel de Jong, ‘Staat van Oorlog:’Wapenbedrijf en Militaire Hervorming in de Republiek der 
Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621 (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2005) [‘State of War:’ Arms Industry and 
Military Reform in the Dutch Republic, 1585-1621]. 
17
 For other examples of histories centered on commodities, see Noël Deerr, History of Sugar, 2 vols. (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1949); James Walvin, Fruits of Empire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660-1800 (New 
York: New York University, 1997); Russell Menard, Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture 
in Early Barbados (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2006); David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the 
Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Jennifer L. Anderson, 
Mahogany: The Costs of Luxury in Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Jane T. Merritt, 
The Trouble with Tea: The Politics of Consumption in the Eighteenth-Century Global Economy (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016); and Brian Fagan, Fishing: How the Sea Fed Civilization (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2017). 
  7 
As Daniel Richter once wrote, the “Iroquois used European goods and tools in 
distinctively native ways.”18 Following this insight, this thesis seeks to explore how the 
Mohawks adopted and manipulated European gunpowder technology for their own purposes. 
Building on the recent work of David Silverman, it examines the Mohawk-Dutch partnership in 
greater detail, in order to expand Silverman’s brilliant elucidation that the Mohawks did not 
decline after the advent of firearms, but mastered them, “making choices for their own futures 
instead of suffering  as passive victims of colonial decisions, abstract economic forces, or foreign 
technology.”19 
Yet in order to understand how Native Americans made European technology their own 
to the fullest extent, historians need to go one step further, by recreating the world as the 
Mohawks saw it. In order to better understand the complex web of relations in the colonial 
northeast in which the Mohawks and Dutch operated, I have adopted the term, Ahnowahraake, as 
a place name for the eastern woodlands of North America in which this history takes place. In 
Mohawk, Ahnowahraake (A’nowara:ke) means “on the turtle,” a concept that originates from the 
Haudenosaunee Creation Myth: the myth of the Earth Grasper, also known as the Woman Who 
Fell from the Sky.20 In the tradition, Sky Woman is falling violently to the earth composed 
entirely of water. Various animals scramble to save her, frantically sacrificing themselves to 
obtain dirt from the ocean floor. Muskrat succeeds, placing a clump of dirt on a floating turtle’s 
                                                 
18
 Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 83.  
19
 David J. Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), 55. 
20
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back. The turtle’s back is transformed into an island, and Sky Woman is gently carried down by 
geese onto it, completing the intersection of the physical and spiritual realms from which life 
begins.  
This is how the Mohawks envisioned North America in the seventeenth century, as a 
giant floating turtle upon which all life existed, swaying back and forth as it navigates the cosmic 
waters of the universe. Ahnowahraake is a native space, a world set in motion long before 
Europeans arrived. Ahnowahraake becomes a lens for historians to view the eastern woodlands 
of North America the way Europeans encountered it as “a network of relations and waterways 
containing many different groups of people… that was sustained through the constant 
transformative “being” of its inhabitants.”21 Reconfiguring the historical analysis of North 
America as a predominantly native space in this way reveals more nuanced views of Mohawk 
imperial construction and intercultural exchange. The Dutch, in this instance, tried and failed to 
establish themselves in a native world embroiled in conflict, one the Mohawks navigated with 
exceptional prowess by drawing on years of cultural experience and traditions molded over 
generations of change. The Mohawks were more than just people of the longhouse, they were 
people of the canoe, utilizing lakes, rivers, and streams to exert imperial dominance over eastern 
North America.  
                                                 
21
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Beyond its utility in portraying the eastern woodlands of colonial North America as an 
inherently Native world, Ahnowahraake as a framework also stresses the importance of imperial 
entanglement and a shared colonial experience. Following the lead of Eliga Gould, Jorge 
Cañizares-Esguerra, and others, I use Ahnowahraake as a means of shattering the rigid colonial 
boundaries that once were the foundation of comparative histories.22 Indeed, as this study 
reveals, the colonial gunpowder trade formed the conduit on an interconnected space in which 
the ebb and flow of Dutch, English, French, Swedish, and Native American jurisdictions moved 
as one, juxtaposed between two overbearing forces: the Atlantic and the heart of the continent.23 
In order to explain my view of the Mohawks as a dominant force in Ahnowahraake, there 
are two additional elements of my analysis that must flushed out here. The first, as I have already 
alluded to, is my conception of the Mohawk Nation as an empire. This historiography of the 
Iroquois empire begins with Lewis Henry Morgan and Francis Parkman in the nineteenth 
century, whose works first envisioned the Iroquois as masters of the wilderness, ruthless 
imperialists skulking about the eastern woodlands in search of enemies to torture and consume.24 
Then in 1940, George Hunt contextualized the Iroquoian themes of declension and war into a 
                                                 
22
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new thesis: the beaver wars.25 Economically motivated, the empire of the Five Nations now had 
a vision, to obtain beaver pelts by any means to trade for European goods. Finally in 1960, Allen 
W. Trelease added the final link to the history of the Iroquois empire, transforming Hunt’s study 
within the context of English and Dutch colonization.26 Trelease maintained the framework of 
declension, but for the first time, “European trade and aid were indispensable components of 
Iroquois greatness.”27  
For a moment, scholars appeared to be closing in on the more familiar concepts of 
indigenous autonomy and agency used today. The publication of Francis Jennings’s The 
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, however, took the scholarship in a different direction.28 Morgan’s 
“empire for the Iroquois never existed.”29 In its place, Jennings inserted the Covenant Chain, 
diminishing the imperial reach of the Five Nations to an ancillary extension of English 
hegemony in North America, and thereby reducing the Iroquois into a state of perpetual 
dependence, devoid of an independent political identity. Finally, in 1987 a collection of essays 
edited by Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell hit the final nail in the coffin, confiscating 
empire from the Haudenosaunee once and for all, albeit in a fashion that posed more questions 
                                                 
25
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than it answered.30 Together, these scholars compiled the most in-depth analysis of the Iroquois 
of the time, forcing scholars to build a new theoretical framework from which to understand 
Iroquois history.  
 Daniel K. Richter’s The Ordeal of the Longhouse answered it beautifully.31 Following the 
example of Merrell’s The Indians’ New World, Richter chronicled the history of the 
Haudenosaunee in a continual state of regression and renewal, adapting to the trials and 
tribulations of seventeenth-century North America in order to preserve their cultural identity and 
autonomy.32 Richter’s monograph has since remained the standard work on the Haudenosaunee, 
and has had a powerful influence on the progression of the field ever since. While other scholars 
including Matthew Dennis and José António Brandão have subsequently published important 
contributions to today’s perception of the Iroquois, none have matched the impact of Richter’s 
magisterial work.33  
After a revolution of sorts in Native American history, however, the great chain of 
Iroquois history seemed in need of repair, so that by 2010, it appears historians had already 
begun to take Iroquois history in a new direction. Jon Parmenter, David L. Preston, and Gail D. 
MacLeitch, among others, put forth studies “positioning native people as central actors” in order 
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to enhance the trajectory of survival, what Edward Countryman has recently broken down into 
“four successive historical situations in which the Iroquois found themselves compelled to take 
part:” the seventeenth century; a period of development situated between the Great Peace of 
Montreal and the beginnings of the Seven Years’ War; the imperial crisis and American 
Revolution; and the foundation of the early American republic leading up to the Civil War.34  
These recent studies, combined with the Mohawk (and Haudenosaunee) traditions 
established in older works, suggest in my view, that the empire the Iroquois was not so 
ambiguous. In the same ways that the Comanche, Powhatan, Anishinaabeg, or Quapaws dictated 
the course of their relationships with Europeans, so too did the Mohawks with the Dutch. 
Invoking the precursor to what would become the basis of the Covenant Chain agreement later 
formed with the English and French, the Mohawks implemented an alliance framework called 
kaswentha or “Two Row.”35 First put into practice with the Dutch, kaswentha in theory 
symbolized “a separate but equal relationship between two entities based on mutual benefit and 
noninterference.”36 Although the relationship between the Mohawks and Dutch did not always 
pan out this way, it is nonetheless important that the Mohawks routinely chastised the Dutch 
when their actions broke kaswentha protocol. Kaswentha thus formed the basis of how the 
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Mohawks absorbed Europeans into their space and forced them to accommodate their own 
customs, traditions, and ambitions regardless of whether or not the Dutch consented. The 
Mohawks dominated Ahnowahraake, and as the Dutch quickly realized, Europeans did not. The 
strategy implemented by the Mohawks–who continually insisted that the trade in gunpowder 
belonged within the framework of diplomacy established by kaswentha–worked.   
By the 1660s, the Mohawk-Dutch partnership proceeded to deteriorate under the 
mounting aggression of neighboring Europeans and Native Americans, no longer incapable of 
carrying out protective countermeasures. While English settlers increasingly penetrated New 
Netherland’s borders, Indians from New England, New France, and the Delaware River Valley 
initiated disparate retaliatory offensives into Iroquoia. Together, the disparate movements 
crippled the Mohawks and Dutch at a time of increased vulnerability, created from the inability 
to recover from years of war that strained resources and population numbers. The Mohawks and 
Dutch suffered a mutual political decline, culminating in the loss of New Netherland to the 
English and a Mohawk Nation in recoil. The Mohawks would rise again; the Dutch would not.  
Central to all of this, was gunpowder. Through the context of the colonial arms trade, 
with special attention to gunpowder, this thesis examines the transformation of this intercultural 
symbiosis from separate factions to brothers in arms “joined together with chains.”37 These 
Mohawk-Dutch encounters and negotiations, dictated by the need for gunpowder and pelts, 
reveal a distinct arc of intertwined fates, outlining their shared rise, peak, and decline within a 
world embroiled in conflict. The first Dutch observers might have described North America as “a 
blessed country, where milk and honey flow,” but in reality, these initial European traders 
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encountered a volatile landscape stricken by indigenous discord.38 These Native American 
contests for power and autonomy, notably those between the Haudenosaunee and their 
surrounding neighbors, conjured a vortex that inevitably swallowed the Dutch whole. To be sure, 
New Netherland’s relationship with the Mohawks was unsustainable, but it was also 
unavoidable. 
  
                                                 
38
 Jacobs uses this phrase to illustrate how initial Dutch observations of North America came from traders, 
highlighting that Dutch colonists were interested primarily in the exploitation of the land’s resources, but also that 
like other Europeans, they conceived of North America in terms that did not consider the impact of Native 
Americans. Jacobs, New Netherland, 1-44. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE MOHAWKS’ OLD WORLD: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MOHAWK-DUTCH 




 Most histories of Iroquois-Dutch relations begin with Henry Hudson’s infamous voyage 
in 1609; this one does not. Ahnowahraake was a world set in motion long before the arrival of de 
Halve Maen and the waves of Dutch traders that followed its wake. Traditionally, this moment 
has been described in the context of encounters, a potential first contact between the Native 
Americans of the Hudson Valley and Europeans, immortalized in the context of discovering a 
new world.
1 Yet the actions of these indigenous groups described in the records paint a different picture. 
Upon sailing within the vicinity of Castle Island near modern-day Albany, Indians believed to 
have been Mohicans met Hudson’s crew ready to trade beaver and otter pelts for “Beades, 
Knives, and Hatchets,” although no documented voyages had come remotely close to Mohican 
territory since Giovanni Verrazano’s peripheral visit almost a century earlier.2 Because of the 
entangled indigenous networks of Ahnowahraake, the Mohawks and their neighbors were well-
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 Juet, NNN, 36-60.  
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 Juet, NNN, 49; Evan Haefeli, “On First Contact and Apotheosis,” Ethnohistory 54, no. 3 (July 2007): 429. Not to 
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acquainted with Europeans and their goods long before European traders entered the Hudson 
Valley. Indeed, the world that Hudson’s crew encountered in 1609 was in fact quite old.  
 Bringing Mohawk history to the fore reveals a nuanced interpretation of how events in 
the first years of Dutch trade and settlement unfolded. By pulling back into the sixteenth century, 
when we first see Mohawk responses to European trade goods as well as the preexisting 
geopolitical rivalries set in place, historians may rediscover patterns of continuity otherwise not 
visible, which influenced Mohawk objectives and actions in the seventeenth century. This simple 
understanding, then, suggests the initial encounters between the Mohawks and Dutch traders are 
more complex than historians have previously believed.  
When grounded in the deeper history of Ahnowahraake, Mohawk responses to Dutch 
trade and settlement become more pronounced, adding depth to the shallow areas of the 
historiography of Mohawk-Dutch relations traditionally defined by moments such as the 
construction of Fort Nassau, the Mohawk-Mohican War, and the “beaver wars” of the 1630s. 
These events can be seen quite differently when considered in the context of entanglement, the 
unseen ties that bound the Dutch to a world entrenched in Native American rivalries and 
conflicts they could only begin to understand. Ahnowahraake was no edenic paradise ripe with 
the fruits of profit, but an old world over which the Mohawks exhibited incredible influence 
over, a blanketing cloud of manipulation and power under which the Dutch quickly fell. 
 
The Sixteenth Century  
Mohawk responses to the advent of European trade date back well into the sixteenth 
century. As European fishermen of the North Atlantic began probing the coastline near the 
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mouth of the St. Lawrence River, these Laurentian Iroquois–and their Algonquian neighbors–
proved more than willing to resupply European food stores in exchange for metal goods. The 
bulk of these encounters took place in or around the flourishing trade center of Tadoussac, but 
occurred as far away as Newfoundland.3 Tadoussac’s location across the St. Lawrence River 
from Île aux Basques provided European mariners the unique opportunity to carry out usual 
business in a centralized location from which they could reprovision themselves while also 
touching into indigenous trade circles. By the late sixteenth century, European traffic to 
Tadoussac reached close to 100 ships a year.4  
The Laurentian Iroquois, Algonquians, and Montagnais benefited immensely, usually 
carrying off superior metal tools in exchange for provisions. A growing consciousness of the 
potential profit of the fur trade, driven by the increased demand for beaver hats in Europe, 
gradually led to a growing number of European vessels sailing to the St. Lawrence valley in 
subsequent years. In the interim, while European mariners continued to take advantage of the 
trade at Tadoussac, others began exploring the coastal interior for resources and a potential route 
to the East Indies. This was precisely what Francis I of France instructed Jacques Cartier to do in 
1534.5 Cartier reached the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1535, and his accounts provide the first 
documented accounts of Iroquoian peoples.  
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The Mohawks, too, quickly developed an interest in the new European trade goods that 
gradually flowed into the interior. Archaeological evidence reveals  the arrival of trade goods 
from Tadoussac into Iroquoia by the mid-sixteenth century. Exotic glass and metal objects, 
found in grave sites located as far west as Seneca territory, illustrate a clear map of the complex 
web of indigenous trade connections sprawling inward across the continent upon which the 
Mohawks initially relied.6 For them, items such as glass beads or copper kettles possessed 
spiritual qualities congruent with the traditional appreciation for wampum. Like wampum, the 
Mohawks revered these objects for their orenda, “a supernatural force inherent in shiny objects 
that seemed to come from outside the natural world.”7 The increased practicality and spiritual 
value of these new European goods drove a gradual demand for more among the Mohawks and 
their neighbors. As a result, by 1550 the Laurentian Iroquois benefitted as middlemen in a 
burgeoning indigenous trade system between Iroquoia and Tadoussac which–along with the 
trade axis developing out of the Chesapeake–became one of two “key axes of human, material, 
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and informational movement during the early contact period of Iroquois history.”8 As both axes 
continued to expand, the Mohawks found themselves–as historian Jon Parmenter argues–
increasingly isolated after 1560, a decline possibly related to the severe drought that fell upon 
much of North America at the time.9  
In addition to the growing fear of isolation, the Mohawks grew increasingly concerned 
over a developing alliance between the Europeans and their northern rivals, the Montagnais, 
Algonquins and Wendats (Hurons). The Montagnais benefitted the most. The growing French 
presence at Tadoussac enabled the Montagnais to act as middlemen, controlling the inward flow 
of goods to their allies located deeper in Ahnowahraake.10 The Mohawks, longstanding enemies 
of the Montagnais, feared the repercussions of this newfound French connection the Montagnais 
had cultivated. Unsatisfied with their limited access to European goods via the Laurentian 
Iroquois, the Mohawks aggressively pursued direct trade access to Tadoussac, relieving 
themselves of their dependence on the Laurentian Iroquois while simultaneously threatening the 
control over the area exerted by their Montagnais enemies.11  
Just around the time the Mohawks began a forceful push towards Tadoussac, the 
Laurentian Iroquois dispersed. Exploring the vacant lands once occupied by the Laurentian 
Iroquois in 1608, Champlain remarked the Indians “abandoned them on account of the frequent 
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  20 
wars which they carried on there” and “out of fear for the enemies.”12 Historians have since 
debated possible reasons for the dispersal of the Laurentian Iroquois, including disease, 
migration, and war.  Presently, the consensus is the Laurentian Iroquois is a combination of the 
three, with most of their population believed to have been absorbed by other Iroquoian peoples, 
the Wendats and Mohawks.13 For the Mohawks, absorbing the Laurentian Iroquois refugees into 
their communities solved multiple problems. On the one hand, the culturally and linguistically 
similar Laurentian Iroquois were easier to incorporate into Mohawk society. On the other, 
overlapping Laurentian territory gave the Mohawks better access to trade with the French, who 
had established a trading post at Tadoussac by 1600.14 
French efforts to entrench their presence in the St. Lawrence valley negated any 
advantages the Mohawk gained from absorbing Laurentian Iroquois communities. Their 
incipient alliance with the Montagnais, made clear by their new trading post at Tadoussac, was a 
dark omen for the future of Mohawk trade ambitions in the St. Lawrence valley. Committed to 
keeping the Mohawks out of Laurentian trade, the Montagnais sent two diplomats to the court of 
King Henri IV in 1602, brokering for a military alliance. Having foreseen the advantages of a 
Franco-Algonquin union for the advancement of the fur trade, Henri agreed to assist the 
Montagnais in making peace. His commitment to maintain a French presence in North America 
however, meant war was not off the table. The two diplomats, accompanied by a Champlain-led 
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convoy, returned to North America the following year to make peace with the Iroquois, but the 
negotiations went sour fast.15 The Mohawks wanted access to Tadoussac; the Montagnais would 
not allow it. The French kept their word, and Champlain promised to send for additional forces. 
In the interim, a treaty was struck with the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Eastern Abenaki. For 
every inch the French advanced towards control of the fur trade, the Mohawks lost a mile.16 
By either good fortune or adept observation, the French quickly established themselves in 
the Laurentian trade axis, effectively dipping their hands into the highest quality fur market 
while also obtaining a post in a newly formed northern alliance. The Montagnais were keen to 
protect their profitable position as middlemen for themselves and went great lengths to secure it. 
In 1603, an invitation sent to the Kichesipirini Algonquins was well-received when their 
headman, Tessouat entered the walls of Tadoussac, ready to trade with the French in exchange 
for military assistance against the Mohawks and their Iroquoian allies. As a result of their 
inability to secure a direct trade line, the Mohawks resorted to perpetual raids against the 
Algonquins to obtain metal goods, forcing the French to take the side of the Algonquins and 
Montagnais in the ensuing rift.17  
An alliance with the Montagnais gave the Algonquins the defensive strength they 
desperately needed. In addition to partnering with the Montagnais, they also sought out an 
alliance with the Hurons, who intended to utilize their Algonquin connections to establish their 
own tradelines with the French, which would make the Hurons middlemen for furs coming from 
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the interior of the continent.18 Traditionally, the Laurentian Iroquois hold over the St. Lawrence 
River forced the Montagnais and Algonquins to continue utilizing the older trade routes of 
sixteenth-century copper goods that connected Tadoussac to the Great Lakes region via a long 
arch following the trajectory of the Saguenay River and St. Jean basin, the line of which can be 
traced today by the modern settlements of the region.19 The incoming tidal wave of furs rushing 
towards the French meant a stronger presence in Canada would be required especially in order to 
transform the St. Lawrence River into a central artery for the flow of trade. The disappearance of 
the Laurentian Iroquois conveniently provided the French with an empty space from which they 
could seamlessly enter Ahnowahraake, further impeding Mohawk efforts to establish control 
over St. Lawrence trade routes while strengthening their northern Indian rivals.  
The French blockade against Mohawk advances into the St. Lawrence continued in 1608 
when Champlain erected a small fort at Quebec, only a short distance from the abandoned site of 
Stadacona.20 Thus a well-fortified French presence was established at the heart of the St. 
Lawrence valley, and the river was opened up to trade, now well-protected from the Basques, 
Spanish, and the private French traders in the area.21 Later that year, Champlain confirmed he 
would assist an Algonquin war party in an upcoming expedition against the Iroquois, with whom 
the Algonquins “had long been at war, on account of many cruelties practised against their tribe 
                                                 
18
 Champlain Works, 1:107-109; HNAI 15: 347.  
19
 Marcel Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 72-73.  
20
 Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, 19.  
21
 Quebec’s construction was not without resistance, with the plans nearly compromised by a rogue locksmith, Jean 
Duval. Duval’s actions demonstrate the perceived significance to vying European factions of an established French 
presence in North America. Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663, 94; Parmenter, The Edge of the 
Woods, 18.  
  23 
under the colour of friendship.”22 “Having ever since desired vengeance,” the Algonquins were 
ready to shift the balance of power to themselves and their new Wendat and French allies.23 In 
Champlain’s mind, this provided the perfect chance to earn the trust of his new trade partners, 
while also enabling the further exploration of the interior with native protection. 
The events that followed mark the beginning of a new era in Native American warfare. In 
1609, Champlain and his men accompanied a war party of Montagnais, Wendats, and 
Algonquins into Iroquoia. The coalition encountered a Mohawk war party off the shore of Lake 
Champlain. While the sachems of both sides deliberated on when to fight, Champlain and his 
men remained concealed in their canoes, evading detection by Mohawk eyes. Both parties agreed 
to fight at dawn, and through the night the French remained hidden, never once giving the 
Mohawks reason to suspect their presence. The battle lasted only seconds. Within the blink of an 
eye, Champlain’s arquebuses gunned down two Mohawk chiefs, and mortally wounded a third.24 
Bewildered by the thunderous noise and immediate loss of their leaders, the Mohawk warriors 
fled, even leaving their shields behind.25  
Historians have traditionally used this moment to describe two related, but distinct 
trajectories: the beginnings of a long and bitter rivalry between the French and the Five Nations 
and the deadly impact of European firearms on technologically inferior Native American 
peoples.26 As David Silverman has argued, however, this analysis is incomplete when one 
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considers the broader trajectory of Indians’ assessment and adoption of firearms. “The ironic 
result of the colonists’ superiority in firearms,” Silverman explains, “was the Indians’ so-called 
skulking way of war, which plagued Euro-American society throughout the colonial era.”27 
Indeed, this “Champlain thesis” as Silverman calls it, was not paradigmatic as a moment from 
which Native Americans collectively declined in an inevitably deterministic pattern akin to Jared 
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.28 Instead, we see a transformative saga in which Native 
American groups such as the Mohawks embraced gunpowder technology. This short encounter 
marked the beginning of a new era in Iroquois (and Native American) warfare, setting in motion 
the gradual transition of the Mohawks to gunpowder technology that would gain traction in the 
coming decades. This gunpowder was Dutch in origin, but it was the Mohawks that make the 
most of its power.  
The destructive power of gunpowder technology forced Native Americans to design new 
military strategies. The technological advantages of firearms gave Indians with first access a 
quick advantage over rivals who lacked them.29 Up until then, battles were fought with relatively 
few casualties. Traditional armor and shields provided adequate protection from arrowheads, but 
quickly proved useless against musket balls and shrapnel. The Iroquois’ early entrance into a 
Native American arms race allowed them to advance through enemy territory with relative ease. 
Their ambitions drew from a combination of forces: the need for adopted captives, hunting 
grounds, beaver skins, and the glowing opportunity to subjugate their ancient rivals once and for 
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all.30 As we shall see, the inability to make gunpowder themselves left the Mohawks dependent 
on access to European traders, a need the Dutch would fill in return for beavers. In this way, Fort 
Orange would become a portal to the international arms market, and one the Mohawks sought to 
reserve for themselves. 
 
The Governor Called Jacques 
News of Hudson’s voyage caught the attention of many merchant capitalists in 
Amsterdam and a scramble ensued for merchants seeking to establish themselves in the 
burgeoning fur trade. In 1611, the Van Tweenhuysen Company (VTC) dispatched the St. Pieter 
to the New World.31 In 1613 or 1614 a crude trading post was erected on Castle Island near 
present-day Albany. The post’s construction, and the decisions of some men to stay behind and 
maintain it, was likely the VTC’s response to increased merchant competition in the area.32 After 
a brief period of hostility, the separate companies conceded “transatlantic ventures could only 
yield profits if the purchase prices for beaver pelts were kept down and the costs of maintaining a 
small fort could be shared.”33 The directors of the four companies petitioned for a monopoly, and 
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by October the companies had amalgamated into the New Netherland Company.34 The 
protection from rival merchants however, did not make the process of familiarizing themselves 
with the Indians any easier. 
 Although the economically-minded Dutch were not compelled to record the details of 
their relationship with the Indigenous groups, Haudenosaunee oral traditions place great 
importance on this period in the formation of their alliance with the Dutch and a “governor called 
Jacques.”35 In 1678 for instance, a delegation of Onondagas recalled, to the English officials at 
Albany, the beginnings of the “Ancient Brotherhood” that emerged “from the first Instance of 
Navagation being in use here (at the Time of a Govr Called Jacques) & hath continued to the 
Time of Old Corlaer & from Old Corlaer to his Present Excely.”36 Historians do not know 
definitively who Jacques was, but his perpetual resurgence in the oral traditions calls attention to 
his importance to the Haudenosaunee.37 For the Mohawks and their Kanosoni brethren, personal 
relationships were essential to the nature of gift-giving and their partnership with Europeans, 
Dutch and English. Inquiries into the mysterious figure of Jacques could potentially illuminate 
the context behind the Mohawk-Dutch alliance, and perhaps answer questions regarding what 
both groups expected of each other.  
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 The most convincing case put forth by Richter and others suggests ‘Jacques’ must have 
been none other than Jacob Jacobsen Eelckens, a Dutch mariner whose career involved ventures 
for several fur trading companies and is also believed to have spent considerable time with the 
natives.38 Born in Amsterdam in 1593, and then relocated to Rouen around 1600, Eelckens grew 
up exposed to the rising merchant culture of the burgeoning fur trade.39 His career began as a 
merchant clerk, but by twenty one years of age he was a skipper of a supercargo accompanying 
Christiansen to North America for the VTC.40 Historians have assumed Eelckens was one of the 
company men to stay behind on Castle Island following the construction of the trading post.41 Of 
the group known to have remained, we know there were at least six and can name four of them: 
Esker Annes, Dirck Claesz, Cornelis Hendricksen, and a man called ‘Kleyntjen,’ or ‘shorty.’42 It 
is possible Eelckens was present as well, but likely not until after 1615 since his first mention in 
the record comes from July 1614, referencing his return to Amsterdam with Christiansen.43 Hart 
implies Eelckens returned to North America in 1615 as a member of the New Netherland 
Company and resumed command of the trading post on Castle Island then.44 We do not know 
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when he left the post, but it must have been around the time the Hudson washed away the trading 
post in 1617, since Eelckens was sailing for a new company on a new ship in 1618.45  
 This account of Eelckens goes against some of the assumptions historians have made of 
his involvement in North America thus far. These discrepancies in the narrative can be attributed 
largely to the fascination with a dubious treaty, and also to a deposition made by Eelckens to 
English officials in 1633 in which he claims to have lived “foure years” with the Indians.46 
Historians have used this information to argue Eelckens must have lived on Castle Island from 
the construction of the post between 1613/14 and its destruction in 1617, but no records exist to 
confirm this. Their willingness to accept it relates directly to the treaty Eelckens is said to have 
authored.  
The treaty aforementioned, is most commonly known as the “Tawagonshi Treaty,” a 
trade pact alleged to have been drawn up by Eelckens and Christiansen and signed by 
representatives of the Mohawk, Oneida, and Onondaga. Both sides are believed to have 
commemorated the accord per their own customs. The European traders had the written 
document, while the Iroquois responded with a gift of wampum, signifying the beginning of 
what has become known as the “Two-Row Tradition,” or kaswentha. The meeting is said to have 
followed the construction of the Dutch trading post, but the rest is unclear. The document has 
been purported by certain parties to carry significance as the first documented treaty between the 
Dutch and the Iroquois as well as that between Indigenous peoples and Europeans in North 
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America. While historians may continue to debate the legitimacy of this document, others must 
now revisit this formative period with the tools necessary to revise our understanding of what 
happened, a process that inevitably includes the daunting task of separating assumptions from 
fact.47 Multiple arguments have been made to demonstrate that a treaty drawn between the Dutch 
and Iroquois is unlikely, but this does not mean a ceremony intended to serve such a purpose did 
not occur. Eelckens, nor any other Dutch trader in the Hudson Valley at the time, possessed 
permission from the States General to conduct treaty negotiations. More likely than not, 
Eelckens orchestrated an agreement facilitated via an exchange of goods. A presentation of metal 
goods and cloth to the Mohawks and/or Mohicans for the right to build on their land would have 
followed Dutch protocol in other parts of the world in establishing trade relations, while the 
Mohawks would have understood this moment as a ceremonious gesture to a new mutually-
beneficial partnership that could level the balance of power with their Montagnais-French 
enemies.48 
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 That Eelckens and Christiansen drafted any type of diplomatic treaty document with the 
local indigenous peoples is unlikely on multiple counts that highlight the importance of 
understanding these initial encounters within their proper contexts. Neither Eelckens nor 
Christiansen likely exhibited the literary skills required to draft such a document.49 Indeed, as 
skippers of private trade vessels, neither possessed the authority from the States General to 
execute diplomatic functions. Such would have been unnecessary anyway given the lack of other 
external threats to the local geopolitical structure like an Iberian presence in the area.50 An ability 
to conduct matters of international diplomacy would serve no benefit to merchants in the 
Hudson, who continued to exercise business on behalf of themselves and their respective 
companies.51 Moreover, cultivating a direct relationship with the Iroquois at this time would not 
have been a priority given the willingness of other Hudson Valley native groups to trade. The 
drawing up of treaties and desire to establish alliances with local communities was atypical for 
Dutch trading, based on previous experiences in other parts of the world including South 
America and Africa.52 This is not to say however, that Eelckens did not contribute to the 
formation of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership. The evidence available suggests he did.53  
 Looking at this period from a Mohawk perspective helps explain the discrepancies 
between the written record and oral traditions over the involvement of men like Eelckens. That 
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the only mention of the “governor called Jacques” stems from the oral history, demonstrates the 
differing expectations the Mohawks held for their new foreign neighbors. In the immediate 
sense, the arrivals of the Dutch and English would have given the Iroquois a useful 
counterbalance in their quarrels with the French in Canada and direct access to the trade they had 
been fighting for. Moreover, on a metaphysical level, the success of these interactions with 
orenda–the omnipresent spiritual power of the universe–mattered greatly to the well-being of 
their communities and the retention of balance in the world.54  
In the Spring of 1617, melting ice upriver caused the Hudson to swell over Castle Island 
and destroy Fort Nassau.55 In response, the Dutch traders opted to relocate a few miles 
southbound where the Tawasentha Creek or “Norman’s Kil” flowed into the Hudson. “The new 
situation was well chosen,” writes Brodhead, “The portage path of the Mohawks, coming from 
the west, terminated about two miles above at Skanektade.”56 It was once alleged by nineteenth-
century historians and Iroquois ethnographers the word Tawasentha translated to “the place of 
the many dead” in the Mohawk language.57 This was sacred Mohawk territory, an intersecting 
plane between the spiritual and physical realms. One wonders how the Mohawks perceived how 
the Dutch almost blindly stumbled right up to the eastern doorstep of their extended longhouse.58  
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Despite some initial success for Eelckens and others however, trade did not always go so 
smoothly. In October 1618, leading NNC officials sent Christiaensz aboard the Swarte Beer back 
to the Hudson to resume trade. Christiaensz had been warned by Eelckens and Engel not to 
hinder their trading, but proceeded anyway, sealing his fate. In 1619, just off the coast of 
Governor’s Island, Indians violently attacked the Swarte Beer killing Christiaensz and most of 
his crew.59 The limited records available do not discern what might have provoked the attack, but 
other documented incidents reveal flaring tempers and violence were not necessarily uncommon. 
That following year, a tense situation aboard the Schildpad climaxed when Eelckens took four 
Indians hostage. The secondary account provided by Hart suggests tensions rose out of 
indecision on the part of the Indians and paranoia on the Dutch, but that the Dutch only released 
the four prisoners after a ransom in wampum was paid signals their openness to aggressive 
trading strategies. Indeed, ransoming captured Indians for wampum quickly became a pattern.60 
In 1622, “Jaques Elekes,” imprisoned a Pequot sachem on his ship and threatened to “cut 
off his head” unless a ransom of 140 fathoms of wampum was paid.61 The quick ability of the 
Pequots to fulfill the demand demonstrated to Eelckens and compatriot Hans Hontom the 
Pequot’s wealth and power, while also underscoring the importance of wampum in indigenous 
                                                 
59
 Jacobs, New Netherland, 36. It is possible the reasons for the attack against Christiaensz are similar to those 
speculated by Haefeli in Hudson’s voyage which involved a seemingly random attack by Navasinks. “On First 
Contact and Apotheosis,” 416.  
60
 Hart, Prehistory, 37. Jacobs, New Netherland, 37.  
61
 Salisbury speculates the sachem was Tatobem, who was later murdered by Dutch traders in a separate incident. 
He further argues this event became a “critical point in the rise of the Pequot and Narragansett.” Van Wassenaer, 
NNN, 86; Mark Meuwese, “The Dutch Connection: New Netherland, the Pequots, and the Puritans in Southern New 
England, 1620-1638,” Journal of Early American History 3, no. 1 (January 2013): 307, (on Tatobem’s murder) 314; 
Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1984), 148-149; Klooster, The Dutch Moment, 259. 
  33 
societies.62 For Dutch traders like Eelckens and Hontom, “always interested in learning about 
commodities in order to expand their commercial activities,” the process was largely 
successful.63 Later on in the Hudson Valley, Hontom took a Mohawk sachem hostage following 
a brief altercation.64 To the horror of the Mohawks who met Hontom’s demanded ransom of 
wampum, Hontom “cut out the male organs of the aforesaid chief, and [hanged] them on the 
mast stay with rope, and thus killed the sachem.”65 It is unclear how this incident affected 
Eelckens’s relationship with the Mohawks. His presence, if not involvement, might explain why 
the West India Company did not employ him after 1624. Nonetheless, Eelckens’ dealings with 
the Mohawks years later unfolded quite differently from that of Hontom’s, who the Mohawks, 
and their sachem Saggodryochta remembered quite well.66 
 
Mohawk-Mahican War  
The first test for this Dutch-Mohawk relationship erupted in the form of a native conflict 
known as the Mohawk-Mohican War. In the early summer of 1626, a Mohican war party made 
its way into Fort Orange. In short order, they were joined by Dutch commander Daniel van 
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Krieckenbeeck and several of his men. The entourage marched into Mohawk territory, where 
suddenly a waiting band of Mohawk warriors “fell so boldly upon them with a barrage of 
arrows.”67 Krieckenbeeck, three of his men, and several Mohican warriors were killed. The 
Mohawks consumed one Dutchman, burned the rest, and “carried a leg and an arm home to be 
divided among their families, as a sign that they had conquered their enemies.”68 Bewildered by 
the news of what transpired, then Director-General Pieter Minuit sent Pieter Barentsen, a trade 
with years of experience in learning indigenous customs and languages, into Mohawk country to 
make peace. Barentsen’s experience, including regular contact with the Mohawks through his 
work on the sloops, made him a favorable candidate as an intercultural ambassador and likely 
contributed to the success of his mission for peace.69 “They wished to excuse their act,” Van 
Wassenaer later recorded of the Mohawks, “and asked the reason why the latter [Dutch] had 
meddled with them [Mohawks]; otherwise, they would not have shot them.”70 Van 
Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated attack is the only documented case of Dutch involvement in the war, 
and little is known of why he elected to support the Mohicans, breaking the WIC’s strict policy 
of maintaining neutrality. Historians continue to argue over the causes of the war and why the 
Dutch became involved, but the results are plain. Both the Mohawks and Dutch had different 
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objectives and presently remained uncertain of how to proceed without interfering in the affairs 
of the other. 
 Among a select group of scholars, the Mohawk-Mohican War has received critical 
attention in recent years that, in addition to the historical misconceptions they address, must be 
recounted to some degree here.71 To begin with, the Mohawk-Mohican relationship remains 
ambiguous to historians. The two nations were at peace when the Dutch arrived in 1609, but had 
been at war previously for an unknown number of years. Although the history of this prior 
rivalry is lost, archaeologists have discovered Mohawk sites from this period closely hugged the 
bends of the Mohawk River, making use of the topology to ward off potential Mohican attacks, 
thus indicating relations were at times less than amicable.72  
Complicating the issue further, is the issue of van Krieckenbeeck’s intervention. At a 
glance, any Dutchman living at Fort Orange must have known challenging the Mohawks with 
only a handful of gunmen was not only dangerous, but also potentially ruinous for trade. The 
lack of strong Mohawk retaliation suggests this was an isolated incident, and not indicative of a 
deeper anti-Mohawk stance. Nevertheless, left with only two relatively vague sources, historians 
remain divided to the meaning of van Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated decision and its implications for 
the Mohawk-Dutch relationship.73 
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 Historians’ attempts to discern the cause of the conflict stem primarily from two 
contemporary accounts, one from the hand of Secretary de Rasiere  and the other from the ear of 
Champlain. The focus of de Rasiere ’s entry on the war is the disruption of trade and as such he  
outlines Dutch objectives in the conflict: to rid themselves of the Mohawks and restore trade 
with the Canadian Indians to the north. Champlain’s document, informed solely by Native 
Americans, tells the Mohawk/Mohican side of the story which is less concerned with the fur 
trade. On the Dutch perspective of events, the passage oft quoted from de Rasiere  reads as 
follows: 
“I must perforce go up the river to see whether I can get the Minquaes 
[Mohawks] to come to an agreement with the French Indians whereby they may 
obtain forever a free passage through their country. That being accomplished, I 
hope to carry out my design of [exploring] Lake Champlain, and, if this cannot 
be done by amicable means, I beg your Honors to authorize me to go with 50 or 
60 men on an expedition against them in order to drive them off, which in the 
end will have to be done anyway, as they are a vindictive race. I shall take great 
pleasure in it.”74 
 
Meanwhile, listening from afar in Quebec and relying on Indian intel, Champlain recorded:  
“During the winter some of our savages [Montagnais and Algonquins] 
went to the settlements of the Dutch, and were asked by them and the 
savages [Mohicans] of that region to make war on the Iroquois, who had 
killed twenty-four of their men and five Dutchmen, for not willing to 
allow them free passage to go and make war on a nation called the Wolves 
[Sokokis], with whom the Iroquois were at enmity. And in order to 
persuade our savages, who were at peace with the Iroquois, to undertake 
this war, they made presents to them in wampum belts, to be given to 
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certain chiefs, amongst others, to the Reconciled, in order to break the 
peace.”75 
 
From these contemporary accounts, historians at first assumed the Mohawk-Mohican 
War stemmed from a fierce desire on both sides to control the Dutch fur trade.76 Economically 
motivated, the Mohawks attempted to monopolize the trade by denying the French Indians “free 
passage” to trade with the Dutch while also driving out the Mohicans.77 By extension, historians 
have interpreted the Dutch to have regarded the Mohawks as a threat to the enterprise. As 
evidenced by Champlain’s journal, the Dutch welcomed efforts by the Mohicans, and the French 
Indians, to drive the Mohawks out. By 1628/29 it becomes clear the Mohawks proved successful 
in driving the Mohicans–at least partially–into the Upper Connecticut River Valley, thereby 
resuming sole control of indigenous access to trade at Fort Orange.78  
In the traditional view, historians have since gone on to interpret the significance of this 
conflict in terms of economically-motivated imperialism and alliances. The war became 
famously known as the first indigenous conflict in North America to have directly erupted out of 
tensions created by the introduction of European trade. The success of the Mohawks established 
the base of a longer imperial saga in which the Haudenosaunee went on to conquer their 
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surrounding neighbors in a hunt for beaver skins in order to further guard their relationship with 
European traders and the flow of goods from their hands.79  
Based on this narrative, the Mohawk-Mohican War initiated the “beaver wars” of which 
the Iroquois would fight several in the 1640s and beyond. “While it was in the Indians’ interest to 
trade with more than one European power,” Trigger concluded, “no tribe in the area was 
sufficiently self-confident that it was prepared to acquiesce that its enemies, or even potential 
enemies, should trade with the same European power with which it had an alliance.”80 The 
Mohawk-Mohican War, then, established a pattern of Mohawk (and Haudenosaunee) ambition to 
control the fur trade.81   
With both sweeping developments in Dutch and Native history, it should come as no 
surprise that this view has not aged particularly well. For one, Iroquoian historians writing since 
Hunt have done little to correct the Eurocentric economic model he employed. Trelease, Trigger, 
and Jennings all maintained the same basic framework employed by Hunt, and only in 1992 had 
Richter only initiated the process of adopting the Mohawks’ perspective.82 Shortly after, 
Matthew Dennis echoed the usual narrative, but crucially added an important distinction that 
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bears renewed consideration. “While European materials and trade goods held great attraction for 
native people,” Dennis continued, “the Iroquois and other Indians did not conceive of their 
relationships with Europeans simply in economic terms.”83 With historians finally 
acknowledging the limitations of the ethnocentric approach, it seemed the opportune time to 
rewrite the entire event in new words. Despite such remarkable progress however, when Starna 
and Brandão set out to set the record straight in “From the Mohawk-Mohican War to the Beaver 
Wars,” they missed the mark.84  
Together, Starna and Brandão echoed the argument put forth in previous publications by 
Starna, that scholars had continued to interpret the conflict incorrectly.85 “The primary sources,” 
they insisted, “simply do not describe the Mohawks, or their native foes, as doing much at all of 
what they are said to have done.”86 They focused on perceived errors in the interpretation, but 
offered little on the problematic methodology. To be sure, the piece is relatively successful in 
refuting the correlation between the Mohawk-Mohican War and the Beaver Wars originally 
proposed by Trigger. The Mohawk-Mohican War did not establish a pattern of indigenous 
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 William A. Starna and José António Brandão, “From the Mohawk-Mohican War to the Beaver Wars: Questioning 
the Pattern,” in Ethnohistory vol. 51, no. 4 (Fall 2004), 725-750.  
85
 See Gehring and Starna, “Dutch and Indians in the Hudson Valley,” 14-19; William Starna, “Assessing American 
Indian-Dutch Studies: Missed and Missing Opportunities” New York History 84, no. 1 (2003): 7, 24-28,  in which he 
somewhat ironically observes a growing pattern in Indian-Dutch historiography “that one secondary source tends to 
resemble earlier secondary sources, with the possible addition of seemingly inventive, but usually inconsequential 
twists on the same old story;” or his latest publication: Starna, From Homeland to New Land, page numbers.   
86
 For better context, the complete concluding rebuttal is: “The Mohawks had not been poorly positioned to take 
advantage of the early seventeenth-century trade; they did not make a peace with the French Indians in 1624 with 
the intention to then attack the Mohicans and seize control of the trade at Fort Orange; and they did not blockade the 
Champlain Valley to prevent French Indians from trading with the Dutch.” Starna and Brandão, “From the 
Mohawk-Mohican War to the Beaver Wars: Questioning the Pattern” Ethnohistory 51, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 740.  
  40 
dependence on furs that–as beaver populations dwindled–perpetuated military campaigns by the 
Haudenosaunee in order to accumulate more furs to trade for more goods.  
However, Starna and Brandão found themselves distracted by the conflict’s legacy and 
failed to offer an accurate alternative interpretation of the conflict itself, which if done correctly, 
may greatly change our understanding of Mohawk-Dutch relations in this period. In this vain, the 
basis of their argument countered four core assumptions that continued to pervade in the 
historiography: first, the Mohawks enjoyed only limited trade with Europeans before 1628; 
second, this limited access to European goods, and importantly Fort Orange, due to the Mohawks 
being “landlocked” by the Mohicans; third, the Dutch, in turn, considered the Mohawks 
“marginal to their economic interests” and actively pursued higher quality furs from Canada; and 
fourth, that the Mohawks recognized this Dutch desire to trade with the French Indians and 
sought to cut them off.87 Having now stated the aims of their scrutiny, what follows below does 
not attempt to rehash, but proposes a new interpretation based off factual evidence and 
conservative assumptions from the existing scholarship. 
From a Dutch or European perspective, the lack of sources makes piecing together the 
outline of the conflict difficult. From a Mohawk perspective however, despite the lack of 
sources, it is clear enough to justify why they would have initiated a new war against the 
Mohicans. The Mohawks were losing ground in the St. Lawrence river valley and along the 
Ottawa River by the 1620s, while their relationship with the French remained especially rocky. 
This directly conflicted with the increased necessity of hunting grounds as a result of the 
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population boom that saw Mohawk numbers increase to more than 4,500 between 1580 and 
1614.88  
A renewed peace with the Montagnais in 1624, orchestrated predominantly by 
Champlain, allowed the Mohawks to reset themselves, recalibrating to the increased volume of 
trade around Fort Orange and Quebec. It is likely the Mohawks made use of their peace with the 
French Indians to renew war against the Sokokis as Champlain’s intelligence described. Mohican 
territory acted as a buffer to the Indian nations of the Upper Connecticut River Valley including 
the Sokokis, Pennecooks, and Pockumtucks. As a strong eastern Algonquian speaking power, the 
Mohicans frequently protected these eastern nations from Mohawk war parties. It is also possible 
that the Mohawks sought war against the Mohicans who then turned to the Upper Connecticut 
River Valley Nations for help. Curiously, this can be evidenced by threats from Champlain to 
help the Mohawks if a coalition did emerge.89 
But why might the Mohawks have initiated war with the Mohicans and why did the 
Dutch side with the Mohicans? To reiterate, it has been traditionally argued–and debunked–that 
the Mohawks attacked the Mohicans to gain access to trade at Fort Orange while some historians 
have assumed the fighting erupted out of the refusal of the Mohicans to allow the Mohawks free 
passage into the Upper Connecticut River Valley. In view of the sources at hand however, there 
                                                 
88
 Starna and Brandão, “From the Mohawk-Mohican War to the Beaver Wars,” 726. 
89
 Peter Allen Thomas, In the Maelstrom of Change: The Indian Trade and Cultural Process in the Middle 
Connecticut River Valley: 1635-1665 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Amherst, 1979), 47. Biggar, 
Champlain Works, 5: 214-219, 229-230, 308. Inference from passage, notably on 217 is not clear. Champlain clearly 
threatens to aid the Mohawks against the Dutch and the Mohicans, but there is no clear mention of peoples 
belonging to the Upper Connecticut River Valley. It might be worth noting the Mohicans may have been weakened 
by disease from the 1616 epidemic, however, historians are still unsure of how far the disease penetrated inland. On 
this epidemic and possible Mohican casualties, see Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, “European Contact and 
Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics,” Ethnohistory 35, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 
21-23; Shirley W. Dunn, The Mohicans and Their Land, 1609-1730 (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 
1994), 76; 257-259; and Starna, From Homeland to New Land, 45-46.  
  42 
appear to have been other possible motives. First, it is possible the Mohawks, in a manner 
relative to their imperial power, sought to take control of all Fort Orange trade for themselves as 
the Pequots had successfully done around Fort Good Hope around the same time.90 This move 
would have allowed the Mohawks a primary say in who the Dutch could and could not trade 
with, an especially crucial position they would have used to prevent the Dutch from trading 
wampum to their enemies, the French Indians. 
 Secondly, and equally likely, the Mohawks sought to displace the Mohicans as 
middlemen in a burgeoning wampum trade. The Mohicans possessed geographical advantages 
the Mohawks coveted access to, controlling the wampum trade axis that extended north-south 
from the coastal groups of Southern New England and the Long Island Sound to the First Nations 
of Canada.91 In doing so, the Mohicans could collect wampum from coastal groups via either 
tribute or trade, and then turn around and exchange this wampum to the Northern Algonquians 
for their beaver skins before then trading these skins to the Dutch for more wampum. If one 
considers this indigenous trade network, one that mattered little to the business of European 
traders, the Mohawks were indeed landlocked, not from Dutch trade, but from the wampum 
producing polities to which the Mohicans had access. 
In a manner of good fortune, the Dutch entering Ahnowahraake inserted themselves 
along key nodes of the indigenous wampum trade. The location of Dutch trading posts scattered 
along the coast from Narragansett Bay to the Long Island Sound gave them direct access to the 
largest wampum production zones. Dutch traders could obtain the shell beads from the 
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Narragansetts and Pequots and then use them as a bargaining piece to lure in trade of the 
Canadian First Nations that did not have local access to wampum.92 According to Neal Salisbury, 
“It was the prospect of wampum that drew the Ottawa Valley Algonquin and the Montagnais 
allies of the French to begin carrying many of their furs to the Mohicans after the Dutch 
established a new Hudson River post at Fort Orange in 1624.”93 It should be seen as no 
coincidence then, that the Mohawks promptly established peace with the Montagnais in order to 
pursue a new war against the Mohicans for trading with their enemies. These actions should not 
be taken lightly. From a Mohawk perspective, a steady flow of wampum into the hands of their 
enemies in Canada would contribute to a spiritual strengthening that could then leave the 
Mohawks at a disadvantage in future conflicts.94 For these same reasons, the Mohawks would 
not have wanted Northern Algonquian groups such as the Montagnais trading with the Dutch, 
thereby negating the advantage the Mohawks possessed from having access to the Dutch 
themselves.95 
 Although only a blip in most histories of the period, the Mohawk-Mohican War had 
significant short and long-term consequences in Ahnowahraake. Fear of Mohawk retaliation 
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following van Krieckenbeeck’s ill-fated attack forced the Dutch to relocate south. Shortly 
thereafter, Director Pieter Minuit and Secretary Isaac de Rasière orchestrated the purchase of 
Manhattan Island for a bundle of tools and goods worth approximately sixty guilders.96 The 
island provided the Dutch with an ideal location to facilitate trade with the indigenous groups 
that surrounded the harbor, but also control entrance of the Hudson River. This new location was 
also more easily defensible, since no other indigenous groups inhabited the island. Also of note is 
how the war changed the geopolitical landscape. By 1629, the Mohawks had effectively driven 
the Mohicans out of the Hudson Valley, forcing the nation to relocate with their allies in the 
Upper Connecticut River Valley and instituting a tributary system there.97 This rivalry would 
continue through the duration of New Netherland, and embroil the Mohawks in intermittent wars 
the Dutch could not avoid. The Mohawks were a problem the Dutch–nor any other seventeenth-
century colonial power–could not solve.98 
 While Starna and Brandão are correct in identifying some historical misconceptions and 
errors that have skewed our understanding of this event, they have equally become distracted in 
the event’s overall importance. Indeed, the Mohawk-Mohican War, for what it was, is not 
significant for being “the first and defining example of a conflict fought in direct response to the 
European-introduced fur trade,” true or otherwise, but for its illuminating light on a complex web 
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of geopolitical rivalries and tensions that which contemporary observers could only partially 
understand.99  
Historians including Trelease, Richter, Parmenter, Trigger, Starna, Brandão, and others 
have all grappled to some extent in illustrating the true nature of this conflict, diverging wildly in 
how the conflict relates to the French and Dutch, and also to several Native American political 
groups including the Mohawks, Mohicans, the Upper Connecticut River Valley Indians, the 
coastal groups in Southern New England and around Long Island Sound, and the French Indians 
including the Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons. When one considers the breadth of this 
disorienting geopolitical landscape, it stands to reason then that historians have overly relied on 
the written record, composed by contemporaries lacking an adequate sense of the complex web 
of relations they sought to describe.  
While excellent historical and anthropological scholarship has done well to help color in 
some of the missing pieces, this event will frustratingly remain a shattered mosaic for historians, 
just as it had been for the contemporaries we rely on to describe it. The reality of the Mohawk-
Mohican War remains an elusive truth, one that may only be uncovered if the motivations of the 
Mohawks and Mohicans are fully considered, rather than those of Champlain or de Rasiere. If 
the Mohawk-Mohican War may not have produced a pattern, but its historiography has: the 
inability of historians to recognize the Mohawks and Dutch inhibited disparate objectives and 
different interpretations of the events happening around them. Moreover, the conflict initiated a 
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“contest for power” between the Mohawks and their eastern Algonquian rivals, “[that] 
significantly influenced life in the Northeast for the next half century.”100 
 
Disease and Uncertainty  
 How the Mohawks perceived their position by the 1630s might be best illustrated by the 
death of a nameless Mohawk sachem who readily accepted his execution at the hands of the 
Montagnais, satisfied with the imperial position the Mohawks had carved out for themselves. In 
1631, an Algonkian-Montagnais war party returned to New France with the spoils of the recent 
raid of a Mohawk village. Nine Mohawks including the sachem were captured, the Algonquins 
kept six captives for themselves and left three for the Montagnais to take back to Tadoussac so 
they too could share their trophies with their families. At first, negotiations delayed the ritual 
execution process as the Mohawks and Montagnais attempted to broker a peace. Unfortunately 
for the captives, however, the murder of one of the captives by a drunken guard stalled 
negotiations indefinitely. As a result, the rest of the prisoners were killed including one particular 
“powerful and courageous” sachem in particular whose confident taunts captured the attention of 
French observers.101 Upon learning of his impending death, this Mohawk sachem happily 
boasted of his own Montagnais conquests before adding “his friends will take still more.”102 In 
resignation of his fate, the sachem bade farewells to his friends, family, allies, and even the 
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“Flemish Captain who goes to trade for furs in the country of the Hiroquois by the Northern 
sea.”103 This last quip, undoubtedly the warrior’s final means of taunting his executioners, 
perfectly captured the confidence of the Mohawks as they entered the 1630s, both well-seasoned 
in battle and primed to take advantage of the Dutch connection they controlled.104 
 The Mohawks, a stronger nation with a powerful grasp over the indigenous geopolitics of 
Ahnowahraake possessed the upper hand over a small faction of traders inexperienced in the 
local customs and too weak to disregard them. The Dutch may have had wampum and other 
exotic goods of use to the Mohawks, but trade as a medium of exchange held equal weight in 
diplomacy. Trade with the Dutch occurred on Mohawk terms, and as the Dutch would discover, 
this meant exotic goods took second place to the value of established connections and personal 
relationships. The Dutch learned this lesson the hard way when Eelckens returned to New 
Netherland under an English flag, and to their dismay, briefly resumed trading at Fort Orange as 
if he had never left. 
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 In 1632, Eelckens returned to the Hudson River as skipper of the William, commissioned 
by London merchants to dispute Dutch commercial claims to New Netherland. Following a brief 
standoff with Van Twiller in Manhattan, Eelckens made his way up the river to Fort Orange with 
the Dutch in slow pursuit.105 Preparation of the Zoutberg delayed the Dutch departure by several 
days, leaving Eelckens approximately two weeks to trade with the Indians nearly uninhibited. By 
the time the Dutch caught up with the William, anchored a mile south from Fort Orange, trade 
between Eelckens and the surrounding Indians was well underway. Almost immediately after 
pitching his tent, both Mohawks and Mohicans broke through the trees to trade with Eelckens, 
pelts in hand. Until authorities from New Amsterdam arrived, all the Dutch at Fort Orange could 
do was attempt to out-trade their English rivals whereupon they immediately fell to a 
disadvantage. Eelckens, “beinge well acquainted” with the Indians and “havinge heretofore lived 
foure yeare with them,” had the upper hand.106 Eelckens possessed key knowledge of Mohawk 
trading practices that made for a successful intercultural relationship, and the Mohawks 
remembered the ‘governor’ well for it. But just as they remembered the good traders, they also 
remembered the bad. When Hans Hontom, appointed just a month earlier as the commies of Fort 
Orange  attempted to “challenge” Eelckens, the Mohawks withdrew.107 Saggodryochta, recalling 
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how he witnessed first-hand Hontom violently mutilate and murder another Mohawk sachem, “at 
once packed up his skins and rising up said, ‘That man is a scoundrel, I will not trade with 
him.’”108 For a moment it seemed the English, via the intercultural connection established by 
Eelckens, appeared to have superseded the Dutch in their relationship with the Mohawks, but the 
success was short-lived. Van Twiller and the Zoutberg arrived to confiscate Eelckens’s goods 
and escort him out of New Netherland. As for the Mohawks and the Dutch, Saggodryochta was 
outraged a man of Hontom’s abhorrent character could become a principal representative of the 
Dutch. In his native tongue, he threatened to kill Hontom “the first time they should find him 
alone.”109 Hontom told them to “do their best.”110  
The Mohawks did not hold back. Saggodryochta organized a massive force of 900 
Konosoni warriors to send a message to their Dutch brothers and finally avenge the death of the 
fallen chief Hontom murdered.111 In short order the army surrounded the fort, demanding the 
surrender of Hontom, intent on avenging the death of the sachem he had tortured to death years 
earlier112 Perhaps with the fate of Van Krieckenbeeck’s coalition fresh in his mind for the 
moment, Hontom refused to leave. In a show of force and aggression the Mohawks retaliated, 
setting ablaze the Company sloop docked on the river and slaughtering nearly all Kiliaen van 
Rensselaer’s livestock.113 Hontom survived the onslaught, but the message was clear. The 
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Mohawks controlled Ahnowahraake, including the Dutch who to them were one and the same 
despite the colony-patroonship dynamic.  
The Mohawks did not recognize colonial jurisdictions as the Dutch had, perceiving New 
Netherland and its patroonships as one entity, one extension of their longhouse, and one to be 
held accountable for its actions.114 The Dutch colonists did not see things the same way. Hontom 
died soon after in a scuffle with Cornelis van der Vorst in Rensselaerswijck. How exactly the 
fight started is unknown, but it likely ignited out of residual tensions from the Mohawk attack 
that put the colony on edge. The Dutch knew the Mohawks were not to be trifled with, and 
Hontom’s “behavior with the Indians was shameful.”115 
 Disaster struck for the Mohawks in 1633 when the first smallpox epidemic swept across 
Ahnowahraake.116 The effects were devastating as Native Americans perished in unprecedented 
numbers, never before seen by their own accounts. As the disease spread westward out of New 
England, several indigenous groups suffered drastic population losses, effectively paving the 
way for English settlement into the Connecticut River Valley where the recorded losses 
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peaked.117 Contemporary writings closely followed the trail, with documentation of the sheer 
destruction appearing in Bradford, Winthrop, Jameson, and others.118 Modern estimates place 
Mohawk population numbers in 1633 at around 8,100 strong.119 Studies by Snow and Lanphear, 
based on the archaeological data, estimate a mortality rate of 75 percent in Mohawk country, 
leaving approximately 2,000 survivors.120  
In an instant, the Mohawk vision for Ahnowahraake began to blur. The immediate severe 
losses forced the Mohawks to regroup, in order to rekindling their imperial aims would require 
hundreds of new captives to replace those that had been lost. They would mourn for their victims 
on the battlefield, and would look to the Dutch for help. Understandably, the sudden losses from 
smallpox slowed trade between the Mohawks and the Dutch considerably.  
In light of both the recent diplomatic setbacks and a fear of French intervention, the 
Dutch were quick to investigate what had happened.121 In December of 1634, a small expedition 
led by Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, a barber-surgeon who arrived to New Netherland in 
1630, embarked from Fort Orange into Mohawk country.122 By the time van den Bogaert visited 
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the Mohawk Valley the following year, the disease had passed through the heart of Iroquoia into 
Huronia [Wendake], but evidence of the epidemic remained.123 Some of the descriptions left by 
Bogaert in his journal that documented his journey into Mohawk country provide clear 
indications of a recent smallpox outbreak. Upon reaching the easternmost village, Onekahoncka, 
van den Bogaert discovered Saggodryochta living “one-quarter of a mile from his village 
because many Indians here in the castle had died of smallpox.”124 Van den Bogaert’s journal 
does not detail his brief encounter with Saggodryochta, but historians can speculate what they 
might have discussed. As the surgeon soon discovered, in spite of the obvious physical damage 
smallpox had wrought on the Mohawk communities he visited, the disease did little to alter to 
their spirits.  
The timing of the Dutch expedition could not have been better. As van den Bogaert 
traversed deeper into Mohawk country, the words “Allese Rondade,” or “Shoot,” echoed by the 
piercing shouts of Mohawk warriors, reminded him of why Saggodryochta had been glad to see 
him.125 The smallpox epidemic created a void in Mohawk communities that had to be filled 
immediately. New warriors and matrons had to be adopted from neighboring indigenous groups. 
The need for captives meant waging new wars, and the Mohawks, now well-versed in the power 
of gunpowder technology, sought guns of their own to win them.126 From a Mohawk perspective, 
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the Dutch were the perfect suppliers: the beaver skins Dutch traders wanted were relatively easy 
to acquire, and more importantly, the Mohawks viewed the Dutch as expendable.  
The Mohawks controlled the relationship, and as was made perfectly clear during Van 
den Bogaert’s visit, they could just as easily turn to the French if a partnership with the Dutch 
could not be achieved.127 Moreover, his journey illustrated the precarious position the Dutch 
unwittingly found themselves in as a result. After days of refusing to discharge their muskets for 
fear of their own safety, Van den Bogaert and his comrades eventually gave into the pressure, 
firing a thunderous volley skyward that captivated his hosts.  They had little choice, whether they 
fired or not did not change the reality that their fates were in the Mohawks’ hands128.  With the 
leaders of the global arms trade at their disposal, the Mohawks ushered in “the dawn of a new era 
in the Northeast.”129  
 Conveniently for the Mohawks, the Dutch were the perfect arms suppliers. By the 1630s, 
the United Provinces were firmly established as the leading arms dealers of the world with 
supply lines linked to the Baltic, Mediterranean, and East Indies.130 Trading in gunpowder 
required connections to the East Indies and the cooperation of the East India Company, allowing 
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for the swift development of commercial markets within which guns, gunpowder and 
ammunition were sold to international bidders regardless of diplomatic relations. Moreover, 
many Dutch traders were perfectly willing to trade munitions for beavers, often at exorbitant 
prices. Although historians of New Netherland have mostly focused on the “wampum 
revolution,” the Mohawks were purchasing guns early and paid steep prices for them.131  
Dutch traders exploited Mohawk demands for guns, powder, and shot to the fullest 
extent. During the 1630s, firelock weapons could be furnished for roughly 12 guilders, and a 
pound of gunpowder for 2. The Mohawks, in turn, paid five to ten times the production costs in 
up to 120 guilders per gun and 12 guilders for gunpowder, equating to approximately 20 and 2 
beaver pelts respectively.132 Gunsmiths in New Netherland could make additional profits by 
charging Mohawk warriors for repairs, a practice the Mohawks took considerable exception to 
throughout the seventeenth century.133  
The Mohawks benefitted from access to Dutch firearms, but also from advancements in 
firearm technology. The emergence of the flintlock by the mid-1630s, a far and away 
improvement from the antecedent matchlock or wheel lock, meshed nicely with Mohawk 
imperial ambitions. The key component to the flintlock’s improved efficiency was the “battery,” 
which combined the steel and pan lid into a singular cover that protected the charge from the 
elements prior to ignition. This critical alteration, in addition to other cosmetic improvements, 
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made the flintlock more compatible with indigenous warfare, a “dependable and relatively easy 
to maintain” weapon that fit the Mohawks’ “skulking way of war.”134  
 Previous historical inquiries into the effects of gunpowder technology on the Mohawks 
and Haudenosaunee are generally one-sided: the introduction of guns into Iroquoia resulted in a 
growing dependence on European weaponry at the expense of declining cultural traditions and 
knowledge, inducing an endless cycle of inciting wars to obtain beavers to obtain guns to fight 
more wars.135 Yet, “in both this world and the next,” Richter points out, “Iroquois used European 
goods and tools in distinctively Indian ways.”136 Richter, Parmenter, and Silverman have since 
turned the tables, ushering in new ways to think about Native American warfare in strictly native 
terms. Rather than subscribing to the Champlain Thesis, Silverman argues the gun quickly 
became a central element in indigenous culture, especially as a symbol of Indian manhood via its 
pragmatic uses in hunting and warfare, but also as a means of exercising cultural autonomy.137  
Indeed, gunpowder technology formed an integral role in Mohawk diplomacy. The 
transfer of munitions, tools with symbolic meaning to power and sovereignty, helped facilitate 
the preservation of kaswentha, maintaining a steady balance of exchange between the Mohawks 
and their Dutch brothers. Mohawk warriors interested in procuring Dutch flintlocks “did not so 
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much purchase European goods as they did ‘Indian goods’” constructed specifically to meet their 
needs.138 
 This same adaptability that enabled the Mohawks to seamlessly adopt gunpowder 
technology into their way of life swiftly pervaded the ritual adoption of people, a core element of 
cultural preservation in Haudenosaunee society known as “requickening.”139 Following the death 
of an individual, the deceased’s title, social role, and any duties associated with either would be 
transferred to a living successor through ceremony. In the cases of high status individuals, these 
positions were typically filled from within the lineage, clan, or village. For members of lower 
social rank or importance however, Haudenosaunee communities relied on cultural adoption. As 
a result, Mohawk warriors conducted raids or battles with their indigenous neighbors with the 
explicit intent to capture potential adoptees. Captives deemed worthy of entry into society would 
escape death by ritual torture, and in turn be ritually absorbed into social role vacated by the 
deceased, thus restoring balance within the community. Ritual violence became the primary 
avenue for dealing with tragedy.140 
 A successful “requickening” depended on success in war. The wars initiated in the 1630s 
and onward were not as much fought over beavers as they were over captives for which the 
epidemic of 1634 created a dire need. Between 1635 and 1640, the Mohawks waged “mourning 
wars” in seemingly all directions, usually against their enemies.141 One of their ancient enemies, 
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the Wendats, became a primary target. The harsh effects of smallpox in Wendake coaxed many 
Wendats to convert to Christianity. According to W. J. Eccles, this made the Wendats favorable 
targets for adoption, since the Mohawks would have perceived their willingness to convert to 
Christianity as evidence of a weak cultural loyalty that could be exploited.142  
 The Mohawks did not shy away from attacking Europeans either. They made multiple 
attacks against the English during the Pequot War. In August 1636 a war party of Mohawks 
armed with Dutch flintlocks fell upon some English in Connecticut, killing several.143 A year 
later, a group of Mohawk gunmen joined forces with Pequots against a joint English-
Narragansett coalition in Connecticut, a further warning to both the English and Narragansetts 
that the Mohawks were not to be trifled with.144 According to Alfred Cave, Roger Williams’s 
report of this second attack is false, but nonetheless, Williams’ observations of the Mohawks as 
“most savage, their weapons more dangerous, and their crueltie dreadfull, roasting allive, etc.” 
succinctly captures the consistent attitude of New England Indians towards the Mohawks.145 
Even in a weakened state, they were a considerable threat in want of respect, a lesson the English 
learned after Mohawk messengers delivered the head of Sassacus back to Connecticut in 1637.146 
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The move served as a gesture for continued good trade relations with the English, but was also a 
conspicuous reminder Ahnowahraake was a world the Mohawks controlled. 
 Both English and French agents recognized the ferocity of Mohawk warfare, but 
ultimately blamed the Dutch for their rise in power. Contemporaries believed the Dutch were 
intentionally dealing arms to the Mohawks in order to harass their European rivals. Moreover, 
the resulting imbalance of power between Native American factions necessitated the need for 
French and English agents to trade guns, gunpowder, and lead to their own indigenous allies, a 
practice both factions abhorred for fear of their own safety. As the Mohawks expanded their 
imperial reach, the effects rippled across Ahnowahraake, inciting tension and fear that affected 
the relationships of Dutch, French, and English colonists with their neighboring Indian groups 
for the next several decades. As intense as the effects of their partnership were however, neither 
the Dutch nor the Mohawks intended to assist the other in the problems they shared ties to. 
Neither party was certain of the role of the other in their own designs, neither fully trusted the 
other, but for the moment both factions realized one could meet the needs of the other. It was a 
symbiotic relationship in the making, yet neither the Dutch nor the Mohawks were willing to 
acknowledge the signs that both had become dependent on the other for survival.  
 
Conclusion  
  By 1639, a Mohawk-Dutch relationship began to solidify into something both sides 
could recognize as mutually beneficial. Mohawk reliance on firearms developed hand-in-hand 
with their desire to extend their longhouse, to make “one people.”147 Far-flung hunting 
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expeditions for beaver pelts might not as of yet been necessary, but it fit snug within the motives 
of Mohawk military campaigns. Wars for captives often served the dual purpose of gaining 
access to new hunting grounds whereby additional beaver populations could be exploited.148 
Despite some resistance from colonial officials and the WIC Directors, many Dutch traders were 
more than willing to oblige. Even then they had little choice. Years of strained relations with the 
Mohawks made perfectly clear that the Mohawks–could and did–trade with their French and 
English rivals and more importantly, could easily exterminate New Netherland altogether. The 
Dutch were expendable.  
 Two events in 1639 perfectly capture the dichotomous nature of New Netherland’s 
existence in this early period. First, the lift of the company monopsony on the fur trade ushered 
in a wave of private traders eager to capitalize on a burgeoning market. At the same time, in 
recognizing that “which has already caused much evil and will hereafter result in greater evil if 
no means be adopted,” the WIC attempted to officially halt the vending of guns, powder, and 
shot to the Indians.149 Effective March 31, 1639, “every inhabitant of New Netherland … [was] 
… most expressly forbidden to sell any muskets, powder or lead to the Indians, on pain of being 
punished by death.”150 As far as the outcome, the Dutch received mixed results. The lift on the 
company monopsony provided enough incentive for New Netherland’s population to boom with 
scores of settlers flooding the docks of New Amsterdam over the subsequent years. 
Consequently however, the newly-opened opportunity for profit attracted private traders who 
bore no interests in adhering to the local laws that colonial magistrates lacked the resources to 
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fully enforce. The ordinance prohibiting the trade of munitions would be one of several to be 
restated over the duration of the colony, but the official legislation did little to curb the rampant 
smuggling that private traders brought with them, much less the official company trade that 
continued unabated.  
 The advent of European trade into Ahnowahraake did not render an old world new. 
Certainly European goods helped reorient trade axes over which indigenous geopolitics 
fluctuated, but these goods did little to affect the imperial strategies of Native American factions. 
As has been discussed thus far, the Mohawks utilized traditional systems of adaptation and 
survival to navigate change before and after the beginnings of European settlement. They did not 
react to European colonization, but instead forced Europeans to accommodate their own value 
systems and customs. It was the Europeans who found themselves constantly reacting to the ebb 
and flow of the indigenous conflicts that continuously shift across the landscape, connecting the 
worlds of New England, New France, and New Netherland beyond a point any of the three were 
comfortable with. Far from a land where milk and honey flowed, Ahnowahraake was a world 
enmeshed in intense geopolitical friction dating back to centuries that convulsed in a manner 
utterly invisible to the first Europeans’ eyes.151 As the Dutch would quickly discover, 
Ahnowahraake was a distinctly native world, and they would need the help of the Mohawks if 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GUNPOWDER DIPLOMACY: TRADE AND SECURITY IN NEW NETHERLAND AND 




 Perched atop his horse with a clear view of the Mohawk castle, Arent van Curler and his 
envoy waited patiently “fully a quarter of an hour,” on a brisk morning in 1643 while their native 
hosts prepared the welcoming ceremony.1 Van Curler knew the process well. Travelling from 
village to village into the heart of Mohawk country, he had been well-received at every turn with 
warm welcomes, smooth gift exchanges, and hearty meals just for the occasion, all indications of 
the immense respect the Mohawks held for their Dutch brother. Standing in unison, the village’s 
best warriors brandished muskets, took aim at the sky and fired. These were ceremonies 
articulated to demonstrate the weight of Mohawk power. The Mohawks took pride in their rising 
capacity as a military force, and no Dutch colonist had been more instrumental in this feat than 
Corlaer.2 Having graciously acknowledged the salute, van Curler’s group approached, guided by 
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the glowing smiles of their hosts that broke through the clearing smoke. “There was,” he later 
wrote, “great joy among them because I had come.”3 
This short cultural exchange, albeit part of a larger initiative in van Curler’s failed 
attempt to procure French prisoners of war–a group that included Father Isaac Jogues–from his 
Mohawk allies, marked the beginning of what would become an intense relationship between the 
Dutch and the Mohawks. With the help of Dutch munitions, the Mohawks evolved from a 
premier fighting force into an imperial power that could hold its own against Dutch, French, or 
English foes, leading to their expansive conquests that would stretch from Iowa to Maine over 
the following decades. In return, the Dutch received a powerful–and feared–native ally that could 
serve to tie the Dutch economy into the fur trade while also providing mediation for intermittent 
Dutch-Indian conflicts, both equally crucial to the colony’s economic prosperity and encouraging 
immigration.  
From a Dutch perspective, trading a steady flow of guns, powder, and shot to appease the 
demands of their powderful Indian neighbors assured continued friendship and alliances crucial 
to sustaining a colonial presence in Ahnowahraake. Yet these promises did little to curb the 
prevailing fears of Indian duplicity. The “imminent danger of being suddenly attacked, 
massacred and driven off” by Indians and Europeans alike was a constant threat in the minds of 
both the colonists and the WIC, especially after Kieft’s War.4 This fear became the basis for the 
ordinances that officially banned the trade of guns, powder, and shot. Indeed, by 1650 the WIC 
acknowledged the trade had reached a point in which the “aforesaid contraband goods cannot 
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easily  be cut short or forbidden, without evident danger of new war  and trouble between the 
subjects of the State and the Aborigines.”5 The scarcity of gunpowder compounded the issues. In 
trading away their limited gunpowder supplies for continued friendship, the Dutch were trading 
away their best means of defense in exchange for temporary peace. Only a year earlier in 1649 
did Director-General Petrus Stuyvesant remark on the paucity of powder available for the 
“eventuality of new war.”6 With the looming threat of being overrun by the English in New 
Haven permanently stitched in the back of Stuyvesant’s mind, the suppression of the gunpowder 
trade became all the more prudent, especially following successive encroachments into the 
Connecticut and Delaware River Valleys in the late 1630s and 1640s.7 
Looking at the Mohawk-Dutch partnership through the eyes of van Curler and other 
Dutch gunrunners yields a nuanced view of why the Dutch traded munitions to the Mohawks, 
voluntarily and by force, and the implications of these actions for the combined futures of New 
Netherland and Rensselaerswijck. Together, van Curler, and the Mohawk headman he dealt with 
set dangerous precedents for how the Mohawks and Dutch negotiated with one another, 
solidifying the place of gunpowder in kaswentha. From this moment on, the Mohawks expected 
a continual supply of guns, powder, and shot from WIC representatives in order to maintain their 
friendship, anything less threatened to break the chains that bound them together.  
 In 1643, Van Curler and the Dutch had reason to believe a bright future was on the 
horizon. As Wim Klooster argues, “the Dutch empire in the Atlantic reached its greatest extent” 
in 1642 following the additions of Luanda, São Tomé, and expansion in West Africa and Brazil, 
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all on the heels of the Iberian disunion.8 After years of struggling to establish themselves in 
North America in the same way, the Dutch finally conceded any progress to be made in North 
America would come only with the cooperation of the Mohawks. By July 1640, Kiliaen van 
Rensselaer dropped his charges of indemnity against the Mohawks for killing his cattle years 
earlier–a change of heart likely influenced by the success of William Pynchon to divert Mohawk 
trade in Springfield–and instructed van Curler to forge a new relationship with the Mohawks.9 
Accordingly, “three very fine blankets” were distributed in van Rensselaer’s name to three 
sachems. The first was for Saggodryochta, who van Rensselaer took careful attention to mention 
by name, and the other two “to the two chiefs who have the greatest credit and power among the 
maquaes [Mohawks] or to one of the principal men of the mahikans [Mohicans].”10  Doing so 
was no difficult task for van Curler, who was already known to “spend too much time in the 
woods” and had even constructed the patroon’s house on the western bank of the Hudson, 
opposite Rensselaerswijck, but closer to the Mohawks.11 The letters detailing van Curler’s vivid 
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ideas for the Dutch colonization of North America may not have survived, but his actions make 
them clear.  
 Like van Curler, the Dutch of New Netherland depended on the Mohawks for survival. 
The Mohawks’ firm grip on much of the fur trade made them an invaluable client for both the 
company and its colonists. In addition, siphoning off munitions to the Mohawks increased the 
protection of the colony. On one hand, increasing Mohawk power helped sustain their 
dominance over the smaller indigenous nations that surrounded New Netherland on all sides. On 
the other, fueling Mohawk military campaigns abroad worked well to both create a buffer zone 
between the Dutch and their imperial rivals, the French and the English, while also serving as a 
means to indirectly disrupt trade with the Native Americans of those areas. Lastly, elements of 
fear and dependence also played a considerable part in Dutch motives. The WIC recognized the 
degree to which New Netherland’s sustenance and economy depended on the Mohawks, and as a 
result, feared the consequences potentially wrought should relations turn sour to the point the 
Mohawks divert the fur trade to the English or French. Worse still, the Mohawks were powerful 
enough in Dutch eyes to oust the colony altogether, either on their own or in a joint effort with 
French or English agents eager to see New Netherland razed. Maintaining the gunpowder trade 
with the Mohawks assured their allegiance, and with luck, their protection.  
 
Rensselaerswijck 
 By the time of his trip in 1643, van Curler had done well to climb the ranks in his great-
grand uncle’s patroonship. After two years of training under Jacob Albertsz Planck, Van Curler 
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was made the patroonship’s secretary and bookkeeper in 1639, and commies by 1641.12 Together 
with Cornelis Teunisz van Slijck, representative of the patroon, and Pieter Cornelisz van 
Monnickendam, who collected tithes and monitored operations on the Hudson, the three men ran 
Rensselaerswijck. The three men, “all in their early twenties,” historian Janny Venema notes, 
“repeatedly had differences of opinion.”13 Yet it appears from an early stage, van Rensselaer 
favored van Curler over the others, and seems to have entrusted him with the greatest amount of 
authority.14  
 The objectives of Rensselaerswijck changed considerably after 1639. Prior to the end of 
the fur trade monopsony, WIC policies for New Netherland typically favored trade over 
colonization and settlement. Patroons enjoyed separate colonial jurisdictions outside the control 
of the West India Company so long as their businesses were conducted where company 
representation did not exist in order to not interfere with the official trade. As part of the original 
pro-colonization faction of the WIC, Van Rensselaer seemed disinterested initially in the fur 
trade, evidenced by his tense relationship with the Mohawks in the 1630s. For years, van 
Rensselaer continued to demand retribution for an incident involving Mohawk warriors and Hans 
Hontom in 1632. Yet, by 1641, van Rensselaer appears to have changed course. He still 
considered Rensselaerswijck as primarily an agricultural colony, but interests in taking 
advantage of the fur trade were present.15 Always an astute observer of events in the patroonship, 
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even from afar, perhaps van Rensselaer recognized the necessity of the fur trade in efforts to 
promote and sustain a colonial settlement.  
 Van Rensselaer’s change in course, and subsequently Van Curler’s newfound duties as a 
cultural liaison would force extensive changes in the Mohawk-Dutch relationship. Despite efforts 
by Van Rensselaer to curb smuggling within his patroonship, as well as the effects of the 
seasonal private traders that would float firearms and brandy up the Hudson, it would not be 
enough to prevent Rensselaerswijck from turning into a reliable commercial supplier for 
munitions, linens, and liquor.16 As a result, Rensselaerswijck and the private traders hiding under 
its jurisdiction quickly set precedents for how the Mohawks and other Indians would pursue 
relationships with New Netherland through the duration of the colony. Indeed, attempts by 
Director-General Kieft to curb the hazardous trade of guns and alcohol failed to suppress the 
operations in Rensselaerswijck where most of the illicit trading occurred.17 Indeed, “after 1639 
there are many references to Iroquois armament, and one of the most commonly assigned 
reasons for the growing tensions at Manhattan and the outbreak of Kieft’s War in February 
1643.”18  
The outgrowth of illicit trading in guns, powder, shot, and liquor from Rensselaerswijck 
completely changed the nature of trading around Fort Orange.19 Almost immediately, official 
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company trade at Fort Orange declined, while a local population of private traders quickly 
sprouted. Like van Curler, these traders were commonly called boschlopers, secretive merchants 
“who defied West India Company directives by peddling their contraband wares or brokering 
trade with native inhabitants in the forests of and its colonial North America.”20 Under the cover 
of foliage, these private traders, “well-provisioned with high quality trade goods such as textiles 
and firearms,” undercut company prices and utilized the lack of locally-centralized government 
offices to forge intercultural partnerships and alliances.21 Traditionally, historians have portrayed 
these traders in specific terms, as “strong-armed” merchants not above resorting to physical 
abuse or intimidation to acquire the business of Mohawk patrons.22 While violence did indeed 
pervade many of these encounters, however, the treatment of these incidents as evidentiary 
fragments of a frontier where “civility vanished” does little to push forth a stronger 
understanding of intercultural relationships, especially ones the Mohawks often controlled.23  
As the commies of Rensselaerswijck, Van Curler brokered an alliance with the Mohawks 
on their own terms, travelling from his residence near Fort Orange with gifts that echoed loudly 
in a world that hinged on commitment and reciprocity. Although van Curler technically by title 
represented Rensselaerswijck, and not New Netherland, the Mohawks nonetheless perceived him 
as an ambassador of all Dutch people, enabling van Curler to carry out a diplomatic mission 
without official authority from the States General. As a result, he successfully resumed the 
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dominant role in Mohawk-Dutch relations previously held by Eelckens, carving out a permanent 
place in Mohawk memory as an influential intercultural contact and ambassador of all Dutch 
people.24 Despite lacking any diplomatic titles or duties from the States General or West India 
Company, “the Mohawks received him as the respected headman he appeared to them to be, with 
all due ceremony as embellished with the fruits of intercultural trade.”25 Van Curler’s success 
would set a precedent for years to come, forcing both Willem Kieft and later, Stuyvesant to 
continue trading company munitions to the Mohawks, while also attempting to derail the 
contraband trade the Mohawks willfully encouraged.26 
 
Security  
Faced with the constant, simultaneous threats of an English invasion or Indian massacre, 
the Dutch had little choice but to continue trading gunpowder to the Mohawks for their own 
security. The Dutch depended on their alliance with the Mohawks to help settle disputes with 
other indigenous groups and for protection from potential French or English threats. Colonial 
officials frequently called upon the Mohawks to act as mediators as happened in both Kieft’s 
War and the Second Dutch-Munsee War–sometimes known as the Peach War–as well as other 
small conflicts that intermittently plagued the colony. The Mohawks and Mohicans both exerted 
heavy influence over the smaller Hudson Valley bands, and the Dutch used this power dynamic 
to their advantage as best they could when necessary.  
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 Most of the friction between the Dutch and Indians in the early stages of settlement 
stemmed over land. In response to the influx of colonists in 1639, Kieft made several land 
purchases from the Indians in the vicinity of New Amsterdam.27 At first these transactions, such 
as one land deed with the Rockaways, often came with stipulations that the Indians could remain 
on the land to “plant corn, fish, hunt, and make a living” that could contribute to the welfare of 
the colony through trade.28 While agreeable initially, however, sharing land with the Indians 
soon became problematic for the Dutch. It was not uncommon for groups such as the 
Rockaways, either unfamiliar with or apathetic towards European concepts of private property, 
to frequently resell purchased land to different buyers in exchange for goods including guns, 
powder, shot, knives, linens, wampum, and alcohol.29  
Additionally, the lack of distinctive geopolitical boundaries often made settlers 
uncomfortable, leading to intercultural disputes frequently worsened by alcohol.30 Colonists’ 
pigs, for example,  proved to be quite troublesome, with numerous incidents of free-range pigs 
destroying Indian gardens and crop fields.31 The hazardous effects of these occurrences are 
captured in ordinances as early as 1640 warning that the continued failure to restrain livestock 
will result in poor harvests and worse, “the Indians would be caused to move and develop a 
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hatred against our nation and some injury might happen to one or the other of us.”32 These 
specific clauses in land deeds and ordinances, moreover, reveal how Dutch settlers remained 
reliant on the Indians for at least some of their food supplies. Surviving in Ahnowahraake meant 
maintaining amicable relations. Moreover, the need to preserve healthy relationships with local 
Indian nations was becoming increasingly difficult around New Amsterdam, “where the fur trade 
was fast disappearing.”33  
 Navigating the complex geopolitics of Ahnowahraake required an adept awareness of 
what was occurring in the forests surrounding New Netherland. By 1639, the Mohawks were 
obtaining guns from English traders along the Connecticut River, and were less than shy about 
showing them off to Dutch traders.34 Archaeological evidence suggests the Mohawks had long 
been receiving firearms from Dutch sources at this point, but any indication that the Mohawks 
might turn to English suppliers was a red flag to Dutch colonizers. Maintaining the trade 
connection that sustained the colony’s economy and protected its borders meant the WIC would 
have to reconsider how to go about preserving the colony’s relationship with the Mohawks, even 
if the answer was obvious.35 The Mohawks wanted guns, and would go to great lengths to get 
their hands on them.  
Many of the smaller indigenous groups in the Hudson Valley and around Manhattan soon 
looked upon the Dutch arms trade with the Mohawks and Mohicans with disdain, and it was 
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partially the refusal of Dutch officials to permit the sale of firearms to the coastal Indian groups 
around Manhattan that led to the outbreak of Kieft’s War. In contrast to Dutch strategies for the 
Mohawks and Mohicans, colonial officials sought to avoid trading munitions to the smaller local 
groups for fear of uprisings against Dutch settlers, only a short extension from the intermittent 
conflicts that continued to impede further settlement.36 In 1639, officials in New Amsterdam 
posted the first ordinance banning the sale of guns, gunpowder, and shot to the Indians.37 The 
new law forced disgruntled Hudson Valley groups–incapable of asserting themselves in ways the 
Mohawks or Mahicans could–to trek up to Rensselaerswijck where van Curler would draw up a 
similar ordinance two years later.38 The Dutch took great precaution with regard to who 
gunpowder went to in these early years, and the case of the smaller Munsee bands living in the 
vicinity of New Amsterdam, the risks outweigh the benefits. Maintaining an adequate supply to 
meet the demands of the Mohawks and Mahicans, moreover, was equally crucial. The Dutch 
might have been the world leaders in arms dealing, but New Netherland was far from a top 
priority in terms of imperial possessions and received resources accordingly. While the focus in 
the Dutch Atlantic remained Brazil, carefully retaining munitions for the most important clients 
was paramount.39 
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In February 1643, a well-armed Mohican war party conducted a raid against unsuspecting 
Wecquaesgeek and Tappan Indians, armed only with bows and arrows.40 According to De Vries, 
“eighty to ninety” Mohican warriors had descended from Fort Orange, “each with a gun on his 
shoulder” to levy tribute from the smaller Algonquin nations.41 At least seventeen 
Wecquaesgeeks were killed. As the invaders made off with many captive women and children, 
the bewildered survivors fled to Fort Amsterdam to seek refuge.42  
That the attackers were Mohicans and not Mohawks is worth discussing further here. 
O’Callaghan and Brodhead were both confident enough to ignore the primary documents and 
assume the attackers were actually Mohawks and not Mohicans.43 The Mohawks were in fact 
enemies of these smaller Algonquian groups, but attacks were rare and would have factored little 
in Mohawk imperial designs at this time.44 The Mohicans, on the other hand, were allies with 
these smaller Hudson Valley groups and as part of their covenant, occasionally called upon these 
groups to collect tribute. According to De Vries, this attack was the result of the 
Mohicans“want[ing] to levy a contribution,” probably in response to other events happening in 
Ahnowahraake.45 Amy Schutt has argued the Mohican attack might have been a response to Van 
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Curler’s renewed covenant with the Mohawks. “The Mohicans watched these activities 
carefully,” Schutt continues, “and considered ways to make themselves valuable to the Dutch at 
a time when the Mohawks were gaining an advantage.”46 The attack on the Weckquaesgeek and 
Tappans aligns with both objectives, since exerting their influence of the wampum and corn 
trades of the lower Hudson Valley, and by the same token, avenging the death of Claes Swits 
would have allowed the Mohicans to bolster their position as Dutch trade partners in their own 
terms. Building on highly coveted wampum connections gave them leverage over the Mohawks 
as well.47 
 In the short and long term, the tensions between the smaller Hudson River indigenous 
groups and the Mohawks, Mohicans, and even the Susquehannocks, helped create a state of fear 
among the WIC Directors. Kiliaen van Rensselaer himself took quick precaution in the event a 
new Indian war might spread up river. Venema speculates it was likely the 1643 attack that 
might have encouraged Kiliaen van Rensselaer to install Nicolaes Coorn as a drill sergeant on 
Beeren Island along with artillery along the southernmost side. These installments initiated the 
process of transforming the island into a defensible retreat for the colonists as well as an ideal 
location for storing company goods and housing an arsenal over which Van Rensselaer hoped to 
maintain tight control.48 An inventory list from 1643 included “two iron three pounders with 
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their gun carriages, ladles and sponges, a cannon, gun carriages, musket balls, muskets, firelocks, 
pistols, spears, powder, ball molds, and other equipment for a value of f. 1094.18.”49  
 For fear of an attack, colonial officials expected settlers to have adequately equipped 
themselves for training and protection. The guns, gunpowder, and lead that made its way to the 
colony were mostly property of the WIC and kept in the colonial armories. There were times the 
WIC felt it necessary to supply colonists with guns, powder, and shot before crossing the 
Atlantic. In a letter to Stuyvesant, the Directors note their permission directed to Antonia 
Juriansen, a mother travelling with a large family aboard the Valckenier in 1648 “to take with her 
12 guns, 50 lbs. of powder and as much lead for the defense of her family in time of need.”50 The 
Directors paid close attention to these particular cases. In order to insure “all smuggling be 
prevented,” the WIC routinely requested Stuyvesant to maintain close watch on incoming 
colonists “to see whether they have not made a profitable trade in arms, instead of keeping them 
for defense.”51  
 Although their relationship with the Mohawks was at least partly to blame for the 
internecine fighting with the local Indians, the Dutch still relied on this connection for the safety 
of the colony. Colonial magistrates knew well enough to take advantage of the influence the 
Mohawks exerted over the local bands of the Hudson Valley, and frequently called upon 
Mohawk sachems to mediate conflicts and help restore peace. It was only after Kieft’s first visit 
to Fort Orange in the seven years he had been in New Netherland that progress towards peace 
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were tangibly in reach. In the summer of 1645, Kieft embraced kaswentha for the first time, 
calling upon Mohawk and Mohican ambassadors to assist drawing up the terms of a new peace 
treaty.52 With the assistance of Van Curler and the representatives of Rensselaerswijck, an 
agreement was swiftly met. Shortly thereafter, Kieft, in the company of Rensselaerswijck 
officials and Mohawk ambassadors journeyed back to New Amsterdam. There “under the blue 
canopy of heaven,” a ‘masked’ Mohawk sachem Agheroense, serenaded his international 
audience with metaphors of brotherhood, peace, and the laws of kaswentha.53  
Evidently, much of Agheroense’s speech, undoubtedly clouded in metaphor akin to 
Haudenosaunee tradition, went over Dutch heads. The “mask” Agheroense wore captivated 
onlookers including van der Donck, who later wrote that Kieft and La Montagne determined the 
substance was gold, prompting secretive expeditions into the mountains “which the Indians had 
indicated perfectly.”54 This distraction, over a substance that turned out to be pyrite, perfectly 
captures the lack of awareness of even the most adept Dutch intercultural liasons of Mohawk 
customs. The mask symbolized not wealth or beauty, but clarity, an important theme deeply 
rooted in the metaphorical Tree of Peace from the Deganawidah Epic.55 Unbeknownst to Dutch 
observers, Agheroense–by covering half of his face in pyrite–was actually replicating a specific 
concept from Haudenosaunee oral traditions. The pyrite–ironically, given the Dutch reaction to 
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it–represented the “clouds that covered the sun and implied the absence of clarity and reason.”56 
While addressing the forum of Dutch colonists and Indians before him, the unpainted side faced 
the Dutch indicative of their adherence to kaswentha, while the gold faced the Indians, an 
intentional signal that the Indians had been behaving poorly and with lack of clarity, for why else 
would they seek to harm the Mohawks’ Dutch brothers.57  
On August 30, a general peace was declared, culminating in the signing of a treaty 
between the Dutch and the several Indian Nations involved, all under the supervision of the 
Mohawks, “the strongest and most feared in the country.”58 The negotiations provided the 
Mohawks with an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to kaswentha and their 
relationship with the Dutch as well as a means of strengthening their influence over the local 
Munsee groups, in order to take advantage of their wampum production.59  
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Trade  
When Adriaen van der Donck wrote, “the beaver is the main reason and the source of the 
means for the initial settlement of this fine country,” he was not wrong.60 In fact, it took the 
Dutch just two decades to exhaust the beaver population around Manhattan Island to near 
completion by 1639.61 This posed significant challenges to the colony’s development with a new 
wave of colonists on the way. The end of the WIC’s monopsony on the fur trade was a final 
resort to encourage settlement. It incited a sharp increase in colonists while also exacerbating 
New Netherland’s problems including its peripheral importance to the Dutch in the Atlantic. 
Unlike in Brazil, the Dutch in New Netherland did not possess a mint to sustain a metallic-based 
economy or sugar to attract many capital investors, resulting in a local currency driven by 
wampum and beaver pelts.62 Success of the colony and its inhabitants quickly entangled itself 
with the unreliable current of the fur trade, ultimately tying both settlers’ and traders’ fates to the 
land that was constantly shifting from geopolitical tensions below the surface. As these new 
colonists would soon find, Ahnowahraake was no more stable than the ships they sailed in on.  
While the fur trade around New Amsterdam began to dwindle as a result of the declining 
populations in the surrounding areas, the fur trade at Fort Orange expanded tremendously in the 
1640s, resulting in the swift armament of Haudenosaunee war brigades.63 Jogues reported the 
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Mohawks possessed “nearly three hundred arquebuses” in 1643, and by the following year, 
Dutch traders “sold for furs in the consequence of great profit” enough guns, powder and lead for 
the Mohawks to field an armed force 400 strong.64 With the French establishing new posts at 
Montreal and Fort Richelieu in 1642, the Mohawks were more than happy to oblige, and “gave 
everything they had” for firearms.65 
Although colonial officials recognized the inherent dangers of trading munitions to the 
Mohawks, the intimate ties between the fur trade and New Netherland’s economy ultimately 
bound the colony to its continuation.66 Private traders and settlers alike depended on the fur trade 
for survival and many families took on illicit enterprises at the risk of substantial fines and even 
banishment in the face of poverty.67 In 1657 for instance, Beverwijck officials discovered 
twenty-three year old Susanna Jans serving one daring Mohawk patron a concoction of beer, 
brandy, and wine on the grounds that her “husband having double hernia and being therefore 
unable to earn his living and she being burdened with three small children, for whom she can buy 
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no food except with beavers.”68 Initially, the court resolved to have the defendant pay a steep 
fine of 500 guilders, but upon observation the final fee amount was never transcribed. 
Considering the Susanna Jans’ household would never have been able to pay the fine, it is 
possible magistrates either looked the other way or settled out of court.69 Connivance, in Dutch 
society, was common practice.70 
Private traders eager to turn a quick profit and return to Europe were even less likely to 
abide by colonial regulations. While some families might have resorted to illegal measures in 
times of need, itinerant traders disinterested in settling permanently in the New World felt less 
inclined to obey local regulations that protected the security of the New Netherland. As a result, 
lifting the monopsony in 1639 not only caused an upsurge in private traders, but an equal spike 
in illicit trading. Smuggling remained a continuous problem through the entirety of the colony’s 
duration. The high demands and profitability of selling guns, powder, and shot enticed private 
traders. Although legal ordinances made participation in the contraband trade punishable by 
death, the WIC appears to have been lenient on the issue. Adopting the same policies used to 
deal with matters of religious tolerance, the Directors encouraged Stuyvesant to “take good care 
that through this winking no more ammunition be sold than each one had need of for 
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protection.”71 These ordinances were continually renewed to no avail.72 Private traders continued 
smuggling contraband to the Indians, and colonial magistrates lacked the means of stopping 
them. Even then, not all those who were caught were necessarily punished.73  
Two distinct classes of merchants developed in New Netherland in the 1640s: major and 
minor. The major merchants were generally permanent residents, and demonstrated interests in 
climbing the social rankings with large amounts of capital and family connections. The minor 
merchants, otherwise known as the Scotch merchants that frequently drew the ire of Kiliaen van 
Rensselaer, were seasonal.74 Often independent, these merchants made voyages to New 
Netherland on private loans known as bottomry bonds.75 These traders, crucially, did not 
typically own places of residence in the colony, and therefore have traditionally been understood 
as apathetic to the local ordinances prohibiting the vending of firearms or liquor. Discussions of 
smuggling, as a result, usually focus around them. As we shall see however, merchants well-
grounded in the affairs of New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck were also heavily involved.76 
Petrus Stuyvesant would do his best to put an end to the clandestine trade in arms following his 
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assumption to the position of Director-General of New Netherland in 1647. As he soon 
discovered though, the private trade in gunpowder had already taken a life of its own.  
 Stuyvesant’s crackdown on the illicit trade began in May 1648, the fiscal of New 
Netherland, Hendrick van Dyck uncovered a major smuggling operation and arrested Jacob 
Reynsen for “selling gunpowder, lead and shot to the Indians.”77 The court proceedings reveal a 
tremendous amount of information regarding Reynsen’s network connections, activities, and 
eventual sentencing paint a vivid picture of the inability or unwillingness of colonial officials to 
fully suppress illicit trading networks. Reynsen was convicted on two charges: buying guns, gun 
barrels, and locks from the company smith and corporal, Barent Ennesz van Noorden, and 
subsequently sending these arms along with powder and lead to Fort Orange where his partner, 
Jacob Schermerhoorn, sold them to the Indians.”78 The gunpowder consisted of 70 pounds 
brought over from Holland with him in prune barrels, and an additional 75 pounds purchased 
from Egbert van Borsum and Abraham Willemsz.79 Reynsen admitted to smuggling lead into 
New Amsterdam himself by casting overboard a watertight cask containing ten staves of lead to 
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a location he later returned to fish it out undetected.80 This case involving Reynsen and 
Schermerhoorn provides not only the most revealing example of smuggling operations in New 
Netherland, but also of the company’s response. Reynsen, Schermerhoorn, and others were 
found guilty of smuggling and illicit trading, the consequences of which being that “the 
Christians are weakened and the barbarians strengthened.”81 Yet, their actions went unpunished. 
 Several aspects of the official response to this particular smuggling case are telling of 
how the colonial government lacked the necessary means of curbing the contraband trade. First, 
the colonial government seemed disinterested in pursuing the maximum penalties, namely 
execution, for their prisoners. Although the crimes of Reynsen and Schermerhoorn were 
punishable by death, Stuyvesant, “considering the petition and recommendation of several honest 
persons and Inhabitants of this place and the former good behavior of the offenders,”  opted to 
moderate the sentence.82 Instead, “to punish them as an example to others,” he ordered the 
confiscation of their goods and a five year banishment from the colony to begin on the next ship 
out.83 As for van Noorden, he was sentenced to house arrest inside the smith shop for one year in 
order to compensate the value of the total goods sold as company property. He too avoided 
execution, but on the pretense of being a first-time offender.84 By August 1st, a petition among 
the colonists successfully prompted the remission of Reynsen’s and Schermerhoorn’s 
                                                 
80
 See Reynsen’s confession, NNCM 4: 530, and 532 where it is noted his operation goes back to March 1647.  
81
 NNCM 4: 535. No specific Indian groups are mentioned in any of the documents pertaining to this case 
suggesting perhaps Reynsen and Schermerhoorn traded indiscriminately, but also the availability of arms at Fort 
Orange for any Native American groups with access.  
82
 Stuyvesant references Kieft’s ordinance of February 23, 1645: NNCM 4: 533, on the ordinance, which references 
the troubling amount of powder among the Indians and complaints of the king of France regarding the trade, see 
O’Callaghan, NNLO, 47.  
83
 Done on July 9, 1648: NNCM 4: 533-534.  
84
 July 9, 1648: NNCM 4: 534-535.  
  84 
banishment. Their exile null and void, Stuyvesant resolved to “declare them henceforth capable 
of going, coming and returning here as other respectable persons are permitted to do.”85 Despite 
the gravity a punishment of banishment carried, leniency prevailed. For better or worse, Jacob 
Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn were free men again. 
 Broader measures to curb smuggling were equally ineffective. Upon learning of 
Reynsen’s method of casting off contraband goods into the bay, the company immediately 
responded by stationing a vessel, De Liefde, under the command of the naval store guard on 
board at Sandy Hook to monitor and convoy incoming ships from patria.86 Interestingly, this was 
done “without written resolution adopted by all the members of the council, in order that it might 
proceed more secretly.”87 The presence of Govert Loockermans on the Council of Nine bound 
Stuyvesant against making his intentions known.88 Stuyvesant hoped to gather closer 
observations of the operations of Govert Loockermans and his ship, De Valckenier.89 The 
targeting of Loockermans suggests his influence on the affairs of Reynsen and Schermerhoorn. It 
is possible Reynsen’s tactics of hiding watertight crates of contraband goods into the bay may 
have been a well-established practice within Loockerman’s circle. If or how long the plan was 
carried out however, is not known. A report from August 15 notes De Liefde was in desperate 
need of repair and prone to heavy leakage. Lacking the materials and carpenters to repair the 
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vessel and replenish its provisions, Stuyvesant and Council resolved to sell the ship with the 
intent to dismantle it for parts if no buyer could be found.90  These were troubling times for the 
Dutch colony. A decaying infrastructure and stagnant population contributed little to prevent the 
continued seepage of munitions to their potential enemies.  
To make matters worse, the root of Reynsen’s smuggling activities went to an English 
owned ship. The St. Beninjo, while captained by the Dutch skipper Snoy, was owned by 
Englishman William Westerhouse. The ordeal with Westerhouse’s ship became the point of 
contention over Stuyvesant’s push for the Hartford Treaty. Both the Dutch and English argued 
over the jurisdiction of the St. Beninjo. As Stuyvesant understood the scenario, Westerhouse 
sailed into New Netherland territory with the intent to trade goods, contraband or otherwise, 
without paying company fees. Controlling English traders like Westerhouse would help put 
down Dutch smuggling.91 
 Before Loockermans emerged as a prominent schepen of New Amsterdam, he was a low 
ranking cook from Turnhout, Brabant.92 Like many of the other powerful merchant class of the 
1650s, he used his ties to trading to strengthen his personal position in the wake of the colony’s 
population boom during those years as traders flooded the countryside.93 He made most of his 
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success trading around Fort Orange and the Delaware River.94 It is possible he entered the 
contraband trade through his connection to Van Twiller, another thorn in the side of the WIC 
who was caught shipping gunpowder out of the United Provinces in 1653.95 His involvement in 
the fur trade goes unquestioned, but his illicit work in the contraband trade is less well known. 
Both the English and Swedes were growing agitated with Loockermans’ dealings.  
 There is irony to the chaos of 1648. Amidst the efforts of the magistracy to cut down on 
the contraband smugglers and traders, the official Company trade in guns, powder, and lead 
continued. Just a couple months prior to Jacob Reynsen’s arrest, Stuyvesant received orders from 
the Directors to continue selling powder to the Indians while enforcing the contraband 
restrictions.96 The Directors, weary of more conflict with the natives in the wake of the 
disastrous Kieft’s War, urged Stuyvesant to continue the detrimental trade. They feared the war 
enabled the surrounding Indian groups to become “conscious of their strength,” and 
consequently more anxious to provide themselves with muskets, powder, and lead.” Company 
officials–growing increasingly paranoid of their Munsee neighbors–often saw through Indian 
requests for munitions veiled by a need for hunting, but nonetheless resolved to maintain a 
secretive trade so to pacify any ill-will. Not wanting to quell their anger further, the Directors 
explain, “we perceive them to be so extremely eager, that we fear, they would rather begin a new 
war against us, than be entirely deprived of these articles.” They ordered Stuyvesant to supply 
the Indians “sparingly” given the present situation of the colony rendered a new war “wholly 
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unadvisable.”97 He would do so only through the Company officers whilst simultaneously 
preventing private trading. One wonders how Stuyvesant perceived these directions. How could 
his employers expect him to maintain an official contraband trade with the Indians while 
simultaneously denying colonists the rights and benefits of the same? Smuggling was a rampant 
problem in the colony, and Stuyvesant lacked the resources to stop the main contributors. With 
hope of curbing the contraband trade, Stuyvesant renewed the ordinance of 1645, “relative to the 
trade In powder and lead.”98 As for the official Company trade however, Stuyvesant’s options 
were limited. As the English rightly put it, the Mohawks were indeed growing bolder. Their 
ascendancy, fueled by Dutch gunpowder, would mean increased demand for contraband goods.  
 
Appeasement  
Indeed, the period from roughly 1648 through the 1650’s saw a substantial rise in 
Mohawk prowess and reach. Previous Iroquois historians have regarded this period as 
destructive and shaped by indiscriminate violence directed by need for beavers and captives.99 
Parmenter, however, asserts Iroquoian rampages into Wendake drew upon ancient principles. 
Faced with the challenges of substantial population loss combined with now established 
                                                 
97
 All quotes from “Letter from the Directors in Holland to Peter Stuyvesant; the ship “Princess” lost with Dir. Kieft 
and Domine Bogardus on Board; lenient policy towards the Indians Recommended; trade with South America; 
church matters; Governor Forrester of Long Island.” Dated April 7, 1648. DRCHNY 14: 83. The same letter also 
warns Stuyvesant against trading with traders and ships from other Departments of the Company other than 
Amsterdam whom are noted to not have invested in New Netherland and therefore do not deserve its benefits of 
trade. Cornelis Claeson Snoo, skipper of the Hercules, also known as the St. Beninjo (aforementioned), is mentioned 
specifically here as a “cheat and smuggler.” The association between the ship names is made known in a report in 
NNCM 4: 432. 
98
 Referring to Kieft’s ordinance of February 23, 1648; August 19, 1648; NNCM 4: 556.  
99
 White, The Middle Ground, 1-10; Snow, The Iroquois, 114-119; Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 84-
112; Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 61-68.  
  88 
European settler groups within the Iroquoian spatial domain, the Haudenosaunee underwent a 
soft reset.100 The Wendats maintained a pivotal role in this process. Apart from the potential 
benefits of captives, the longstanding rivalry with the Wendats made absorbing Wendake into 
Iroquoia an accomplishment of intense, symbolic power. This extension of the longhouse 
remained crucial to the “requickening” process that began to unfold after 1650.101 That the 
Iroquois could also land a disruptive blow to French operations in Canada in the process was an 
added bonus.  
Gunpowder featured centrally to the Iroquoian designs of renewal in these years. The 
means by which they could have planned to undertake campaigns as far as Iowa rested heavily 
on a trusted source for additional munitions. Historians have done well to grasp the Iroquois 
perspective in these developments. Silverman correctly discerns the heavy influence firearms left 
on Iroquois military power in Wendake and elsewhere.102 Moreover, Benjamin Schmidt and Jon 
Parmenter have respectively emphasized the significances of cartographic knowledge and 
conceptions of space among the Haudenosaunee.103 Knowledge of their surrounding terrain and 
peoples proved just as important as guns themselves. Expanding their geographical reach 
brought the benefit of new hunting grounds that could produce additional beavers and sustain 
growing populations.104 The Dutch had little say in how the Mohawks and their brethren used the 
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munitions they acquired. Far less so, could they say no when the Mohawks returned looking for 
more.  
The Mohawks had their own reasons for arming themselves. Peace negotiations with the 
French continued to stagnate in the years following Kiotsaeton’s speech in 1645. Following 
another failed missionary expedition that cost Father Jogues his life in 1646, and numerous 
attempts to convince the Wendats to turn against the French, the Mohawks settled on a more 
aggressive strategy that would cut off all ties between New France and Ahnowahraake.105 This 
strategy quickly took shape following Jogues’s death, with the Mohawks using their intimate 
knowledge of their northern hunting grounds to systematically blockade Algonquin and Wendat 
convoy routes to New France.106 Tensions escalated further the following year, as the Mohawks 
joined forces with the Senecas to inflict direct assaults on Wendake beginning in July 1647.  
Once again, disease was a driving factor. A second surge of smallpox raged across 
Iroquoia in 1646-1647, forcing Haudenosaunee to regroup.107 In June 1646, an unknown Indian 
pregnant woman managed to escape captivity from the Mohawks to Trois-Rivières. In her 
weakened state, starving and unborn child dead, she informed the Jesuits the Mohawks were 
“inflicted with a general malady, which caus[ed] great numbers of them to die.”108 Over the next 
several months, wave after wave of Haudenosaunee warriors, mostly Mohawks and Senecas, 
steadily eroded the edges of Wendake and even Anishinaabeg. Jesuit reports from the 1640s and 
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1650s detail specific attack strategies, generally involving armed Haudenosaunee warriors killing 
the men and making off with as many women and children as they could take.109  
The Wendats suffered most, and historians have generally declared Wendake to be utterly 
destroyed by 1650.110 Haudenosaunee war parties led by Mohawks, Senecas, and Onondagas 
continued to pursue the remaining pockets that fled westward into Anishinaabeg. More attacks 
would come in the years that followed, as the Haudenosaunee “shattered” the Petuns, Neutrals, 
and Eries by 1657.111 French contemporaries that attributed the success of the Haudenosaunee to 
their access to guns, gunpowder, and lead were most certainly correct. Crucially, although 
descriptions of these wars provide numerous in-depth examples of Haudenosaunee ingenuity and 
effectiveness in battle, horrified European observed to horrified European onlookers, blamed 
Dutch guns for the damage the Haudenosaunee caused.112 
The Five Nations benefited from these onslaughts in distinct ways. For the Senecas, 
Cayugas, and Onondagas, the attacks effectively cleared out new hunting grounds that expanded 
their source base for food and beavers. The Mohawks, in return, received prisoners and the spoils 
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of war, as well as the reciprocal military aid from their Haudenosaunee brethren against a newly 
forming Franco-Susquehannock alliance.113  
 
Retaliation  
European colonists on all sides of Iroquoia grew increasingly alarmed at the breath of 
Mohawk power. Witnessing the disappearance of the Wendats first hand, French officials found 
it prudent to begin arming the neighboring Indian Nations in New France and northern New 
England. The French took the additional step of extending terms of an alliance with the United 
Colonies in 1650, arguing the Mohawk aggression against the Abenaki and Sokoki would prove 
hazardous to English settlements. Yet the residual fear of Mohawk aggression from the Pequot 
War influenced the English decision to decline the offer.114 Moreover, the United Colonies were 
preoccupied with threats closer to home where relations between the Mohegans and 
Narragansetts began to boil over.115 Countless rumors circulated in English circles of an 
impending Indian attack, with the Dutch supplying the arms. Meanwhile to the south, the 
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Swedish and English in the Delaware Valley and the Chesapeake both took to arming their 
indigenous neighbors as well, especially the Susquehannocks.116 
French, Swedish, and English observers blamed the Dutch for the rise of the Mohawks 
and promptly demanded Stuyvesant to cease and desist the “daingerous liberty” of trading guns, 
powder, and shot to the Indians.117 Stuyvesant acknowledged the concerns of his neighboring 
governors, but as he well knew from his recent attempts to cut off the munitions network of 
Reynsen and Schermerhorn, halting the illicit trade in gunpowder was beyond his control. 
Indeed, Stuyvesant knew well of Govert Loockermans’ contraband network well before governor 
of New Haven, Theophilus Eaton, complained of Loockermans’ selling of “powder, gunnes and 
lead” to the Indians with the intention “to instigate the Indians there against the English.”118 
Stuyvesant stood firm, refusing to concede any knowing of Loockermans’ activities he most 
certainly knew to be true. Dissatisfied with Stuyvesant’s ploy, Governor Eaton fired back with a 
letter that illustrates the remarkable–yet unsettling–underground network Loockermans had 
created. The region “concerning this dangerous trade,” Eaton explains, stretches from “att 
Aurania fort, at Long Island, within the river of Conneticut, att Narrowgansett, and oth[er places 
within the English] jurisdictions.”119 He describes Loockermans’ “crooked and perverse waye,” 
on Long Island as well: “with everie Coate hee would give a pownd of powder, which procured 
him a quicke markett, and soe furnished the Indians, with powder that they could sell to the 
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English.”120 Eaton then goes on to say, “the same Indians further testified, that Govert wisht 
them to Cutt of the English, and the Dutch (to such a worke) would furnish them with peices, 
powder, and shott enough.”121 Stuyvesant had no answer, but he knew eventually, the English 
would.122  
Anglo-Dutch relations rippled over the continued trade to their indigenous neighbors, 
with traders like van Curler and Loockermans standing at its center. Rumors circulated around 
southern New England that the Dutch were conspiring with the Narragansetts against the 
English, using the sloops of private traders to discreetly smuggle munitions into the estuaries of 
Narragansett Bay.123 Although it was later determined most of the rumors had been intentionally 
circulated by Uncas, Loockermans played no small part in giving them added credibility.124 For a 
moment, the English thought they had finally caught Loockermans in May 1648, only to realize 
they had arrested the wrong Govert. Shortly after his arrest, Govert Aertsen appeared before the 
Council in New Amsterdam to request an official document of personal identification that he 
may produce before the United Colonies magistrates to prove he was not in fact Govert 
Loockermans.125 Aertsen had been spending time in Rhode Island “where he was threatened to 
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be put into prison, it being said that he was Loockemans.”126 A Captain Cleroq informed Aertsen 
that Loockermans was already well known in the area for selling powder and lead to the Indians, 
and regarding the misunderstanding, “they would have confiscated his sloop for that reason had 
he been Lookmans.”127 There could be no question Loockermans was causing trouble in all the 
wrong places. Stuyvesant knew the English were looking for reasons to oust the Dutch there, 
which would surely happen if he allowed Loockermans to continue his illicit business.  
 Between the slippery dealings of Loockermans, the rumors of a Narragansett attack, and 
lately the Dutch confiscation of the St. Beninjo in New Haven, the commissioners of the United 
Colonies would tolerate the chaos no longer. In October 1648, Stuyvesant received a scathing 
letter concerning “a daingerous Liberty taken by yours to sell guns, powder and shott, and other 
Instruments of warr to the Indians.”128 The letter reads heavily with concern towards the trade at 
Fort Orange where the Commissioners perceived the Mohawks to becoming more “bould, and 
dareing and may proue daingerous to us all.”129 English aggression was temporarily stalled, 
however, following the death of John Winthrop Sr. in 1649. Winthrop’s death provided a brief 
moment for reconciliation between the English and the Dutch who had become fond of Winthrop 
over the years.130 Stuyvesant made the most of the opportunity. In 1650, he met with the 
governors of the United Colonies to draft a new boundary line between New Netherland and 
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New England. The resultant Hartford Treaty ceded western Long Island to the English, and set a 
new boundary line northward from the coastal town of Stamford.131 New Netherland lost a great 
deal of territory in the deal, but by biting the bullet and formally recognizing New Haven, 
Stuyvesant hoped the English might resolve to respect New Netherland’s boundaries going 
forward. As Andrew Lipman has noted, the treaty negotiations failed to address either English 
encroachment on the Delaware or the illicit arms trade with the Indians, implying Stuyvesant 
likely knew further action would be required to counter English expansion.132 
Indeed, the beginning of the First Anglo-Dutch War in Europe gave Stuyvesant reason to 
believe the end was near. While the conflict never officially reached North America, it doubtless 
influenced the actions of governor Eaton who requested assistance from Cromwell to help 
overtake New Netherland.133 Cromwell approved. In late 1653, the Dutch caught wind of an 
impending invasion orchestrated by Cromwell’s government, prompting the swift construction of 
fortifications in New Amsterdam.134 Fortunately for the Dutch, a prompt peace agreement 
between England and the Dutch Republic would force Cromwell to divert the expedition to the 
French in Acadia. For a moment it seemed the English threat had fizzled out. Stuyvesant made 
the most of the opportunity, redirecting the resources he had compiled to fight the English 
towards New Sweden. Worrisome developments had been unfolding along the Delaware River 
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as well where the Swedes succeeded in capturing Fort Casimir, indefensible for lack of 
gunpowder.135 
 Increased hostility between New Sweden and New Netherland had been brewing for 
some time, particularly over the arms trade. Both the Dutch and Swedes complained of each 
other selling gunpowder to the Susquehannocks as part of concerted efforts to ruin each other’s 
colonial enterprises. In 1648, New Sweden Governor Johan Printz is noted to have “protested 
and complained vociferously” of the operations of Govert Loockermans who had been “highly 
suspected here by many people for contraband trade of guns, powder and lead to the Indians.”136 
The Dutch were quick to accuse Printz of the same.137 It was the taking of the fort and the 
continued disruptions of trade there with the Susquehannocks that encouraged the WIC to 
empower Stuyvesant in dealing with it. Conveniently for Stuyvesant, this special attention only 
came after the loss of Dutch Brazil in January 1654.138 
The Dutch-sponsored Iroquois attacks also drew particular resentment from other native 
groups, especially the Susquehannocks. As allies of the Wendats, the Susquehannocks looked 
upon the rising Iroquois hegemony with particular disdain. Their alliance with the Wendats as 
mutual rivals of the Haudenosaunee caused the Susquehannocks to view “the assault as a direct 
attack on themselves.”139 Seneca and Oneida attacks against the Susquehannocks of the Niagara 
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River Valley and Ontario peninsula directly between 1652 and 1654 forced the Susquehannocks 
to pursue guns, gunpowder, and lead with increased ferocity, but also compelled them to 
reconsider their relationship with the Dutch.140 The Dutch conquest of New Sweden in 1655 
opened up New Netherland to fierce retaliation by the Susquehannocks for having eliminated 
their premier European partner.  
 Like the Haudenosaunee and Susquehannocks, the Dutch too were in a process of 
realignment. Antagonization of Portuguese forces in South America drew attention to Dutch 
Brazil. The First Anglo-Dutch War isolated Dutch forces in Brazil, leaving the colony 
susceptible to Portuguese invasion.141 The surrender of Brazil back to the Portuguese was a 
heavy loss for the WIC, but beneficial for New Netherland. The colony’s new attention came just 
in time. In a bold move, New Sweden’s new governor, Johan Rising captured Fort Casimir that 
May. When asked why the fort gave in without resistance, Commander Bicker predictably 
replied, “there is no powder.”142 By November, Stuyvesant received the permission and 
gunpowder from the Directors to seize New Sweden altogether.143 The takeover of the colony in 
1655 went smoothly, but carried heavy consequences. It appears the Susquehannocks did not 
take kindly to the removal of their premier trading client, and retaliated with a vengeance.144 
 Stuyvesant and New Sweden governor, Johan Printz had been arguing back and forth 
over the continuing trade of guns, gunpowder, and lead to the Indians of the Delaware, 
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particularly the Susquehannocks. The Susquehannocks, the dominant group in the area, relied on 
gunpowder technology to offset the ascendancy of their Mohawk rivals. With New Sweden often 
lacking materials, they turned to the Dutch with the hope of establishing steady trade lines. 
Indeed, a letter sent back to Stuyvesant in September of 1648 concluded the Susquehannocks 
were “very unhappy that this river is not continually stocked with our goods. The Swede 
presently has little merchandise left; consequently, if we had any here, there would be without a 
doubt a favorable trade with the Minquas.”145 Loockermans capitalized on the opportunity. Printz 
had already been complaining of Loockerman’s trade in the area earlier in the year. Although 
Loockermans’ dealings may have been private, Printz interpreted them as actions sanctioned by 
Stuyvesant and the WIC. He complained about Stuyvesant’s “arrogant and unneighborly 
conduct” regarding Stuyvesant’s having “ordered some beavers from the Indians with the 
intention of trading them for some contraband merchandise.”146 Amid the accusations towards 
Loockermans as well as the arrests of Jacob Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn, Stuyvesant 
summarized the intensifying relations between New Netherland, New Sweden, and New Haven 
to the WIC Directors: 
“It is known to me and to all your honors that since our arrival here frequent complaints 
have been received from our neighbors, the English and Swedes, as well as from our 
own subjects, about the altogether too dangerous and prohibited trade in powder, guns 
and lead carried on with the natives, whereby our persons, although we protest our 
innocence before God, are accused and suspected of conniving at this trade, not only by 
our neighbors, the English and Swedes, but also by some of our vassals, and that not 
without some semblance of Justification and reason, because the trade is carried on so 
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generally, in regard to which the fiscal, who by virtue of his office is most concerned 
therein, has become either too lax or blind.”147   
 
Stuyvesant recognized the detrimental effects of a trade he lacked the power to stop. 
Maintaining a flow of arms to the Indians had its benefits in diverting trade, but the results 
were still concerning. The colonial gunpowder trade grew parallel to rising tensions among 
New Netherland’s imperial rivals. Moreover, the problems pertaining to New Sweden were 
of less importance than those of an expanding New England. There, the illicit trading with 
Indians by merchants like Loockermans only seemed to contribute to the growing 
apprehension behind English encroachment into the Dutch colony.  
 Stuyvesant was in the midst of executing a significant ransom while these laws were 
being introduced. On October 17th, 1655, an envoy of fourteen captured “Christians” marched 
into Fort Amsterdam. They were sent by the Achkinkeshaky chief, Pennekeck, who “requested 
that the honorable director general show his faith by sending powder and lead.”148 With hope the 
rest of the prisoners may be turned over, Stuyvesant resolved to send him “two Indian prisoners 
captured by our people, although not of his people, as a present and a little powder and lead.”149 
Unwilling to assume the subordinate role, Stuyvesant thought it necessary to inform Pennekeck 
that prisoners ought to be returned “with the goodness of the heart.” The powder and lead, he 
claimed, were not part of the ransom, but intended as a “token of our good faith, and that only so 
                                                 
147
 June 23, 1648: “Written Proposition submitted to the Officers of the council by the Honorable Director General 
Stuyvesant,” in NNCM 4: 525-527. 
148
 Gehring notes this as a variation of Hackensack; October 16, 1655; NNCM 7: 102. For a detailed discussion on 
Stuyvesant’s relationship with Pennekeck, see Merwick, The Shame and the Sorrow, 125-127.  
149
 NNCM 7: 103. The two Indian captives had Wappinger and Esopus ties, 104.  
  100 
that they do their best with the other sachems to gain the release of the other prisoners.”150 
Stuyvesant assured more powder and lead would be sent upon the return of the rest of the 
prisoners, but only the condition the gunpowder was a gift and not part of a ransom. He tried to 
hold his ground in the negotiations, but nevertheless lacked any power in swaying the pendulum 
his way. However Stuyvesant worded his decisions would not change the troubling power 
dynamics New Netherland shared with the local Indian groups during these years.  
Stuyvesant’s strategy was failing. Responding to Dutch inquiries on the prisoners, 
Pennekeck demanded an additional 75 pounds of powder and 40 bars of lead for the remaining 
28 prisoners.151 Having “seriously considered the hardship of the captured Christians,” 
Stuyvesant and his Council conceded to meet the demanded amounts of powder and lead. 
Moreover, the “demonstrate to them our sincere intentions,” they opted to send “an additional 35 
lbs. of gunpowder and 10 staves of lead over and above the ransom as a gift.”152 Gunpowder 
continued to drain out of the company vaults as New Netherland failed to fulfill a dominant role 
in Ahnowahraake.  
 
Conclusion 
Gunpowder played a crucial role in the cultivation of Indian-European partnerships. In 
response to the volatile changes brought about by European settlement, groups like the Mohawks 
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and Susquehannocks both coveted European clients. Europeans needed furs, and the Indians 
wanted guns. The Susquehannocks in this case, “cultivated Europeans as clients, while some 
Europeans cultivated Native Americans as trading partners.”153 Van Zandt correctly applies this 
framework to understand the reasons for the Susquehannock onslaught of New Amsterdam, and 
takes it further. When viewed collectively, the Mohawk attacks made possible by Dutch 
weaponry suggest the Peach War resulted from a long build-up of Susquehannock resentment 
toward the Dutch who favored the Mohawks–their on-again-off-again enemies–in trade. Beyond 
avenging the end of their Swedish partnership, the Susquehannocks were actively protesting a 
Dutch-Iroquois partnership that threatened their continued existence.154  
The resulting dynamics of the Peach War are telling of how Indians negotiated their 
position with the Dutch around gunpowder. At a time when Stuyvesant’s need for gunpowder 
was critical, he found himself forced to give quantities away as ransom for prisoners captured by 
Munsee groups during and after the Peach War. One residual attack of six Dutch men hunting at 
“Schoorsteenveger’s plantation” resulted in a man’s torso being fully pierced by an arrow. The 
thirty unidentified Indians captured four men and as ransom demanded a wealth of goods 
including “20 double handfuls of gunpowder.”155 These sort of negative consequences from 
private European excursions happened frequently enough by then to call for an ordinance to be 
adopted by the Director-General and Council soon after. Not wanting to continue paying 
ransoms that incentivized the Indians, the ordinance decried, “no person, of whatever capacity he 
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may be, shall henceforward undertake to proceed or to go inland without first having applied for 
and obtained the special consent of the director general or their deputy.”156  
This was the world Arent van Curler and the Mohawks created. By the 1650s, the 
colonial trade in gunpowder had expanded well beyond the means of European control. Private 
traders like van Curler willfully traded munitions to the Mohawks, molding in place a specific 
medium of intercultural exchange colonial governments were forced to abide by. The Mohawks, 
in return, happily absorbed the Dutch into the extended longhouse as brothers both figuratively 
and literally through marriage with Mohawk women. “The Mohawk and Munsee women who 
entered into these few recognized, permanent relationships and their male kinsmen,” Susanah 
Shaw Romney has shown, “sought to access power inherent in the other-than-human quality of 
their odd neighbors,” gunpowder surely among them.157 Just as among the Anishinaabeg, the 
Mohawks sought marital kinship ties to “solidify diplomatic bonds.”158 Van Curler recognized 
the benefits of these cultural exchanges and reaped the rewards. In the 1650s he conceived a 
child with a Mohawk woman, and would eventually receive rich Mohawk land in return.159 
An intimate relationship with the Mohawks had its benefits. While Stuyvesant abhorred 
the illicit munitions trade and the problems it helped create, he nonetheless felt compelled to 
maintain an official supply line of gunpowder to the Mohawks for the security of the colony and 
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preservation of the fur trade. The subsequent rise of the Mohawks, climaxing with the dispersal 
of the Wendats, naturally incurred negative reactions from French, English, Swedish and Native 
neighbors. Indeed, the imperial success of the Mohawks and the expansion of Dutch settlement 
into Beverwijck marked the furthest extent to which the Dutch-Mohawk partnership would 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 





 Following the “usual ringing of the bell,” churchwardens, Nicasius de Sille and Govert 
Loockermans prepared to address the bustling crowd anxiously seeking refuge from the cold 
January air.1 As an order of appreciation for the good fortune that had been bestowed upon New 
Netherland over the course of 1658, the Director-General and Council proclaimed March 13, 
1659 as a day of prayer, and de Sille had been tasked with delivering a speech Stuyvesant had 
written himself just for the occasion. As the bustle of an anxious crowd dropped to a whisper, de 
Sille spoke, bringing Stuyvesant’s words to life from the page. “Honorable and well beloved,” he 
began, “... the good and all merciful God has favoured and blessed this newly rising Province… 
with many and innumerable mercies and benefits.”2 Of these blessings, de Sille recounted the 
agreeable health of the colony, a newfound peace with the neighboring Indians, and the 
“remarkable increase of population and trade.”3 Stuyvesant would soon discover, however, that 
his optimism was sorely misplaced.  
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Two parallel trajectories emerged in the 1660s: the decline of Mohawk power and the 
final descent of New Netherland. After years of warring for captives and beavers in the distant 
corners of Ahnowahraake, the Mohawks finally showed signs of slowing down. The rise of the 
Mohawks in the 1640s and 50s prompted many of their enemies to begin building arsenals of 
their own so that by 1660, the tables had turned. The Susquehannocks had access to guns, 
powder, and lead from English in the Chesapeake as well as Dutch and Swedish traders and 
knew how to play one power off of another.4 The Mohicans and their eastern allies wasted no 
time in acquiring gunpowder weapons either. Aside from the Dutch traders at Fort Orange, 
Silverman speculates Indians of the Upper Connecticut River Valley such as the Pocumtucks, 
Pennecocks, and Sokokis most likely received guns from John Pynchon’s trade post in 
Springfield as well as the French to the north.5 These Indians benefited from connections to New 
France as well, with the Western Abenakis acting as gun runners between French traders and 
their Algonquian speaking allies in New England.6 By acquiring reliable access to gunpowder, 
the Indian rivals of the Mohawks increased in power, putting themselves in a better position to 
fend off military attacks and even coordinate their own against Iroquoia and New Netherland. 
The Dutch, for their part, worried these campaigns would bring about potentially hazardous 
consequences for the colony. Soon enough, retaliatory raids from New England Indians began 
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striking the area around Fort Orange.7 Indeed, the Mohawks would eventually recover from the 
ordeals of the 1660s. Their Dutch brethren would not.8 
New Netherland’s economy continued to give way as the fur trade showed signs of a 
crash. Indian wars around the colony and the decline of the Mohawks and Haudenosaunee 
slowed the incoming stream of pelts while prices skyrocketed as a result of private Dutch, 
English, and French traders. Moreover, New Netherland was once again embroiled in conflicts of 
its own when conflict broke out at Esopus again in 1659 and again in 1663, steadily draining the 
limited resources that remained in the colony as the WIC stumbled towards bankruptcy. Making 
matters worse, the continued encroachment of the English into Oostdorp (Westchester) and Long 
Island seemed to confirm the rumors of preparations for an incoming Anglo invasion.9  
The Mohawk-Dutch partnership had seemingly run its course, no longer capable of 
sustaining the increasing outside pressures of Native American conflicts and European advances. 
Dutch attempts to remain neutral in Mohawk affairs grew increasingly ineffective. In the late 
1650s, Mohawk requests to Fort Orange officials for diplomatic assistance with the French fell 
on deaf ears. La Montagne sent out a small delegation in 1658 to no avail, and subsequent 
requests were ignored.10 The French, too, took a position of neutrality rather than assist in  
resolving the conflict. As Trelease notes, both the Dutch and French were content to let “their 
Indian allies do most of the fighting.”11 Nevertheless, these European strategies of neutrality 
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rarely produced the desired result, with Dutch, French, and English colonial governments 
constantly finding themselves entangled in the contests of their indigenous allies.  
 Observations of animosity among local Indian groups in addition to incoming attacks by 
New England Indians and the Susquehannocks suggest the Dutch may have perceived Mohawk 
vulnerability, and consequently, their own.12 For years now the Mohawks had provided a reliable 
buffer zone for the Dutch, but their waning power did not bode well for the colony, especially 
given the growing resentment neighboring Indian nations and Europeans felt for the Dutch and 
their involvement in the Mohawks’ rise in power. Their fates were intertwined. Iroquois 
recession during these years combined with Dutch instability made New Netherland particularly 
susceptible to an invasion of English and Native forces.  
 Indeed, 1659 was a year of mutual decline for the Dutch and the Mohawks, their 
unsustainable partnership finally showing signs of significant wear from the violent ebb and flow 
of Ahnowahraake. In addition to renewed warfare with the Munsees, by 1659 New Netherland 
and Rensselaerswijck were both inundated in what one historian has described as  a “trinity of 
economic plagues:” the continued devaluation of wampum currency, saturation of the beaver 
market, and a chaotic and unpredictable fur trade waning in the event of the wars that enveloped 
the forests of the province.13 Meanwhile in Iroquoia, the fragile peace between the 
Haudenosaunee and New France broke down yet again. Negotiations once again gave way to the 
combined pressures of internal strife within in the longhouse, botched rescue missions to recover 
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prisoners, and the inability of French Jesuits to abide by the principles of kaswentha.14 Worst of 
all, the iron chain binding the Mohawks and Dutch together was eroding away, unsheltered from 
the hostile climate of Ahnowahraake as their respective pressures pitched both sides against each 
other. After Dutch emissaries failed to assist the Mohawks broker a peace with the French in 
1658, silence fell between then, neither side content with the situation at hand, nor how to use the 
benefit of their relationship with the other to improve it.  
 The Mohawks spoke first. In an extraordinary session at Fort Orange that September, a 
disgruntled Mohawk delegation aired the grievances against the Dutch to an audience of 
important Dutch officials and cultural liaisons including La Montagne, Jeremias van Rensselaer, 
and Arent van Curler.15 Several of the Mohawks’ concerns were critical issues. They reminded 
the Dutch that they “are brothers and that we are joined together in chains,” but complained the 
relationship “lasts only as long as we have beavers.”16 They bemoaned the trade in alcohol, and 
asked that no more brandy be sold to their nation on the grounds that “if we drink ourselves 
drunk, we cannot fight” the French.17 They also repeated past protests against the violent trading 
practices of Dutch boschlopers that continued to harass Mohawk trappers in the woods.18  
Like the French, the Dutch too were guilty of violating the terms of kaswentha in recent 
years. Citing how the Mohawks took it upon themselves to fight the French, the common enemy 
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of their Dutch brethren, they demanded that gunsmiths no longer be permitted to charge Mohawk 
gunmen for repairs and “finish their gunstocks at first opportunity.”19 Anything less would be 
seen as interfering with Mohawk imperial aims, a clear violation of kaswentha. To this end, the 
Mohawks also demanded more gunpowder, and complained that while the French appear to have 
enthusiastically distributed firearms to their neighboring First Nation allies, their Dutch brothers 
only provided guns at a price. The Mohawks appear to have been feeling the effects of this 
change in policy in New France, and demanded both horses and men to repair their palisades and 
help assist in recover captives in New France.20 Lastly, as if to tie the iron knot that bound the 
Mohawks and Dutch together, the Mohawks reminded the Dutch of their duties as fathers in 
Mohawk society, calling upon Dutch widowers of Mohawk women to adhere to the traditional 
mourning practice of giving “the relatives of the deceased one or two suits of cloth.”21 This 
poignant clause, an indicator of the “increasing interpersonal bonds between the Mohawks and 
Dutch settlers, reminded the Dutch their relationship had become more intimate than they might 
have liked to believe.22 “You need not present us with any return,” concluded the Mohawks, 
effectively challenging the Dutch to deliver on their promises with more than paltry gifts.23 
An untimely fever prevented Stuyvesant from personally addressing the Mohawks’ 
concerns, invoking the need for a special council of leading cultural liaisons to trek into Mohawk 
country to make amends. Carrying gifts of wampum and gunpowder, van Curler and Jeremias 
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van Rensselaer led the Dutch embassy into the Mohawk castle, Kaghnuwage, ready to renew 
their “old friendship and brotherhood.”24 Following the established model of diplomacy dictated 
from countless Mohawk orations at past gatherings, the Dutch emissaries wasted little time 
before recounting their shared history to their audience that included the three principal sachems 
of the Mohawks. Drawing from van Curler’s agreement with the Mohawks in 1643, the 
emissaries–likely van Curler himself– reminded their Mohawk brethren “it is now sixteen years 
ago that we made our first treaty of friendship and brotherhood between you and all the Dutch,  
which we then joined together with an iron chain.”25 The Mohawks, the Dutch assured, had “no 
reason to doubt that we shall remain brothers,” and to this end the Dutch bestowed upon the 
Mohawks sachems a hefty gift including 75 pounds of gunpowder and 100 pounds of lead.26 
Shortly after these gifts “were gratefully accepted by the chiefs and all the bystanders,” however, 
celebrations were abruptly cut short by news of trouble in Esopus. The Dutch might have 
restored relations with the Mohawks, but they were not out of the woods yet. 
 
Trouble in Paradise  
Hostilities between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians dated back as far as 1653. 
Encouraged by a new peace between the Five Nations and New France, a new wave of colonists 
swarmed into the area. The increased pressure for limited fertile land left the Esopus in a tough 
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position, already strained by the Mohawks and Mohicans who frequently called upon them from 
tribute, usually in the form of corn.27 As pressure mounted on both sides, Dutch settlers worried 
about potential Esopus raids, especially after learning of Esopus involvement in the Peace War. 
Meanwhile, the Esopus exhibited little trust in the new settlers, based on their previous 
experiences with Fort Orange traders that often left them drunk.28 The tense relations prompted 
Stuyvesant to begin constructing a fort there along Rondout Creek that became known as 
Wiltwijck (present-day Kingston).29 His journal makes various notes of the construction process 
and its deficiency of resources including the lack of gunpowder.30 Thankfully for its inhabitants, 
a slender 50 pounds of gunpowder arrived in May of 1659, just enough to ward off the 500 men 
siege in September.31 Relations improved slightly in October when a small box of powder was 
included in a trade with some Esopus, to which they decided the Dutch were “well-intentioned” 
and promised to “come henceforth every day with Indian corn.”32 
Under the impression that a permanent peace with the Esopus would be impossible so 
long as Indians and colonists continued to share the limited fertile land, the Directors expected 
Stuyvesant to drive the Esopus out for good, and implored him to enlist the help of the Mohawks 
to do so. Stuyvesant might have agreed, but he feared the repercussions of asking the Mohawks 
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to assist in what he perceived would have been an easy task for them. In Stuyvesant’s eyes, the 
continued military success of the Mohawks in recent years rendered them an unpredictable ally, 
“a self-exulting, arrogant, and bold tribe made too haughty through their continuous victories.”33 
Indeed, after repeated successes by the Mohawks against the French themselves and their allies, 
Stuyvesant feared a decisive Mohawk victory against the Esopus might reduce the Dutch 
position in the partnership, thereby justifying continued taunting from Mohawk warriors, and a 
perceived vulnerability from other Indian nations. Stuyvesant desperately needed the help of the 
Mohawks, but he wisely perceived the image which the Dutch had made for themselves among 
the Mohawks’ many enemies. Stuyvesant knew his colony was vulnerable, and beyond repeated 
demands for munitions and soldiers, there was in fact little he could do about it.34  
 In the interim, Stuyvesant’s directions to Wiltwijck to appease the Esopus with small 
gifts of powder did little to improve relations in Esopus.35 Strangely, the officials at Fort Orange 
appear to have lost hope of peace with the Esopus, and declined Mohican offers to mediate the 
conflict on the grounds that the Esopus sachems were less inclined to meet at Fort Orange 
themselves. In frustration, the Mohicans washed their hands of the matter. They warned the 
Dutch, “must not be angry with them, if it should happen, that the Esopus savages were to injure 
or capture some Dutchmen along the river and near Fort Orange.”36 Nevertheless, Stuyvesant’s 
strategy of coercion proved successful–at least temporarily– in forcing the Esopus into a peace 
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treaty in 1660. In contrast, Paul Otto has argued the Esopus may have been pushed for peace by 
other Indian groups including the Hackensacks, Wappingers, Mohicans, Susquehannocks, and 
Catskills; the Mohawks were also involved.37 He explains the Esopus decision to give in as part 
of a larger transition of smaller Hudson Valley and Delaware groups who began to willfully–or 
reluctantly–accept Dutch presence in the area.38 For Stuyvesant, a lasting peace would provide 
the opportunity to act upon encroaching English settlers in the area, but in the end, it would not 
last.39 
 The peace treaty of 1660 failed to address the discrepancies between Dutch settlers and 
the Esopus. For one, the forced submission of the Esopus into a peace did little to erase the long-
standing animosity Esopus Indians had for their Dutch neighbors. These feelings were amplified 
by heavy alcohol consumption, especially during times of stress such as the formation of a 
second Dutch settlement at Nieuwdorp (present-day Hurley). Lastly, the Dutch retained many of 
their Esopus captives were “employed” with the slaves on Curaçao. Their reasoning was as 
follows:  
“...to release them, would not only tend to create disregard and contempt of our nation 
among neighbors as well as our own subjects, but also the neighboring barbarians and 
especially the Esopus savages would glory in it, as if they inspired such great awe to 
our people, that we were afraid to rouse their anger and that we had no courage, to treat, 
according to their merits and as an example for others, the prisoners, among whom 
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there are some, who have dared to murder our people, captured by them, in cool blood 
and with unheard cruelty.”40 
 
Even if Stuyvesant had returned the prisoners, it remains possible that violence was unavoidable. 
Against the advice of Stuyvesant, settlers branched out from Wiltwijck to establish a new town, 
Nieuwdorp in 1662, angering the Esopus.41 War would break out again a year later in a 
coordinated attack, adding further damage to the economically crippled colony. 
 The rapid depopulation of beavers in Iroquoia and recurrent Indian Wars that prevented 
the Mohawks from hunting elsewhere forced the fur trade into a steady decline after 1657. As 
historian William Cronon has noted, the commodification of beavers and wampum drastically 
altered Native American systems of hunting and honor. “Certain things began to have prices 
[sic] that had not had them before,” Cronon continues, “one could buy personal prestige by 
killing animals and exchanging their skins for wampum or high-status European goods.”42 
Indians of the Upper Connecticut River Valley where beaver populations still persisted, for 
instance, no longer hunted beavers on the basis of need only.43 Instead, these Indian nations 
including the Abenaki, Sokoki, Penacooks, Pocumtucks, and Mohicans benefitted from trapping 
as many beavers as possible. Pelts in hand, these Indian trappers could then exchange their skins 
in flourishing trade centers such as John Pynchon’s estate in Springfield where Indians of 
Southern New England gathered with wampum, while John Pynchon and Haudenosaunee traders 
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carried English and Dutch goods.44 Some historians have speculated this decline in trade resulted 
from the diversion of trade to Pynchon’s enterprise in the Connecticut River Valley which was 
on the rise after local beaver populations in Southern New England withered away.45 
 The Pynchon family had been successfully diverting the flow of Mohawk and Mohican 
pelts from Dutch hands since the 1630s.46 Springfield’s location on the Connecticut River, “upon 
the great Indian trail leading from the Narraganset and Pequot country, via the Westfleld river, to 
the Mohawk country above Albany [Fort Orange],” allowed John Pynchon to tap directly into 
preexisting indigenous trade routes, making his post an ideal stoppage point for Indian caravans 
of wampum or beaver pelts.47 Like van Curler, Pynchon also exhibited the qualities necessary to 
host cross-cultural encounters, making himself an influential representative of the English in the 
forests of Ahnowahraake. Indeed, much as the Mohawks referred to the Dutch as “Corlaer’s 
men,” the people of New England were subsequently known by the Mohawks as “Pynchon’s 
men.”48 The Mohawks held Pynchon in high regard, and it is no coincidence that when they 
delivered the head of Sassacus to the English in 1637, it was directly to Pynchon’s doorstep.49 
Pynchon’s business remained a significant threat to the Dutch fur trade, who blamed Pynchon for 
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having caused the fur trade to be “much damnified and undervalued not onely to the Inriching 
the said Native barbarians but the overthrow of the trade.”50  
 Despite these supposed successes, the dwindling fur trade in Connecticut drove John 
Pynchon to further into New Netherland. In 1659, he formed a new company with the powerful 
English merchants William Hawthorne and William Paine designed to develop new fur trade 
connections to the west.51 Together, Hawthorne and Pynchon conducted an exploratory survey of 
the Hudson Valley, hoping to find a sufficient place of operations for the new venture. 
Convening with the town officials at Beverwijck, the two requested permission to establish a 
new post near Wappingers’ kill, offering in return the alluring prospect of a new place to obtain 
English cattle which Dutch settlers had a particular affinity for.52 Recalling how the Wappinger 
Indians aligned themselves with the Esopus, and their particular hostility during and after the 
Peach War, Stuyvesant knew potential collusion with Pynchon was not out of the question.53 He 
later warned the Directors against allowing Pynchon to establish himself in the Hudson Valley 
where he may “cut off our beaver trade, as they had done” in Connecticut.54 
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 By 1660, the lack of local beavers forced a greater dependence on Dutch munitions as 
they expanded into enemy hunting grounds.55 In preparation of a long journey into Canada, a 
Seneca caravan stopped at Fort Orange so to stock up on munitions before entering enemy 
territory. Citing their obligation to capture beavers for their Dutch brothers, the Seneca pleaded: 
“They say, we must work hard to fetch the beavers through the enemy's country, therefore we 
ask, that we may obtain much powder and lead, for if the enemies overpower us, where shall we 
then catch the beavers.”56 Despite the ability of Haudenosaunee war parties to beat back French 
defenses, trapping envoys behind enemy lines were not to be taken lightly.57 French documents 
confirm the desperation of the Haudenosaunee, reporting on the Seneca caravan, 600 strong, that 
“[carried] their Beaver-skins to the Dutch with great inconvenience and by long and perilous 
routes” from beyond Montreal.58 Despite short term success, continued excursions such as these 
wrought disastrous consequences for the Haudenosaunee and Dutch. French colonists and their 
Indian allies alike sought to put an end to the Dutch-harassment of their people. Resentment 
towards the Haudenosaunee-Dutch partnership continued to build.  
 In addition to the faltering beaver trade, New Netherland’s economy also suffered from 
major wampum inflation. Its value decreased by approximately sixty percent between 1641 and 
1658, “and more than 200 percent during the following decade.”59 While the WIC took 
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precautions to regulate the quality of wampum produced for the purposes of trade, company 
officials could not prevent traders such as Pynchon from introducing wampum into New England 
markets, where the shell beads were typically undervalued.60 “Apart from trying to keep the rate 
equal to that of the English colonies by continual devaluation,” Jacobs writes, “few solutions to 
the problem could be found.”61  
This posed a significant dilemma for the Dutch, who needed to maintain wampum’s 
value at manageable levels if the fur trade was to remain economically viable. Unfortunately for 
Europeans, however, no amount of gunpowder or linen possessed the spiritual qualities of 
orenda inherent in wampum. Compounding the issue, the seemingly endless warfare of the 
Mohawks and other Haudenosaunee created the need for an increased reliance on Condolence 
and Adoption ceremonies, facilitating a constant need for new additional wampum, the “conduit 
for rebalancing.”62 Needless to say, the continuous inflation of wampum made it increasingly 
difficult for Dutch bookkeepers to balance the account books of the official company store and 
merchant houses, resulting in money lost for both parties, at a time when economic sustainability 
was especially pertinent. Even one historian has gone so far to argue the economic failure of 
New Netherland reduced the colony to ruin before the English frigates arrived.63 
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As wampum values dropped, beaver pelt prices skyrocketed, drawing great ire among the 
Dutch settlers of the Hudson Valley that relied on the fur trade for income.64 The fur trade 
appeared to be on the rise in Beverwijck in 1656 and 1657, only to fall into sharp decline by 
1659.65 Many colonists blamed their economic misfortunes on the boschlopers, the rugged  
private traders of the woods unafraid to undercut established prices or intimidate their clients 
through the use of force to secure business deals. Usually contracted out by other merchants, 
these “brokers” as they were known, offered a selection of presents to native clients, as a means 
of showcasing the goods available for sale at the patron’s residence in Beverwijck. This system 
allowed the smaller traders of Beverwijck to better compete with the “principal traders” who 
enjoyed a greater degree of trade connections and access to resources which allowed them to 
generally offer better prices and acquire most of the business.66 Many of these principal traders 
felt the boschlopers’ violence towards the Mohawks and disregard for market values threatened 
the fur trade altogether, and in May 1660, petitioned the court of Beverwijck–made up almost 
entirely of principal merchants–to outlaw the use of European brokers.67  According to Jacobs, 
the court compromised with a resolution that forbid the use of both European and Indian brokers, 
but recurrent violations forced an amendment that allowed the use of Indian brokers to 
continue.68 Many Dutch traders continued to violate the law on the pretense of chasing after lost 
horses or collecting blueberries, but the rift in itself among the inhabitants of Beverwijck, as 
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Jacobs notes, demonstrates how the decline of the beaver trade “exerted serious pressure on the 
society.”69 
While order among the Dutch traders devolved into chaos, indigenous conflicts around 
Ahnowahraake continued to impede on the flow of pelts into New Netherland from the outside.70 
By April 1664, a frustrated Stuyvesant blamed the poor state of the fur trade, incurring thousands 
of guilders in expenses, on the continued “the wars which the Maquaes [Mohawks] and 
Sinnekuit [Senecas] wage against the Northern and Canadian [Indians].”71 The looming threat of 
English retaliation made Stuyvesant’s calls for peace all the more dire. The United Colonies 
magistrates had grown increasingly unapologetic over the continued English encroachment into 
New Netherland, and in 1659 incredulously reminded Stuyvesant of the “English territorial 
rights” that extended from “Sea to Sea.”72 
The English Restoration in 1660 added an additional layer of concern for Stuyvesant. 
Without a legitimate charter, Connecticut imperialists seized the opportunity to “encourage 
Charles II to define their colony as they did,” a grandiose design that engulfed Rhode Island, 
New Haven, Long Island, and all of New Netherland.73 In haste, Winthrop, Jr. quickly set about 
planning a visit to London, where he intended to pledge the loyalty of his ‘formerly’ puritan 
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colony to the new king. Perhaps aware of Winthrop’s intentions, Stuyvesant asked him to visit 
New Amsterdam before he crossed the Atlantic.74 
New rumors quickly spread of English settlers negotiating land sales near Wappinger’s 
Kill. “Many hounds are the hare’s death,” Stuyvesant warned the Directors, implying the Dutch 
colony would soon be overrun without bolstering its settler population considerably.75 “As the 
state of affairs in England under the last changes is so uncertain,” Stuyvesant lamented, “it is 
undoubtedly to be feared, that they may send some colonists with cattle there overland, to crawl 
along in time and finally obtain their end.”76 In resolve, Stuyvesant suggested the WIC go to 
such extreme ends as to seek out “homeless Polish, Lithuanian, Prussian, Jutlandish or Flemish 
farmers… easily to be found during this Eastern and Northern war.”77 Under the assumption his 
employers will succeed in finding new colonists, Stuyvesant lays out his plan for settlement in 
the following lines: 
We shall on our side endeavor to provide them with cattle and necessary 
provisions and other means and in order that these people may not be delayed 
upon their arrival here, I hope, if it pleases God to give me life and sufficient 
health, to go there during the coming autumn, view the land and buy it from the 
savages and at the same time look up an opportunity, to make the settlement 
defendable, which with the blessing of God will increase and not only will 
promote civilization and bring safety to the yachts and passengers travelling up 
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and down the river, but will also cause mistrust and terror among the barbarians 
or natives.78 
 
Beneath a thin veil of optimism, Stuyvesant’s plea reveals some of the chronic issues that 
plagued Dutch colonial efforts in Ahnowahraake from the beginning. First and foremost, his 
emphasis on contracting foreigners highlights the perpetual problem for the Dutch West India 
Company of populating their colonies with native Dutch people. Domestically, the United 
Provinces remained blissfully absorbed in the Dutch Golden Age by the mid-seventeenth 
century, including a favorable economic prosperity that left Dutch people little reason to risk 
everything by migrating to the New World.79 Stuyvesant rightly understood, that although 
unlikely, the WIC had a better chance in recruiting refugees from the wars that continued to tear 
through Northern and Eastern Europe.  
This inability to implant dense settlements in the heart of Ahnowahraake directly 
contributed to the colony’s downfall in a number of ways. Unlike the English, New Netherland 
and Rensselaerswijck never attained the same level of settlement growth, producing a strong 
enough polity that could hold its own under the constant pressures of Native American 
geopolitics. Instead, the small settlements that dotted the Hudson, Connecticut, and Delaware 
river valleys quickly fused with the local Indian peoples, producing fragile economic and 
political unity out of which Dutch-Native partnerships became the basis for survival. Moreover, 
as was the case with the Mohawks, the Dutch sometimes entered into these relationships in 
subordinate roles, leaving themselves ultimately tied to strengths of their native partners. In this 
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sense then, the Mohawks were the best Native American ally the Dutch could have had, but it 
was also this connection that led to their downfall.  
Despite the tattered state of affairs in New Netherland and Rensselaerswijck, Arent van 
Curler’s relationship with the Mohawks continued to bear fruit. In April 1661, van Curler–
accompanied by three Mohawk sachems–journeyed down to New Amsterdam where he would 
finalize his purchase of Mohawk land that would ultimately become the town of Schenectady.80  
The plans contradicted Stuyvesant’s attempts to consolidate Dutch settlements, but the expansion 
solved the problems of both the Mohawks and the Dutch of Rensselaerswijck. Rensselaerswijck, 
while small, had steadily become overcrowded over the years resulting in an overabundance of 
settlers sharing a pitiful swath of land that was not necessarily fertile.81 The Mohawks openly 
encouraged van Curler’s plans, drawing Dutch trade connections further into Iroquoia off the 
treacherous paths often stalked by enemy Indians.82 Stuyvesant remained apprehensive, but knew 
the new settlement could help address the need for produce in New Netherland and 
Rensselaerswijck while also drawing the fur trade further away from the English.83 Stuyvesant 
worried, too, that van Curler’s connections might draw the center of the fur trade away from 
Beverwijck and further cripple the colony.84 With the English shadow steadily sprawling over 
New Netherland, however, the ill effects of the new settlement might as well have been mute.  
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The tip of that shadow emerged as the sails of John Winthrop Jr.’s ship pierced the 
horizon of New Amsterdam’s harbor in July 1661. Stuyvesant did his best to conceal the chaos, 
and made sure to welcome Winthrop as a respected head of state, saluting the arrival of 
Winthrop’s ship with a 25-pound discharge of powder.85 Stuyvesant respected Winthrop as a 
friend, but approached their planned meeting with caution. With rumors of a new Anglo-Dutch 
war in the air, Stuyvesant calculated his actions carefully.86 He knew inviting Winthrop to New 
Amsterdam, allowing his English rival two weeks time to take invaluable notes on the city’s 
fortifications and stores, was a risk.87 He also knew Winthrop intended to meet with Charles II in 
order to legitimize Connecticut’s territorial claims. By inviting Winthrop, Stuyvesant hoped to 
confide in Winthrop that he might see the Hartford Treaty ratified by the new king, ending 
officially the threat of an English takeover for good.88 Only time would tell if Stuyvesant’s plea 
worked, but as Lou Roper has shown, Winthrop had no intention of fulfilling Stuyvesant’s 
wishes.89 With Connecticut unable to expand anywhere but west, Stuyvesant knew New 
Netherland could not possibly figure into Winthrop’s greater designs. As Winthrop’s ship  
embarked for England, another 25-pound charge sent him off. Stuyvesant later had the gunner 
record the discharge in a logbook. From that moment on, every documentable use of gunpowder 
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in the colony would be recorded for the inevitable day when Stuyvesant would have to defend 
himself for his actions in the eventual surrender of the colony.90 
 
Iroquoia in Recoil  
 The Mohawks had problems of their own. By the 1660s, the Haudenosaunee longhouse 
had begun to crumble under the pressure of the shifting power dynamics over the last several 
years, pitting the Mohawks against the Onondagas and Senecas at points, as these nations 
developed their own ideas of how to renew themselves in a rapidly changing world. Externally, 
the Mohawk imperial expansion seemingly reached its peak, no longer possessing the distinct 
upper-hand in firearms as they had previously. Indeed, the arming of the indigenous enemies of 
the Haudenosaunee by English and French agents left the Haudenosaunee in a state of recoil. As 
the walls of the longhouse began to crack, the Dutch worst fears quickly became reality.  
 The rise of the Susquehannocks posed significant challenges for the Haudenosaunee. In 
the 1650s, the Susquehannocks suffered at both Dutch and Iroquois hands as the Dutch 
conquered New Sweden and the western Iroquois nations conducted military raids into 
Susquehanna and the Chesapeake. As an Iroquoian people, the Susquehannocks lived under the 
constant threat of Haudenosaunee captivity raids. The Dutch conquest of New Sweden removed 
an integral piece in the Susquehannock’s support system, creating the need to find new suppliers 
of guns, powder, and shot.91 Fortunately for them, as David Silverman has pointed out, “a 
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changing political landscape encouraged rapprochement between the Susquehannocks and 
Maryland.”92  Given the superior strength of the Susquehannocks, “Maryland had concluded that 
it was more politic and profitable to seek alliance with the Susquehannocks through the arms 
trade than to continue trying to resist them.”93 The Susquehannocks made the most of their new 
Atlantic connection, bolstering their defenses with munitions, cannons, and in at least one fort, 
fifty English soldiers that could tutor Susquehannock warriors in the art of siege warfare.94 
Accordingly, this newfound strength so emboldened the Susquehannocks were conducting 
military expeditions deeper into Iroquoia.95 Indeed, by the 1660s the Haudenosaunee became 
increasingly fearful of Susquehannock war parties to the point Iroquois caravans to Fort Orange 
numbered as many as 600 strong.96 
Disagreement among the Five Nations over how to address the ascendance of the 
Susquehannocks temporarily split the longhouse in two. The Senecas wanted to continue fighting 
                                                 
92
 Following the execution of Charles I in England, Maryland Puritans revolted against the Proprietary government, 
installing a Protestant government that last until 1658. Many of the political leaders in this movement happened to 
have close ties to William Claiborne, a former munitions supplier and ally of the Susquehannocks. Silverman, 
Thundersticks, 42; Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations; 117-119, 133-137, 174-175; Bailyn, The Barbarous Years, 
154-161. Interestingly, Claiborne established a base of operation on Palmer’s Island, not far from where the itinerant 
Dutch trader of many names, Jacob Claeson (or Young), was also peddling guns to Susquehannock fur trappers. 
Silverman, Thundersticks, 42; Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations, 130-132. For more on Claeson who Stuyvesant 
worried might assist in an English invasion of New Netherland from the south, see DRCHNY 12: 317; Francis 
Jennings, “Jacob Young: Indian Trader and Interpreter, in Struggle and Survival in Colonial America, eds. David G. 
Sweet and Gary B. Nash (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 347-361; see also, to quote Jennings 
therein, the “index references to “Young, Jacob” in that exasperating grab-bag of comprehensiveness, confusion, 
and ethnocentrism:” Charles H. Hanna, The Wilderness Trail, 2 volumes. (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 
1911).  
93
 Silverman, Thundersticks, 42-43. 
94
 JR 48: 75; Silverman, Thundersticks, 42.  
95
 Silverman, Thundersticks, 43.  
96
 JR 46: 155; Silverman, Thundersticks, 45; Parmenter, Edge of the Woods, 111.  
  127 
the Susquehannocks while maintaining peace with New France.97 Having enjoyed peaceful 
relations with the Susquehannocks in recent years however, the Mohawks desired the opposite 
and refused to give on the matter despite pleas for help from the Senecas, Cayugas, and 
Onondagas faced with the growing threat of Susquehannock raids into western Iroquoia.98 The 
refusal of the Mohawks to break their peace with the Susquehannocks nearly brought the Five 
Nations into a civil war. Although tensions never came to blows, the threat of a split in the 
longhouse was great enough for a moment to warrant Mohawk requests for Dutch cannons and 
horses to strengthen their forts along with an expedition to the Mohicans to “renew the old 
friendship.”99 Scant documentary evidence leaves relations between the Senecas and Mohawks 
relatively ambiguous in these years, but by 1660 Dutch records suggest that both sides remained 
on edge. In July 1660, Stuyvesant granted the Senecas’ request for gunpowder on the condition 
they “make and keep peace with the Macquaas [Mohawks]” and only “use it against their 
enemies, where they have to bring the beavers from.”100It remains unclear when the Mohawks 
made peace with the Senecas, but their efforts to mediate conflict between the Seneca and 
Susquehannocks were less successful.101 For the time being, the Mohawks could only hope for 
the best. Another deadly bout with smallpox between 1660 and 1662 again created the need for 
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captives.102 Maintaining peaceful relations with the Susquehannocks allowed the Mohawks to 
focus on adoption raids to the north and east.  
Faced with the need for captives, pelts, and wampum, the Mohawks tore eastward 
through Ahnowahraake, stretching as far as Maine and Nova Scotia.103 The dispersal of the 
remaining Iroquoian peoples in Canada and peace with the Susquehannocks left the Mohawks 
with little choice but to begin adopting Algonquian peoples. The Abenaki appear to have been a 
favored target. They had been sporadically assisting the Canadian Indians in battles against the 
Mohawks since the sixteenth century. More recently, the Mohawks detested the Abenaki for 
acting as middlemen between the French and their enemies in the Connecticut River Valley 
including the Mohicans and Sokokis.104 Both Dutch and English officials tried to curb Mohawk 
aggression to no avail. The Europeans reportedly succeeded in drawing a peace agreement 
between the Mohawks and “Northern Indians” in the Spring of 1661, but the Abenaki might not 
have supported the terms.105 Shortly thereafter, Abenaki on the Kennebec slaughtered an armed 
party of Mohawks coming to collect tribute. The Abenaki tortured and killed twenty-nine, 
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leaving one half-scalped survivor with orders to “tell his country men that like ignominy was in 
store for them if they undertook a similar act of molestation.”106  
The Mohawks returned with a vengeance. In March 1662, a fourteen year old Abenaki 
refugee reported to the Jesuits that a Mohawk war party of 200 men had set out on a rampage 
into Abenaki territory, “resolved to return only at the end of two years, after having roamed over 
the entire land.”107 The next month the Mohawks defeated a band of Abenaki on the Kennebec 
River to avenge the deaths of their kin.108 Weeks later, the same Mohawks ambushed close to 
one hundred unsuspecting Abenaki coming to trade along, taking close to eighty captive.109 
Prisoners and booty secured, the Mohawks turned to the horrified English settlers cowering in 
the fort. The sachems reportedly desired to form an alliance with the English there, but no sooner 
did the English provide gifts then the Mohawks killed ten of their cattle and ransacked the 
trading house.110 By the time the Mohawks reached Nova Scotia the English had had enough. 
While the exasperated governors of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts Bay furiously penned off 
letters to Stuyvesant, other representatives met with Mohawk headman to discuss reparations. 
The Mohawks, restating their sole interests in fighting the Northern Indians, rebuffed the 
charges, unconcerned that the English possessed the power to stop them.111 For Stuyvesant, 
however, the writing was on the wall. Governor Sir Thomas Temple’s words echoed through the 
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empty powder kegs: “[if] matters remain as they are, then we are sure, the Maquaes [Mohawks] 
will be shortly attacked by the English neighbors and the savages.”112  
The consequences of hostility towards the French became increasingly more pronounced 
for the Mohawks. Frequent raids against French indigenous allies eroded French reluctance 
against arming the local First Nations to the point that by 1662, French gun merchants finally 
designed their own flintlock model to comparable in portability to Dutch designs. Supplying the 
local natives with guns strengthened the buffer zone between the Iroquois and French, but also 
meant First Nations could better defend themselves. The Mohawks would discover this the hard 
way when a joint military expedition with Oneida warriors succumbed to Ojibwa gunmen along 
Lake Superior, killing most of their party.113 On the part of the French and English, increased 
imperial involvement directly threatened Iroquois power and spatial mobility. The dissemination 
of firearms to French and English indigenous allies levelled the battlefield. “Without the 
advantage in firearms,” Silverman writes, “the Iroquois no longer enjoyed the lopsided victories 
they had come to expect and that were their measure of a successful campaign.”114 As we shall 
see, these circumstances only got worse when the French Crown seized control of the colony the 
following year.115 
The recent defeats pushing the Mohawks to the brink of collapse incurred significant 
consequences for the colonial economy and security of the Dutch. The increasing vulnerability of 
the Mohawks, exacerbated by recent defeats in New England and Anishinaabe, left the door open 
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for retaliatory Indian-European attacks that could prove fatal for colonists or worse engulf the 
colony whole.116 Moreover, without the strength of the Mohawks, the Dutch all of a sudden lost 
their chief bargaining chip with the Munsees at moment when the waters of the Esopus were 
once again percolating with tension.117 Meanwhile, with the WIC on the verge of bankruptcy 
across the Atlantic, the economy of New Netherland rested almost entirely on the fur trade, the 
economic lifeline that depended directly on Mohawk and Haudenosaunee power and influence. 
These were, as Trelease accurately described, the “perils of coexistence.”118 
 
The Fall 
Shortly after sunset on February 5th, a powerful earthquake struck near Quebec, the 
tremor and its aftershocks jolting Ahnowahraake for several days. Strong reverberations 
channeled through St. Lawrence basin and as far as Boston and New Amsterdam. causing 
landslides and levelling buildings in its wake. New France bore the worst of it: “Mountains were 
swallowed up; Forests were changed into great Lakes; Rivers disappeared; Rocks were split, and 
their fragments hurled to the very tops of the tallest trees.”119 Modern studies suggest magnitude 
levels wavered between 7 and 8 on the Richter Scale.120 “All the elements,” wrote one witness, 
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“seemed armed against us, and threatened us with the direst disaster.”121 In New Netherland, the 
ground quivered from Beverwijck to Manhattan. Undoubtedly relieved to have escaped disaster, 
Jeremias van Rensselaer commented, “we had an earthquake which was very strong further 
inland and did a lot of damage to the houses of the French.”122 However fortuitous Dutch 
colonists perceived themselves was soon to be forgotten. The “year of many disasters” was only 
just beginning, and the Dutch would soon find themselves overwhelmed in a whirlwind of 
calamity, so catastrophic that only God could have caused such destruction.123 God’s wrath, it 
turns out, “was kindled against New Netherland.”124 
The worst was yet to come. Early into the spring, extraordinary flooding caused by 
melting freshets upstream inundated the corn fields. At the time, Jeremias van Rensselaer could 
not yet estimate the potential damage done to that year’s harvest, but later events paint a dark 
picture.125 For the Esopus, the timing of the floods could not have been worse, as they continued 
to find themselves pushed farther and farther away from fertile lands by incoming waves of 
Dutch settlers, while their remaining corn mounds frequently fell victim to Dutch livestock.126 
Meanwhile, tensions continued to brew over the illicit alcohol trade, sporadically inciting 
violence between natives and settlers, especially after news had been received that many Esopus 
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prisoners from the last war had been sold into slavery at Curaçao.127 It is also possible the 
Mohawks called upon the Esopus for tribute in the form of wampum or even captives. The 
Esopus fell under increased pressure to preserve their independence in the face of both increased 
Dutch settlement and the Mohawk want of tribute, and eventually caved.  
On June 7, an armed band of Esopus warriors descended upon the unsuspecting Dutch 
settlers at Wiltwijck and Nieuwdorp. “They took a good time to strike,” as most of the men were 
out in the fields, isolated and unarmed.128 In the blink of an eye, the Indians reduced the 
settlement to ruin, killing many of the men, burning the houses, some of which sheltering women 
and children, and plundering whatever goods they could find including ammunition and clothing. 
In total, officials counted 65 settlers to be either dead or captured. Those taken captive included 
one man, Jan Gerritsen, and at least eight women, and twenty-six children.129 Only a fortunate 
shift in the wind kept the entire town from burning to the ground. The massacre initiated a new 
war the Dutch were ill-prepared to fight, especially with the Mohawks “hard pressed and 
surrounded by their enemies.”130 While the Esopus warriors made off with prisoners and booty, 
the Dutch survivors huddled inside the fort, waiting for Stuyvesant and reinforcements.131 
While the Dutch continued to recover from the destruction of the Esopus Wars, both 
England and France made concerted efforts to restructure and strengthen their respective claims 
in Ahnowahraake by 1663. The new regime of Charles II bent under the pressure of Winthrop, 
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Jr., other influential merchants, and even the Duke of York to sponsor a recalibration of English 
America that included the ratification of previously illegitimate charters and the go-ahead to oust 
the Dutch colony.132 Meanwhile across the English Channel, King Louis XIV of France 
proceeded to overhaul the colonial government of New France. After assuming control of the 
colony, Louis XIV relegated its operations to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, one his ministers and “the 
most powerful man in France.”133 Colbert envisioned a new role for New France in a burgeoning 
French Atlantic world. Moreover, Colbert had the power and resources to address the various 
local problems of the colony, the highest being the Mohawks.134 Colbert drafted plans for an 
army of 1,000 French soldiers to be sent to New France to address the problem of the Iroquois, 
but it would take additional years to put the “massive campaign in motion.”135 
By extension, the administrative changes in New England and New France empowered 
their respective Native allies, allowing the enemies of the Mohawks to blockade pathways to 
hunting grounds to the point that “the trade ceases so abruptly that one hardly sees an Indian … 
because the path is not safe for the Indians.”136 The timing could not have been worse, given the 
current strain that wars with the Esopus and the exhaustive campaigns of the Mohawks put on 
Dutch gunpowder stores. The turbulence of Native American conflicts in Ahnowahraake 
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rendered the Dutch woefully ill-prepared for an invasion. While their enemies prepared for a 
massive offensive, both the Dutch and Mohawks were at a point of recoil.  
The threat of an English invasion was quickly becoming a reality.137 The governors of the 
United Colonies had been complaining of the Dutch contraband trade for years. As early as 
1628, Bradford lamented over the empowerment of local Indians by the trade of “peeces, 
powder, and shote, which no laws can restraine, by reasons of ye bassnes of sundry unworthy 
persons, both English, Dutch & French.”138 Evidenced from letters to Stuyvesant from English 
governors in the Chesapeake and New England, complaints of the trade continued through the 
1650s.139 In September 1663, Stuyvesant received his latest complaint from Colonel Temple on 
Nova Scotia, bemoaning of the most recent developments in the war between the Mohawks and 
the Sokokis. Saheda defended the actions of the Mohawks, recalling to the Fort Orange officials 
that he had warned Temple to “not trouble himself between them [the Mohawks] and the 
Northern Indians.”140 In the face of Temple’s request for peace, the Mohawks showed no signs 
of backing down. Moreover, Temple’s letter contained an alarming new development for the 
Mohawks and Dutch. The English were no longer fearful of attacking the Mohawks 
themselves.141 As English encroachment into Oostdorp and Newesingh increased in the 1660s, so 
too did threats of violence.142  
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Convening at Hartford in October, the Dutch representatives reminded the English once 
again of the oft-ignored boundaries set by the Hartford Treaty, but their pleas fell on deaf ears. 
Winthrop, Jr. confided in his guests that Connecticut’s patent honored New Netherland’s 
boundaries, but his plan had already been set in place. Always an adept negotiator, Winthrop 
willfully leveraged his inside knowledge of New England’s government in order to procure a 
royal charter for Connecticut. For the invaluable intel on the United Colonies, Charles II awarded 
Winthrop with a blank map, allowing Winthrop near free rein to decide Connecticut’s western 
borders as he pleased. Stuyvesant continued to hope that a pan-Indian peace might allow him to 
refocus his efforts on negotiations with the English. Reading between the lines of Mohawk bullet 
holes, however, the writing was on the wall.143 
 With Temple’s threats in the back of his mind, Stuyvesant seized the opportunity 
following a sound victory against the Munsees, to call for a general peace in October 1663. More 
rooms had been circulating of a pan-Indian invasion among some of Algonquian nations, and 
Stuyvesant worried the colony might be on its last leg.144 Enclosed with his instructions to 
Lieutenant Couwenhoven on the exchange of prisoners with the Munsees, Stuyvesant informed 
Couwenhoven of intentions to go to Fort Orange “before the winter and speak with the Maquaas 
[Mohawks], to see whether peace can be made between them, the Mahicanders [Mohicans] and 
the Northern Indians, so that each tribe may go quietly hunting beavers.”145 The Mohicans, with 
a heavy emphasis on their sachem, Aepjen, had remained faithful to the Dutch cause to find 
peace with the Esopus, but new evidence had been mounting of a potential Mohican-English 
                                                 
143
 DRCHNY 13: 363-364; Connecticut Records 1: 411-412; Roper, “The Fall of New Netherland,” 680, 687. 
144
 DRCHNY 13: 294, 299, 301-302.  
145
 DRCHNY 13: 302. Trelease, Indian Affairs, 129. 
  137 
alliance, and worse, of their renewed involvement in the wars between the Mohawks and the 
Sokokis. Shortly after receiving Stuyvesant’s orders to arrange peace negotiations, La Montagne 
caught wind of a joint Mohawk-Seneca expedition travelling to fight the Sokokis, that had taken 
a circuitous route above Cohoes Falls to avoid detection by the Dutch or Mohicans.146 La 
Montagne’s return letter dashed any hope of Stuyvesant’s of negotiating a general peace. The 
Mohicans, La Montagne reported, had abruptly abandoned “their land and their corn.”147 Of the 
other Indians around Fort Orange, La Montagne observed “a strange and unheard of disposition,” 
as if the worst was yet to come.  
1663 ended in the same rough fashion in which it began. That December, the Mohawks 
suffered another major defeat to the Sokokis at Fort Hill.148 Before leaving, the war party 
stopped at Fort Orange, likely for munitions, where they told La Montagne the planned 
expedition was a response to a previous defeat that left a number of Mohawks and Senecas dead. 
Evidently, the Mohawks had accepted a peace offering from the Sokoki without consulting the 
Senecas and Onondagas. When the latter pressed the Mohawks to renew hostilities, the 
Mohawks stepped back, reluctant “to storm their castle, for it is strong and cannot be taken by 
us.”149 Ultimately, however, the Mohawks were finally persuaded to join, and they would lose 
the most men in the fight. Sokoki gunmen successfully warded off an early onslaught of 
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Mohawk, Seneca and Onondaga warriors. In desperation, the attackers furnished an improvised 
explosive from a sack of gunpowder that they ignited and hurled over the palisades. The Sokoki 
defenders quickly extinguished the flames. Utterly defeated the Iroquois withdrew, wounded, 
captive-less, and at least 100 men short.150  
The truth was hard to bear, but the Mohawks and their allies no longer held an advantage 
in firepower.151 Moreover, the Mohawks must have been especially frustrated, having lost the 
most men in a conflict they tried to avoid. Stuyvesant knew the defeat was cause for concern. He 
prayed that Fort Orange might “remain unmolested,” by retaliating war parties and realized 
neutrality in the indigenous conflicts was no longer an option. “We can expect only little trade, 
as long as this war between the natives lasts” Stuyvesant concluded, “it would be therefore best 
to pacify them by intervention.”152 
In May of 1664, a general peace was made with the involvement of most of the Hudson 
Valley groups as well as the Mohawks, Mohicans, Hackensacks, and Marsepinghs of Long 
Island.153 The majority of the local Indian groups could no longer afford to protest Dutch 
colonization as they had become entrenched in the European colonial economy by 1664. Their 
connections to these markets via Dutch traders were too vital to risk.154  
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Weakened by disease and short of ammunition, the Mohawks too, begrudgingly settled 
for peace with the New England Indians. In May 1664, a Mohawk delegation accompanied by a 
few Mohicans and two Dutchmen, doubtless eager to see the fur trade resume, journeyed to the 
Pocumtucks with presents and good will. Until the most recent war with the Sokokis, the 
Pocumtucks had long been allies of the Mohawks, mostly as middlemen in the wampum trade 
with the Narragansetts.155 Relations appeared to be restored, but ended abruptly a month later 
when the Pocumtucks murdered a visiting Mohawk delegation in cold blood, a telling moment 
that reveals the change in stature of the Mohawks. Among the dead, Jeremias van Rensselaer 
reported, was Saheda, “much beloved by us and the Indians on account of his knowledge.”156 
Some historians have suggested the Mohicans might have been complicit in the killings, based 
on the ensuing escalation in hostilities between them and the Mohawks.157  
Rumors had already been circulating that the Mohicans and English had joined forces. 
Following Saheda’s death, Jeremias van Rensselaer reported the Mohicans had not only sided 
with the Northern Indians, but had become increasingly aggressive and attacked his farm.158 The 
Mohicans worked alongside the Abenakis to blockade the Mohawks from reaching eastern 
hunting grounds. With the help of English guns, the Algonquians “render[ed] the roads very 
dangerous,” further suppressing the struggling fur trade.159 
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An intriguing report by van Couwenhoven in March 1664 detailed possibilities of 
collusion between Wappinger Indians and the English of Connecticut–almost certainly Pynchon–
who allegedly promised the Wappingers land in Esopus should they help kill the Dutch.160 When 
confronted by Dutch authorities, Wappinger emissaries denied the charges, citing their distrust of 
the English and want of friendship with the Dutch. As the Dutch knew however, the Wappingers 
were allies of the Esopus and remained on the fence through most of the Esopus Wars.161 With 
English encroachment continuing on Long Island and elsewhere, and rumors of a new patent 
looming, Stuyvesant continued to lament to the Directors on their failure to secure the royal 
ratification of the Treaty of Hartford.162 
The Dutch imperial presence as a whole in the Atlantic had been in decline for several 
years and New Netherland felt every blow. The West India Company failed to recover from the 
substantial loss of investment return following the loss of Dutch Brazil in 1654 and many 
speculated the internal structure of the company would eventually lead to financial ruin.163 The 
WIC never attained the level of profit sustained by the VOC and consequently did not receive the 
luxury of state support the VOC regularly received as a “commercial enterprise and war 
maker.”164 The lack of influence over the States General left the WIC constantly wanting of 
resources that could be redirected abroad, rather than on the continent. The power vacuum left by 
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the Spanish de-occupation of the Low Countries left the States General in a tense standoff with 
Louis XIV, who appeared to have his eyes set on the claiming the region for himself. With the 
need for soldiers and munitions in the Dutch Republic, it became increasingly difficult for the 
WIC to send the necessary troops and munitions to New Netherland, a colony of little 
significance at this point in grander Dutch imperial designs.165 The WIC simply could not meet 
Stuyvesant’s perpetual demands for munitions and soldiers. Only two company ships carrying 
munitions–with roughly 800 pounds of gunpowder between them–docked in New Amsterdam in 
1664 when an English invasion was almost guaranteed.166 
 By the 1660s, the Dutch had grown numb to the arms trade that they initially sought to 
prevent in earlier years. After Stuyvesant’s failed attempts to halt the illicit arms trade upon his 
arrival in 1647, the courts hardly regulated the trade other than to repost previous ordinances.167 
Indeed, in the court proceedings in which the West India Company shamelessly chastised 
Stuyvesant for surrendering the colony, the company officials evidenced the open knowledge 
that gunpowder had become the most important good of the fur trade, with private merchants 
taking care to thoroughly provision themselves for the annual trading season.168 Many of these 
merchants sold guns, powder, and lead indiscriminately to Indians regardless of whether or not 
the they were allies or enemies of the colony. During the final war with the Esopus, the enemy 
Indians were free to arm themselves from the flea market of sloops floating on the Hudson.169 
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The Mohawks took advantage of this freelance trade as well, as one Dutch observer noted when 
he observed two Mohawks paddling down the Hudson with an estimated 300 pounds of 
gunpowder and 400 pounds of lead.170 Moreover, although most of the presents given at 
diplomatic meetings usually consisted of gunpowder and lead, by the 1660s, the Dutch appear to 
have been designing firearms specifically for their native partners. As Silverman has pointed out, 
Indian guns took on a lighter design than the European equivalent, clearly adjusted for the long-
distance transportation that necessitated Iroquois warfare and hunting.171 The thought that the 
Dutch embraced the Indian demands is rather unsettling when the effects of the trade on the 
colony’s downfall are considered.  
 New Netherland fell in two different worlds simultaneously. Rumors circulated of 
English and Indian collusion directed at both the Mohawks and Dutch. While the inhabitants of 
New Amsterdam braced for the incoming English fleet, the Dutch settlers in Beverwijck and 
Rensselaerswijck feared an Indian massacre. Evidence suggests the English were instigating 
animosity between the Mohicans and the Dutch and Mohawks, but an attack from the north was 
not out of the question either.172 “Everything is very [uncertain] here,” wrote van Rensselaer, 
“and we do not know which side [misfortune] will strike us, nor what is hanging above our 
heads.”173 In desperation, the colonists beckoned Stuyvesant for help, who wasted no time in 
getting to Fort Orange to investigate matters himself.174 
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 No sooner did Stuyvesant reach Fort Orange than the sails of four English frigates 
appeared over the horizon of present-day New York harbor. Under the command of Sir Richard 
Nicolls, the fleet “disembarked their soldiers about two miles off at Gravesend,” and weighed 
anchor in Nyack, guns trained on Fort Amsterdam.175 To the south, the English settlers of Long 
Island, some of whom having lived under Dutch jurisdiction for years, began forming ranks. To 
the east, Englishmen on foot and horseback were arriving by the day, “hotly bent on plundering 
the place.”176 To top it off, their forces included a concourse of “600 Northern Indians and 150 
French privateers.”177 In haste, Stuyvesant quickly made his way back to New Amsterdam 
whereupon he had a letter penned off to Nicolls to inquire upon his business. Nicolls’ reply came 
the next morning. Stuyvesant would either surrender the fort and colony to the English or face 
“the mysteries of the war.”178 Despite the tendency of historians to mistake Stuyvesant’s 
stubbornness for foolishness, Stuyvesant knew resistance was out of the question. With a 
shortage of men, defenses in disrepair, and only “a slender supply of powder either in the fort or 
in the town,” the Dutch stood no chance against an multinational force that surrounded the fort 
on all sides.179  
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The English had conquered a shell of a colony, a shattered mosaic of imperialists’ dreams 
and economic promises that gave way to the intense geopolitical environment that made 
Ahnowahraake so difficult to survive in. Stuyvesant’s signature on the capitulation papers may 
have surrendered New Netherland to the English, but it was to the constrictive entanglements of 
Native America to which New Netherland fell. Historians have often glossed over the English 
takeover of New Netherland as a quick affair and an inevitable product of English expansion.180 
Instead, we uncover the saga of a desperate colony on the fringe of a declining imperial network, 
poorly provided and unable to escape the torrents of Native American warfare. Stuyvesant’s 
signature, transferred a power to the English, that was never his to give.181  
In late September, a Haudenosaunee embassy led by Canaqueese met with Nicolls and 
George Cartwright at Fort Orange (now Fort Albany) to discuss the regime change. In exchange 
for favorable trade options comparable to those enjoyed by the Dutch and “kaswentha demands 
for the Iroquois right of free trade and for English noninterference in their war with the 
Pocumtucks and Abenakis,” the Iroquois pledged mutual-assistance to future English designs as 
well as intel of England’s newfound territory.182 As many of the Dutch traders, including van 
Curler continued to live in the area, Canaqueese and Mohawks for the time being continued to 
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enjoy their longstanding connection to the world arms market that would propel Mohawk war 
expeditions across the Great Lakes in the subsequent years.183 Formalities aside though, it took 
time for the relations between the Mohawks and English to smooth over. Demonstrated by 
Mohawk demands for future noninterference in their wars with the New England Indians, the 
Mohawks had not forgotten that it was the English that empowered their enemies, and many still 
held the English responsible for Saheda’s death.184 In some ways, the official transfer of power 
had little effect on the affairs of the Mohawks. From their perspective, Richter concluded, 
“things proceeded largely as they had during the final unpleasant years of New Netherland.”185 
 
Conclusion 
 In October 1665, Stuyvesant–now back in the Dutch Republic–appeared before the States 
General to defend his actions in the surrender of New Netherland to the English. The WIC, in 
dire need of support from the States General, needed a scapegoat.186 Stuyvesant, as shown by the 
evidence he personally compiled for his report, was determined not to let it be him.His account, 
the “Report of the Honble Peter Stuyvesant, Late Director-General of New Netherland, on the 
Causes Which Led to the Surrender of that Colony to the English,” illustrates in vivid detail his 
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point of view of the colony’s demise.187 One by one, he listed the reasons that compelled him to 
surrender. First and foremost, Stuyvesant rightly reminded the States General of the 
overwhelming English presence to the east “who numbered fully 50 to our one, continually 
encroaching on lands within established bounds,” further allowed by the “default of the 
Boundary so repeatedly requested.”188 Second, he recalled the “exceedingly detrimental, land 
destroying and people-expelling wars” of the Indians that so reduced the state of the colony that 
upon arrival, Stuyvesant found Fort Amsterdam “resembling more a mole-hill than a fortress, 
without gates, the walls and bastions trodden under foot by men and cattle.”189 Third, that the 
inhabitants of New Netherland lacked “a suitable garrison, as necessity demanded, against the 
deplorable and tragical massacre by the Barbarians, whereby we plunged three times into 
perilous wars.”190 Lastly, “powder and provisions failing… we were necessitated to come to 
terms with the enemy, not through treachery or cowardice… but in consequence of an absolute 
impossibility to defend the fort, much less the city of New Amsterdam, and still less the 
country.”191 With regard to this final point, Stuyvesant estimated the company store in 
gunpowder to be less than 2,000 pounds, and less than 600 pounds of that usable, “the remainder 
old and damaged.”192 
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 Notwithstanding the lucidity with which Stuyvesant paints a long history of neglect in 
this account, there are important pieces missing.193 As we have seen in this chapter, the Dutch 
and the Mohawks suffered their seemingly disparate declines together, their fates permanently 
intertwined after years of symbiotic relations both sides benefited from. Stuyvesant’s defense–
and his employers’ incredulous response to it–narrate a more complicated arch, yielding to 
another world beyond the trees surrounding New Amsterdam on all sides. New Amsterdam 
might have fallen to the English, but Ahnowahraake claimed Fort Orange and Rensselaerswijck, 
where private traders like van Curler always kept sufficient supplies of gunpowder in-store for 
their Mohawk clients.194 How much gunpowder remained in these stores in August of 1664 is 
tough to say. The WIC Directors chastised Stuyvesant for his failure to make use of it, but 
various supplementary depositions suggest the Directors were misinformed.195 Even then, if the 
Dutch traders of Beverwijck and Rensselaerswijck did have sufficient quantities of power, the 
long history of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership suggests the Mohawks were in fact the ones who 
controlled its use.  
 This was the half that has never been told. New Netherland might have fallen to the 
English in 1664, but it was its ties to Ahnowahraake, and the imperial ambitions of the 
Mohawks, that contributed to its ruin most. It was the rise of the Mohawks, not Dutch farmers, 
that drew the particular ire of English, French, and Swedish colonists. It was the Mohawks who 
transformed themselves with Dutch gunpowder, overtaking broad swaths of Ahnowahraake as 
they sought to expand their influence and survive in a world that changed shape with every 
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epidemic and every war. It was with Dutch gunpowder, that Mohawk gunmen made explosive, 
everlasting impacts across eastern North America. All the while what little gunpowder left in the 
company stores in Fort Amsterdam and Fort Orange, sat unused until it was useless. No matter 
how many firearms or pounds of gunpowder or lead the Dutch brought with them to 
Ahnowahraake, it was the Mohawks that Europeans and Indians feared the most.  
  




 Jon Parmenter summarized it best: “Europeans arriving on the periphery of Iroquoia 
during the early seventeenth century found themselves quickly enmeshed in preexisting 
indigenous conflicts ranging from the St. Lawrence River to the Chesapeake Bay.”1 Identifying 
the usefulness of the Dutch arms trade from the start, the Mohawks quickly absorbed the Dutch 
as a trade partner of mutual benefits. The Dutch profited from the fur and contraband trade, while 
the Mohawks took advantage of their access to arms and gunpowder to subjugate their enemies, 
or in the case of the Wendats, force them to disperse. This Mohawk-Dutch partnership attracted 
negative attention from other native groups and European forces until eventually, the tensions 
boiled over into a full-scale invasion. To make matters worse, the WIC, hobbling by this point, 
lacked the resources to help the colony.  
Having traded away the bulk of the powder to the Indians, and expended most of what 
was left in the Esopus Wars, the Dutch were ill-prepared to defend their colony from a takeover. 
And so without a shot–save for the bloody massacre Colonel Richard Carr carried out against the 
inhabitants of Swanendael–New Netherland was transferred into English hands.2 Historians have 
generally characterized Stuyvesant in this event as stubborn, medieval or “authoritarian.”3 Yet, 
reducing Stuyvesant to a flawed leader at the center of a “Shakespearean” tragedy does little in 
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reflecting on who the man truly was.4 Stuyvesant knew far better than to end “things the way 
they ought to end, in good, quenching blood and fire.”5 A close study of the colonial gunpowder 
trade reveals that he lacked the powder to do so. 
 Analysis of the colonial gunpowder trade uncovers several intriguing and important  
themes of colonial development in the Early Modern age of empires. On the one hand, we see 
the gross mismanagement of a finite resource, while on the other, we develop an understanding 
of how Dutch colonizers reacted to the volatile environment dictated by Native American 
competition and European rivalries. How the Dutch operated in New Netherland is better defined 
by the forces that pulled them rather than the ones they controlled. Naturally, their efforts to 
maximize the efficiency of the fur trade resulted in pursuing Indian alliances as mutually 
beneficial partnerships. The Dutch, entering North America as the world leaders in arms trading, 
carried a massive advantage over their European rivals by having internal connections to goods 
the Indians desired. Yet, things fell apart. New Netherland never attained the importance that the 
colonies in the Dutch West Indies or West Africa held. With gunpowder trickling down through 
markets that involved massive quantities going towards continental conflicts, naval wars, more 
important colonies, and even other European powers, New Netherland sat at the bottom of the 
barrel. Perhaps had supply lines to New Netherland been less constricted, the colony may have 
been better supplied with munitions and soldiers. Nevertheless, such was not the case, and the 
colony ended up trading away far more gunpowder than it could afford to lose. Even during the 
war in 1663, Esopus Indians could obtain “whatever powder and lead they wanted,” from the 
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floating flea-market of sloops on the Hudson.6 The Dutch had so little control over their 
situation, two Mohawks could float down the Hudson in a canoe with an estimated 400 pounds 
of lead and 300 pounds of powder as freely as they pleased.7 New Netherland always seemed to 
be a world the Indians controlled. 
 Complicating things further, the Dutch and Iroquois retained differing ideas of how to 
develop their partnership in the wake of expansion. Consider the Hartford Treaty of 1650. 
Stuyvesant pursued the treaty, and persistently pushed his employers for its official ratification in 
order to protect the colony’s borders. He lists this failure of settling the border dispute as a 
predominant factor to the colony’s downfall.8 Stuyvesant conceived the issue in legal boundary 
jargon by which Native Americans did not abide. While he was trying to solidify New 
Netherland’s borders, the Mohawks were trying to expand their spatial outreach without any 
regard for colony lines. When Iroquois war parties entered New England and New France with 
guns, they blamed the Dutch for participating in “a dangerous liberty taken by many of yours in 
selling guns, powder, and shott.”9 Clearly, the Dutch and Iroquois conceived their maps of North 
America in very different ways. These outlooks were too embedded within their respective 
worldviews to be reconciled.10 
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The colony’s trading of gunpowder to the Mohawks as well as their enemies helped 
cultivate a mutual resentment of the Mohawk-Dutch partnership by English, French, Swedish, 
and Native forces. It was under these pressures, combined with the seemingly continuous state of 
war with local Indian groups, that New Netherland collapsed. Its efforts to retain Mohawk 
allegiance set in motion a current of gunpowder dealings that propelled the colony into the 
affairs of a powerful Indian Nation that it neither controlled or trusted. The results were 
disastrous. The dangerous liberty of trading guns, gunpowder, and lead rendered the Dutch 
woefully unprepared for an impending invasion.  
 Some may argue the Dutch were incredibly short-sighted for being so tolerant of a trade 
that put weapons in the hands of their enemies. I would argue however that New Netherland 
officials had little choice in the matter. Stuyvesant, as evidenced by his post-takeover testimony 
in the Hague, demonstrated extensive knowledge of the colony’s shortcomings and problems that 
led to the capitulation.11 Trading away their defensive strength in kegs of powder may not seem 
advisable, but given the circumstances the colony encountered, it may have been the only option. 
The Directors recognized this and thus an official company trade of guns, gunpowder, and lead 
carried on through the life of the colony. Moreover, private traders like Arent van Curler, Jacob 
Reynsen and Jacob Schermerhoorn quickly recognized the lucrative markets available for guns, 
gunpowder, and lead. Colonial magistrates never truly had the tools to stop them. The WIC 
shared the same objectives as the private traders they sought to obstruct, connections and profits. 
The mismanaged affairs of the colony should come as less of a surprise than that a colony run by 
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motley crew of traders and settlers lasted as long in North America as it did. Perhaps gunpowder 
was just as influential in the colony’s successes as in its downfall. 
 Historians of this period, and of Dutch-Indian relations in general, have developed the 
unfortunate tendency to gravitate around the cultures of violence and conflict that tore the colony 
apart.12 With undeniable certainty, analysis of the gunpowder trade solidifies many of their 
claims. Indeed, as David Silverman has profoundly demonstrated, firearms directly contributed 
to the “violent transformation of Native America.”13 Yet, there is a whole other world that this 
study of the gunpowder trade uncovers, one of alliances and accomodation. Through the eyes of 
individuals, both cultural leaders and intercultural brokers, different patterns and themes become 
clearer and more pronounced. Taking the perspective of Saggodryochta or Arent van Curler, we 
begin to see the world they shared in more complex ways than what may be reduced to a frontier 
or borderland. Their worlds overlapped considerably, and historians must continue to work 
towards reconstructing this shared space.14  
     * * * 
For too long, scholars have written the history of North America with their eyes on the 
ground. Middle grounds, divided grounds, and native grounds have now been used at length to 
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describe the intense confluence of entangled histories and borderlands.15 Meanwhile, historians 
facing eastward have turned their backs on the heart of the continent, a whole other world “far 
from centers of European population and power,” where “Indians were more often able to 
determine the form and content of intercultural relations than were their European would-be 
colonizers.”16 Lastly, historians’ efforts to counter outdated narratives of indigenous declension 
and dependence by declaring colonial landscapes new worlds for all may have inadvertently 
glossed over the established strategies by which numerous indigenous adapted to the changes 
wrought by the arrival of Europeans, their trade goods, and diseases.17 Following the trajectory 
set in motion by historians of native grounds and imperial entanglement, Ahnowahraake 
challenges some of these assertions and offers glimpses into a world as seen from within, a 
volatile and highly-contested space dominated by indigenous quests for independence, 
sovereignty, and survival.  
Looking at the continent from above has its advantages, but also limitations. Historians 
have become masters of magnification and de-magnification, yet the lens in use always has a 
center and periphery, producing a vignette with a focus on the center that inevitably blurs the 
edges. As a result, regional studies of the colonial world–including the Great Lakes, Chesapeake, 
Northeast, and Southeast to name a few–commonly fall victim to the analytical vacuum in which 
outside influences blend into the background, blurred into a landscape that is sophisticated, but 
incomplete.  
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In many ways, the development of Atlantic history helped to the address some of these 
issues. In reconnecting Europeans and Africans to their roots on the opposite side of the Atlantic 
rim, historians transformed the history of colonial North America in substantial–even 
paradigmatic–ways. But what of Native Americans? How do their origins, histories, and 
established traditions play into colonial narratives when there is no distant land to reconnect 
them to? North America was their space, their land, their home, their world. As recent works 
focused on the heart of the continent–“intact and unconquered”–have shown, the advent of 
European goods did not immediately change that.18  
With regard to the Haudenosaunee, Richter and Merrell offered profound insight on this 
issue: “Perhaps future research should shift away from the familiar area of Indian relations with 
Europeans and towards contacts, conflicts, and connections among the Five Nations and their 
native neighbors.”19 It is those contacts, conflicts, and connections that make up Ahnowahraake, 
a world that does not disconnect from the Atlantic, but rather connects the vast Indian social 
world of North America to it. We see then in the shared space of Iroquoia and New Netherland, 
among other regions of intercultural exchange, the confluence of two worlds where continent and 
ocean collide. Peering down onto a static landscape, in my view, fails to capture such dynamism, 
the tectonic shifting of peoples, traditions, and ideas that left North America in a constant state of 
change. Rather than looking down, “A Daingerous Liberty” explores Ahnowahraake through the 
individuals and communities that made it. Through the eyes of Saggodryochta and Arent van 
Curler, or Mohawk warriors and Dutch gunrunners, we see the ever-changing web of contacts, 
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conflicts, and connections that made up their world, each of their lives immortalized as links in 
the chain historians continue to “renew” and “make bright.”20 
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